Screen architecture: A phenomenology of dread atmospheres in thriller films. by Abuhassan, Lama
Screen Architecture: 
A Phenomenology of Dread Atmospheres in Thriller Films. 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Lama Bilal Abuhassan 
Bachelor of Architecture, University of Science and Technology, Jordan 
Masters of Architecture, University of Science and Technology, Jordan 
Masters of Fine Arts in Cinematic Arts, Red Sea Institute of Cinematic Arts, 
Jordan 
 
 
Main Supervisor:  Oriel Prizeman  
Second Supervisor:  Ross Garner 
Welsh School of Architecture  
Cardiff University 
September 2018 
 
  
DECLARATION 
This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any 
other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any 
degree or other award.     
 
Signed   Lama B. Abuhassan 
Date:  18th September 2018 
 
STATEMENT 1 
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD  
Signed   Lama B. Abuhassan 
Date:  18th September 2018 
 
STATEMENT 2 
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, 
and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s 
Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are 
acknowledged by explicit references.  The views expressed are my own. 
 
Signed   Lama B. Abuhassan 
Date:  18th September 2018 
 
 
STATEMENT 3: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS 
I hereby give consent for my thesis to be available online in the University’s Open Access 
repository and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by 
the Academic Standards & Quality Committee.  
 
Signed   Lama B. Abuhassan 
Date:  18th September 2018 
  
 
 
 
 
II 
 
  
III 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My PHD was a very different journey from any other journey I have experienced 
before. In the very beginning, it looked like walking in a very long, dark, and 
narrow tunnel. I had no idea how this tunnel ends. I was walking alone and slowly 
waiting to see a glimpse of light, so I can run…I thought I was alone! I didn’t 
realize that I was blessed to have many people walking behind me, pushing me 
to continue walking. Each one of them gave me a special type of power to 
penetrate the tunnel and to break its bricks, until it was totally opened! 
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Oriel Prizeman and Dr. Ross 
Garner, my research supervisors, for their patient guidance, enthusiastic 
encouragement and useful critiques of this research work. 
Special thanks should be given to the phenomenologists Prof. David Seamon, 
Dr. Julian Hanich and Dr. M. Reza Shirazi for their time and effort in advising me 
to have a better vision to upgrade my research. 
I also would like to thank Prof. Steven Kite and Prof. Adam Hardy for their 
continuous advice. My grateful thanks are also extended to the librarians Sarah 
Nicholas, Andrew Blackmore and Erica Swain, and to Katrina Lewis for her 
patience and help over the past years. 
I am particularly grateful for the assistance given by my colleague and friend 
Karam Al-Awad for drawing the 2D and 3D plan of the case study in this thesis. 
My dear husband, Mahmoud Saimeh, the word ‘thank you’ is never enough for 
your support and patience in the last three years. Your push was and is still the 
power that makes me stronger to go on. I will never reach this without you. Along 
with Rahaf, Rand and Yusor, my daughters, you all have been my motivation and 
my target.  
I cannot forget thanking my mom, my mother and father in law and my sisters for 
their emotional and physical support, and encouragement throughout my study. 
I would like to thank all my family and friends in Jordan and in Cardiff. Just 
because you were part of my life, you made it easier to cross all the difficulties. 
Thank you all and may GOD bless all of you. 
 
My dear dad...I wish I can share with you this moment…may GOD bless your 
soul. 
 
 
 
 
  
IV 
 
  
V 
 
Screen Architecture: 
A Phenomenology of Dread Atmospheres in Thriller Films 
 
ABSTRACT 
By looking at thriller films, and establishing their relationship to suspense, my 
thesis examines the construction of dread atmosphere and how it enables the 
viewer to become part of that atmosphere. 
The aim of the thesis is to develop a comprehensive reading of the atmosphere 
of dread by adopting the approach of phenomenology, and through an 
investigation and analysis of its definition of the process of embodiment, in order 
to identify some of the atmospheric corporeal situations in dread spaces that are 
used to increase the corporeality of the viewer, so as to ultimately reveal the 
experience of suspense.  By doing that, this thesis elaborates on Hanich’s 
analysis and description of cinematic dread’s atmosphere.  
The thesis builds a structure of embodiment based on Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception and on the work of other phenomenologists from 
different fields including film, architecture and video games, to create a framework 
whereby the viewer’s embodiment with the screen is understood. In addition, it 
adopts Shīrāzī’s approach of Phenomenal Phenomenology to read a dread 
scene from the Silence of the Lambs phenomenologically. This reading identified 
new atmospheric corporeal situations, named as quasi-things in Griffero’s terms, 
which have not previously been discussed in the context of film under the 
framework of the phenomenology of text, of transparency and of surveillance. 
The research found that any situation that is linked with the senses, such as  
through ‘sensorimotor verbs’ and ‘sensorial transparency’, is experienced more 
corporeally, consciously, affectively, and eventually increases the sense of 
embodiment. The researcher extends the conception of these phenomena by 
means of a horizontal reading of other films to make the observations more 
objective and generalizable to thrillers in general and the dread atmosphere in 
specific.  
The significance of my research lies in making a contribution to the understanding 
of the kinesthetic experience of cinematic space and to promoting its potential in 
theorising related arts such as architecture, Virtual Reality, and video games. 
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NOTE ON DEFINITIONS 
The researcher has followed a specific procedure in writing some jargons and 
expressions; whenever the expression is in Italic, it refers to other theorists, or it 
means to stress on an issue. Whenever the expression is enclosed by ‘single 
quotation mark’, it means that it belongs to the author of this research. 
To make it easier for the reader, Appendix A is provided with glossary for all the 
expressions used in this thesis. 
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  Introduction 
Dread 
It is night outside, when a middle-aged private detective sneaks into a dark old 
house off the beaten track somewhere in the Californian countryside […] man 
slowly and cautiously climbs a flight of stairs, venturing deeper into the eerie 
place. Apart from quiet string music barely anything can be heard, when upstairs 
a door slowly opens, […]. The detective, however, moves on unsuspecting. 
(Hanich 2010 p.155). 
The foregoing paragraph is a description of a scene in Psycho (Hitchcock 1960). 
It is a scene that describes one of the prototypes of fear in film presented by the 
film scholar Julian Hanich (2010). This prototype is called Cinematic Dread. It is 
a scenario that represents a vulnerable character who is slowly and quietly 
entering a dark, forsaken place harboring threat. Hanich considers this form as 
the highest degree of suspense and the strongest level of immersion in film 
because of its role in achievement and sanctification of the spatial, temporal, and 
emotional forms of immersion. (Hanich 2010; Hanich 2014). 
The Researcher’s Personal Interest in Dread 
For the researcher, there were various main reasons behind choosing 
Dread. These are personal interest and curiosity to know more about thrillers. In 
2009, the researcher wrote her master’s thesis about ‘Cinematic Architecture’, 
which mainly concerns architecture expressed in cinema. This thesis opened the 
gate for her to study filmmaking. Working on that subject and thesis opened her 
mind to the idea that architecture as a setting is not the only facet of architecture 
which can create a mood while watching a film, but that architecture of the screen 
can also create affective, corporeal, and memorable experience. 
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During her study for the Masters of Fine Arts degree in Cinematic Acts, the 
researcher wrote a feature thriller film titled Sight. Senses played a pivotal role in 
her film, and much as in the case of any thriller film, the researcher incorporated 
suspense with elements such as the staircase, following Hitchcock who used the 
staircase as a means to create suspense, where “each step advances but also 
delays the denouncement” (Jacobs 2007 p.28). 
What was behind the senses, the staircase, and other thriller elements? How did 
those elements make viewers attached to the edge of their seats?  
Why Thrillers? 
Saricks defines thriller as a plot-centered story that places the characters 
in dangerous situations. It is one of the genres that share elements with the 
adventure, suspense, and mystery genres. But it is distinguished from them in 
the frame of the story, the details, and how the hero or heroine use their skills 
and knowledge to extricate themselves from that dangerous situation (Saricks 
2001). 
The salient characteristic of thrillers is based on suspense. During a 
lecture in Columbia University in 1939, Hitchcock said: “I am a great believer in 
making the audience suffer […] in making the audience play their part. Such 
exquisite torment is one of the key emotional pay-offs that the audience desires 
from participating in the game of suspense” (Hitchcock 1995 p.272). For 
Hitchcock, suspense is a strategy of engagement that facilitates the encountering 
between cinematic narration and the viewer, thus helping in bringing the viewer 
into the film by energizing, mobilizing, and producing desires, wishes, and fears 
(Hitchcock 1995). 
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Suspense then turns the viewer from a passive subject into an active 
participatory one because, according to Krutnik (2013), it entails two integrally-
connected key characteristics. The first characteristic is that it is a state of 
pleasurable anxiety that stirs the nerves, hence resulting in a mode of affect. The 
second characteristic is that it builds up uncertain outcomes that induce tension, 
suspicion, uncertainty, and emotional disturbance to create an affective 
intensification (Krutnik 2013).  
Hanich’s book Cinematic Emotion in Horror Films and Thrillers: The Aesthetic 
Paradox of Pleasurable Fear was a critical reference for the researcher in 
recognizing that phenomenology, as the way of thinking from Hanich’s point of 
view, expresses her (the researcher’s) own way of thinking and analysis of both 
film and architecture. That book marked the beginning of the researcher’s effort 
to dig deeply into phenomenology of dread.  
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Then came the book of Shīrāzī (2013), Towards an Articulated Phenomenological 
Interpretation of Architecture: Phenomenal Phenomenology. His book made the 
researcher realize that phenomenology is the most helpful conceptual and 
methodological approach for both architects and filmmakers to express and 
design a lived experience. Accordingly, phenomenology, in this thesis, is the main 
approach to understanding the essence of cinematic dread in order to look further 
into the construction of the atmosphere of dread. 
Phenomenology and Embodiment 
Phenomenology is a philosophical approach that describes the lived body 
experience and presence of the body in the world. It was founded in the beginning 
of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl. Afterwards, it was expanded by a group 
of his followers, namely, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Social sciences, 
humanities, arts, and architecture use phenomenology to uncover, understand, 
and describe latent aspects of everyday experiences that are hidden beneath 
habits. The experiences people go through when exploring and describing a 
special phenomenon provides a rich description of their lived body experiences. 
According to the phenomenologist Seamon (2007), this makes the phenomenon 
reveal itself to the subject in all its concreteness and particularity. In 
consequence, phenomenology is a very suitable approach to follow for exploring 
and describing the nature of spatial encounter. 
 
The subject, the role of the body, and the subjective experience are the principal 
pivots of phenomenology. Although the process of consciousness has been 
handled early in the 20th century, it was only in the last few years that philosophers 
Introduction 
5 
 
developed a deep philosophy of body and embodiment, specifically after the 
nineties, and built their theories on theories of the phenomenologists. 
Embodiment in research is the process of encountering between the body and 
the physical environment inhabiting particular time and space (McCardell 2001 
p.36; Marin and Leder 2013). 
The phenomenological features of embodiment have received extensive support 
by contemporary biological and neurological research, in addition to psychology, 
film studies, architecture, video games, and Virtual Reality, because this notion 
focuses on the body and on its sensorial and lived experience and because it 
strengthens the relation of the body with the physical environment to create an 
atmosphere.  
The applications of embodiment are many. However, as a new field, it is still 
flexible for researchers to create new modes of representations, especially in the 
interdisciplinary fields where one can combine different phenomenological 
perspectives drawn from differing fields and recruit them to create a different lived 
experience.  
Phenomenology and Embodiment Discourse in Film and Architecture 
Walter Benjamin (2007 [1935]) deliberated on the connection between film 
and architecture in his essay the work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction. He contended that both of them are communicated primarily 
through the tactile realm and suggested that the cinematic space is a powerful 
kinesthetic experience that “hit (s) the spectator like a bullet” (Benjamin 2007) felt 
in the muscles and skin as they are seen by the eyes.  
Many architects supported the connection between film and architecture, 
including Tom Duncan, Noel McCauley, and Nezar AlSayyed, who used the film 
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as a medium for research into, and analysis of, the built environment. However, 
Pallasmaa (1994, 2001, 2007, 2012) is one of few architects who related 
architecture to film and other fields via the role of the body as a locus of 
perception, thought, and consciousness, and the sensory experience in 
articulating, storing, and processing sensory responses. Accordingly, he gave a 
clear account of the crucial phenomenological dimensions of human experience 
in architecture.  
In architecture, Muhammad R. Shīrāzī (2013) conducted a study in an effort to 
illustrate phenomenology through museums, especially the work of Tadao Ando. 
Johnathan Hale (1994, 2012, 2017) and Candice Hiu-Lam Lau (2012) used the 
phenomenological features of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodiment to read how 
people actually perceive their designed environments in architecture and in 
museums. Also the work of Professor François Penz, who believes that the 
moving image provides people with new perceptual equipment to grasp the 
complexity of architectural and urban phenomena.  
In film studies, the philosophy of phenomenology has been used to gain insight 
into embodiment of the spectator with the screen, with a focus on the senses in 
the visual experience. Studies in this domain include the works of Vivian 
Sobchack (1990, 1992), Laura Marks (2000), Tarja Laine (2006), and Paul Elliott 
(2011). Based on a prolonged, in-depth reading of horror films and thrillers, 
Hanich (2010) developed prototypes of experiences to approach the common 
structure of fear. 
Establishment of the link between the two arts (architecture and film) is recent 
and related studies are rare. These two fields of human knowledge and scientific 
research require further multi-disciplinary research to enrich the lived experience 
in both arts and in other related fields.  
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Research Problem 
Julian Hanich (2010) identified five phenomenological cinematic 
prototypes that cover the horror and thriller films. These prototypes are direct 
horror, suggested horror, cinematic shock, cinematic dread, and cinematic terror. 
However, his discussions of interaction of the subject with the object, and, hence, 
the associated conclusions, emanated from a phenomenological point of view, 
not from an embodiment perspective. In his discussion of cinematic dread, he 
described the atmosphere in dread through the filmic space only; he described 
the constricted atmosphere through certain elements such as the low height of a 
ceiling and its role in constricting the characters and through a closet that is used 
for hiding the character(s) inside. His description of constriction was justified by 
the lack of oxygen to breathe, not by the corporeal effect of the settings on both 
the character and the viewer. Such spaces raise questions of why and how they 
create a constricting atmosphere if someone is describing their essence; does a 
low ceiling affect the weight of the body? Does it evoke a cautious movement? 
Does it awaken any sense? Does it tense any muscle(s)? And how is it 
encountered?  
He also looked at the isolating filmic spaces from a wide angle and at the macro 
level, for example, being away from a city or in a situation that makes the 
character alone and away from people. He highlights the phenomenon of isolation 
as it enhances the potential of dread and builds the anxious expectations of the 
future. Hanich proposed the labyrinth as an example of a constricted and isolated 
atmosphere. He proposed different shapes of settings to function as a labyrinth. 
Examples include long corridors and endless corridors. However, he did not 
describe their role of constriction and isolation in creating the atmosphere. Then, 
how is isolation lived? There should be a bodily exchange with the character as 
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the phenomenologist in film studies, Sobchack (1992) declares, to feel it and 
eventually create a constricted atmosphere. 
In another section, Hanich described constricting and isolating atmospheres 
through the weather and daytime. One of his examples was darkness as a 
phenomenon that affects the sense of vision and the lived body as a whole. 
However, he was very brief in describing it and did not tap on its effect of the 
viewer’s engagement with the character, whether it is a sympathy or empathy 
that affects the whole atmosphere. 
Then, he only tapped on few constricted elements in terms of setting, 
architecture, and mood to creating the atmosphere of fear and suspense, not 
constricted atmospheres. Then what is a constricted atmosphere? Griffero’s 
(2014) study of the aesthetics of the atmospheres showed that the atmosphere 
is more than a setting; it is more related to embodiment, to the felt-body, and to 
the internal and external relationships with the world and into a corporeal 
phenomenon that increases the embodiment of the subject than being a setting. 
This thesis will extend and describe the constricted atmosphere through the 
definition of Griffero relating it to phenomenology and New—Phenomenology. 
In other respects, the philosopher Daniel Frampton (2008) criticized the 
lack of examples and illustrations taken from films to apply the various related 
theories to film. Few theorists such as Laine (2006) and Elliott (2011) applied 
theories of phenomenologists to film in an attempt to create new 
phenomenological perspectives. In this regard, Hanich (2010) recommended 
future research to combine theory with practice in thrillers. Consequently, this 
research fills the gap of cinematic dread atmospheres from an embodiment 
perspective and on the basis of a practice-based approach. 
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Desirability of the Research 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive understanding 
of the atmosphere of dread through an investigation and analysis of its process 
of embodiment and identification of some of the atmospheric corporeal situations, 
namely, quasi-things1, in dread spaces that are used in thriller films to increase 
the corporeality of the viewer so as to ultimately reveal the experience of 
suspense. The findings are intended to have relevance to related fields like 
architecture, Virtual Reality, and video games. 
Significance of the Study to Architecture and Related arts  
The significance of this study is embodied in two aspects. The first aspect 
is its wide and potential application to architecture and related arts, and the other 
aspect is its significance to film studies. 
Phenomenology is a flexible science whose focus is describing different 
phenomena. According to Van Manen (2007), it opens up possibilities for 
establishment of creative formative associations among subjects and objects for 
a phenomenology of practice. 
Architecture is a field that assures the spaces and places to be engaged with or 
lived in. Some buildings require pure functionality, e.g., hospitals, schools, and 
libraries. Other buildings require experience, suspense, and stories to be told. 
Examples of such buildings include museums, memorials, and exhibitions. 
Steven Greenberg, who is one of the international museum designers, claims that 
                                            
1 Griffero defines quasi-things as a situational constraint demonstrated by motor 
reactions and traced or suggested by the situation itself, they provide an accessible aesthetic and 
phenomenological account of feelings based on the paradigm of atmospheres. The term created 
originally by Schmitz in 1978, but Griffero extended it (Griffero 2014; Griffero 2017). 
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the museum is a performance space like the theatre in that it requires the same 
kind of thought and perception. He emphasizes the significance of the space to 
be creative, meaning a place of vital engagement; an audience space 
experiencing objects, setting then the building (Hanks et al. 2012). Although he 
states that the space has to be collaborative and to bring a range of creative 
disciplines, he did not describe the process of collaboration engaged in increasing 
the engagement of the user with the space.  
In 2014, Emma Waterton and Jason Dittmer focused on the lived experience in 
museums. They claim that adopting the assemblage theory, which views the 
entities as composed of heterogeneous elements irreducible to their role within 
the larger assemblage to work together in the museum, guarantees creation of 
an affective atmosphere that is responsible for turning the user into a participant, 
like the case in the Australian War Memorial (Waterton and Dittmer 2014). The 
examples of the rooms they proposed in the Australian War Memorial were based 
on dread. They mainly focused on (i) sensory stimuli such as the case in the 
Royal Air Force Bomber Command chamber; (ii) shcok, like the case in the Dust 
Off hall; and (iii) stillness, like the case in the Roll of Honour and the Hall of 
Memory. Their analysis was not more than a description of the spaces with their 
emotional effect. However, they did not describe the phenomenology of the 
atmosphere itself or how it affects the users, in other words, how the body of the 
user is extended in the atmosphere to absorb it and to be part of it. 
Then, understanding the essence of the dread atmosphere, whether it is in film, 
or in a painting, or in a building, can be applied to any setting that requires dread, 
even to Virtual Reality and video games. 
Pallasmaa wrote many books about architecture and its relation to cinema. 
However, his discussions and arguments were general and did not take into 
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account an embodiment perspective. In view of this, this thesis, up to the time of 
its submission, can be seen as a report of the first research that carried out this 
kind of analysis and linking into the essence of the dread atmosphere.  
In addition to that, this study develops a new method within the new framework 
drawn to read, describe and criticize films. Writers, filmmakers, and architects 
can use this proposed method in the process of designing a dread atmosphere. 
While this study employs theories of embodiment and perception in film reading, 
It provides different perspectives of relevance to filmmakers, writers, Virtual 
Reality designers, and architects to enable them creating corporeal affective 
atmospheres that embody the viewers, users, and players. These perspectives 
are important as they address embodiment, a concept to which scientific research 
in various domains of human knowledge has high potential to contribute. 
Benjamin (2007) suggested that the cinematic space is a powerful 
kinesthetic experience. Therefore, this study makes a contribution to the 
understanding of this kinesthetic experience and to promoting it in related arts 
such as architecture, Virtual Reality, and video games. Additionally, this study 
opens the door and possibilities for other researchers to perform similar studies 
in other genres than thrillers and uncover other phenomena and quasi-things. 
Research Questions 
The central question in this study is to examine the nature of the 
atmosphere of dread and how it is created. This question is addressed through 
the following secondary research questions: 
-Can an improved understanding of atmosphere and embodiment lead to 
identification of new situations (quazi-things) to address so as to enhance the 
dread experience of the viewer of thriller films? 
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-How is the subject’s body, as a viewer, extended to be part of the dread 
atmosphere while watching a dread scene in a thriller film? 
-Does this atmosphere allow the subject to feel her/his body corporeally and 
consciously to achieve the sense of embodiment?  
-How can the spectator be engaged and affected by a screen?  
-Why are some elements (e.g., stairs, doors, corridors, and tunnels) always linked 
with fear in the horror films and thrillers?  
Research Method 
This research is multi-disciplinary in that it used theories from film, 
architecture and theories related to the video games so as to build 
comprehensive knowledge of embodiment because it is a recent philosophy and 
because these fields relate to each other. 
To address the research questions, it followed a methodology that leaned 
heavily on review of relevant literature on the atmosphere of fear. In addition to 
this, the research methodology comprised theoretical and practical measures and 
steps, including a phenomenological reading of a dread scene as a case study. 
In general, this research is a text-based qualitative research that adopted 
phenomenology as its approach to observation and description. As regards the 
literature review, the researcher built her analysis mainly on the concepts of 
Merleau-Ponty (2002), especially those presented in his book Phenomenology of 
Perception, originally published in French in 1945. Accordingly, the researcher 
followed Merleau-Ponty’s structure of linking between the subject and the object, 
adopting it as the subject is the viewer/spectator and the object is the screen. 
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Merleau-Ponty (2002) provided a model of perception, cognition, and movement 
as a primary mode of engagement with the world. This study adopted this 
structure, and extended it. According to embodiment, perception in cinema 
consists of perceptual perception and synaesthetical perception (Sobchack 1992; 
Marks 2004). This means that perception has a level of cognition; sub-cognition. 
In addition to that, Sobchack (1990) stressed the interactive character of film 
viewing as an exchange between two bodies; the body of the character and the 
body of the viewer, according to that, the structure of Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) 
model was expanded, for the first time, in this research to include a shared and 
interpreted perception, movement and action to create a new comprehensive 
framework and structure of film embodiment to follow in order to read and 
describe the case study. 
In order to describe the case study, which is the last dread scene in The Silence 
of the Lambs (Demme Jonathan 1991), the researcher followed the phenomenal 
phenomenology method of Shīrāzī (2013). Phenomenal phenomenology is a 
first-person phenomenology describing the Langen Foundation Museum 
designed by Tadao Ando, which Shīrāzī (2013) distinguished with some 
characteristics based on mixed, comprehensive phenomenological theories that 
describe architecture for the purpose of making the reader as traveler perceives 
and feels, with all the senses, Shīrāzī’s experience. Hence, this research adopted 
Shīrāzī’s method in reading the scene, because it is based on a lived experience 
of one case study. However, it followed the framework structured in the literature 
background in part one of this thesis, in order to extract those characteristics to 
enable the researcher of this thesis to read the scene and to transfer its lived 
experience to the reader again. 
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Having one dread sequence will enable the research to have a phenomenology 
from within as Husserl names it, meaning, it will present a comprehensive reading 
of one case study, instead of having different phenomenological concerns. The 
reading will guide the research to look for the phenomena as they have been 
found, then understand their concerns to enable their appliances in other fields.     
Reflectivity of Subjectivity 
The reading of the last dread scene in The Silence of the Lambs is not a 
universal reading because this reading is the researcher’s own reading of the 
scene, guided and supported by her background in film and architecture. In 
phenomenology, Hanich considers this accepted because the description used 
in such approach is a thick description that creates the ground of lived experience 
and for research (Hanich 2017b). Accordingly, those who follow the experiences 
and objects which arouse their curiosity go to where those experiences and 
objects take them, rather than deciding on where those experiences should go. 
Besides, what makes phenomenology the best approach is that it does not 
provide a means to reach closure, as a result, through observations of 
experience, phenomenology leads to very close descriptions and, as a 
consequence, interpretations of the phenomenon under consideration (Hanich 
2017b). 
In other respects, to avoid any bias towards any particular phenomenon, 
the researcher has established characteristics, from the new framework created 
from the literature, to steer her reading of the case study scene. This means that 
the researcher drew a structure to follow in description. On the other hand, 
Griffero (2014) states that one atmosphere may be viewed, felt, or lived from 
differing viewpoints by the different viewers. Nonetheless, this does not mean 
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that ten different people will perceive ten atmospheres. Also, Hanich (2010) 
states that phenomenology is based on commonalities not on differences, then 
there must be something shared in common, in these viewpoints by those 
persons. Moreover, the researcher agrees with Hanich (2010), and Griffero 
(2014) in that it is rare for the one atmosphere to be completely different for all 
the people and that there is always a common point of view which may vary in its 
level. Lastly, since the philosophy of embodiment has been used in many fields 
other than arts, including psychology and neurophysiology, then research can 
borrow experiments from those fields to describe, and probably justify, a certain 
phenomenon in film from an embodiment perspective. As a final stage, the 
researcher extends the conception of these phenomena by means of a horizontal 
reading of other films to make the observations more objective and generalizable 
to thrillers in general and the dread atmosphere in specific, ultimately to elaborate 
Hanich’s (2010) findings regarding the cinematic dread.   
Limitations of the Study 
As an approach, phenomenology is very flexible and open to all objects 
and to other methodologies. For instance, it can “reformulate certain Freudian 
concepts in the framework of a better philosophy” in order to help psychoanalysis 
“to be completely itself” (Merleau-Ponty 1983 pp.67–69). Within this context, any 
bounds to the scope of research do not preclude it from borrowing any concepts 
from other methodologies as long as they support the research inquiry under 
consideration, which this study actually sought to do. 
This study did not incorporate aesthetic theories of meaning, or the sublime 
because these theories pertain to the function of beauty and sublime. They 
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address the relation between art and society and the truth content in the art 
object, not in the perception of the subject or the lived experience. 
Furthermore, this study did not include psychoanalysis theories since they focus 
mainly on the subject and deny the dualism between the body and mind. Freud 
and Lacan are the pioneers of psychoanalysis. They both relate the subject and 
her/his repression to the moment of unconsciousness via understanding the 
language. Psychoanalysis is an interesting field for those who seek to understand 
the characters of the film and their desires and representations. On this account, 
psychoanalysis does not fit with phenomenal reading and the spatial focus of this 
study.  
In addition, feminism and political agendas, which are two major dimensions of 
psychoanalysis, were not addressed in this study although they relate to the 
spectator, e.g., in voyeurism, the gaze, and visual pleasure. These dimensions 
of psychoanalysis discuss when the screen becomes a site for the spectator’s 
projection of her/his fantasies and desires. For example, feminism discusses the 
issue for a one-way relationship between the spectator and the screen where the 
spectator is a male and the film text is written in such a way as to give a preferred 
reading as discussed in Laura Mulvey’s works (Mulvey 1975, 1996). On the 
contrary, the present study is based on the assumption that the relation of the 
subject with the object is a one-way relationship, coming from the screen, 
because one of the main goals of this study is to understand the corporeality of 
the dread atmosphere and its embodiment on the viewer. 
Theatre can be close to cinema in some respects but the limited space 
and potentials of the theatre and the position of the viewer can affect the 
phenomenology of the dread atmosphere. As a consequence, the corporeality of 
the viewer may differ in the case of the theatre from her/his corporeality in the 
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case of cinema. Moreover, the atmosphere is not controlled in theatre as it is in 
film. 
Structure of Thesis  
In addition to the introduction and the conclusions chapters, this thesis is 
divided into three parts. Part One is an extended literature review aiming at 
answering a main question: how can the body of the viewer be embodied, 
extended and immersed in the screen, while watching a dread scene in a thriller 
film? Part Two is the practical part of this thesis, demonstrating the framework 
developed in Part One and applies it into a phenomenological reading of a scene 
that is described as a dread scene taken from The Silence of the Lambs. Part 
Three develops and identifies some atmospheric corporeal quasi-things 
appeared in the case study, and highlights them in the context of thriller film from 
other different films. 
Part One of this thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter One aims at 
understanding phenomenology. It introduces the work of Hanich (2010) showing 
how phenomenology was used to identify and define prototypes of horror films 
and thrillers. It mainly clarifies one of his prototypes, that is, cinematic dread, and 
expands it on the basis of its atmospheric qualities, which this study has aimed 
to focus on. 
Chapter Two draws the main framework of embodiment based upon the concepts 
of Merleau-Ponty (2002) and other phenomenologists. It illustrates how the 
subject and the object can be encountered. Accordingly, this chapter begins with 
an explanation of engagement as the major factor that controls the level of 
interaction between the subject (viewer) and the object (screen and atmosphere). 
In this study, engagement was defined in terms of the concepts of sympathy and 
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empathy. While a variety of definitions have already been formulated for 
sympathy and empathy, this study adopted the definitions that are broadly used 
in film studies according to Smith (1994) and Hanich (2010). The elaboration on 
engagement is followed by an attempt to realize the body as the subject of 
perception. The related material is intended to clarify how the body communicates 
with the world to be-in-the-world according to Heidegger (1996 [1927]) and how 
it responds to familiar and unfamiliar situations according to Merleau-Ponty 
(2002). In order to have appropriate insight into the corporeal experience of the 
subject, this chapter presented and discussed the New-Phenomenology of 
Hermann Schmitz. This model corresponds to a novel, in-depth look at 
phenomenology of the felt-body and compares it with the material, or physical, 
body. It was assumed that the point of view of Schmitz will help the researcher 
know exactly how the body can be contracted or expanded in certain encounters, 
e.g., in joy or fear, and how this affects the viewer’s feeling to create an 
atmosphere.  
After that, the chapter attempts to determine how the body can be existent, 
conscious, and present in-the-world because the subject does not all the time 
exist with all the tools. Sometimes, the subject uses a tool as an extension to its 
body, such as the cane of the blind person. In that way, the cane does not exist 
and, hence, the subject is not conscious of it. This issue is discussed in this 
chapter from the perspective of Heidegger (1996). Thereafter, a discussing of the 
logic and structure of existence from Merleau-Ponty’s (2002 [1945]) standpoint, 
posits that the subject passes through different stages until reaching a state of 
existence. 
After addressing the issue of the subject, Chapter Two discusses the atmosphere 
as an object and as the whole feeling that results from encounter with the subject. 
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In this discussion, the researcher follows the concepts and views of Griffero 
(2014) as he presented a recent perspective on the atmosphere that builds upon 
the New-Phenomenology of Schmitz. This section gives a definition of the 
atmosphere, an account on its perception, and an illustration of how to energize 
it. Meanwhile, it demonstrates how watching a screen is in itself also an 
atmosphere. Then, the chapter concentrates on a very specific atmosphere 
concerning dread, which is the constricted atmosphere. After that, it draws the 
distinction between space and place, which is a reflection of the subject’s 
existence. 
Chapter Three handles three main themes, namely, the process of encountering 
between the subject and the object; perception; movement; and action. It 
addresses the issue of how the subject can have a lived experience while she/he 
is sitting on a chair and is embodied in the dread atmosphere. 
Perception is discussed according to the perception of perception concept of 
Deleuze (1992) and the phenomenology of perception concept of Merleau-Ponty 
(2002) and according to other theorists who built on these concepts, with 
particular emphasis on the sensory experience and the synaesthetic perception, 
which directly address all the senses, believing in the unity of them. However, on 
the basis of the importance of knowing how each sense can be captured on 
screen, this study adopted the means of Elliott (2011) in dividing the experience 
of the senses. This part of the study was concluded by an account of haptic 
perception, a tactile and kinesthetic perception and a mode of seeing through all 
modes located on the skin and a mode of bodily consciousness and corporeality. 
Movement is defined in this study in the light of the thoughts of Sheets-Johnstone 
(2011 [1999]) who founded her ideas on those of Merleau-Ponty (2002), Husserl 
(1980), and Heidegger (1996). She constructed a structure of movement 
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presenting the spatial and temporal aspects of movement that start with the 
kinesthetic experience and end with a corporeal consciousness. By relating her 
work to that of Schmitz (1964-2005), this study extends her structure of 
movement to describe what happens during watching a film and how movement 
can be revealed while sitting and watching. 
Action is discussed in this chapter in view of the action-image concept of Deleuze 
(1992) and on the basis of its mirroring on the viewer. Other studies are used as 
well to identify the implicit and explicit actions affect the atmosphere. 
Chapter Four concludes the essence of the experience; Affective experience. It 
mainly discusses the driving forces that trigger the encounter between the subject 
and the object, i.e., issues of affordance and motivation. It also discusses theories 
of immersion to find out how the subject can be part of a virtual world for few 
minutes that may in fact last through memory for ever. This is then an experience 
that can be described as an affective experience. 
Not only does part one present a literature review of embodiment within the 
screen, but it also expands theories to fit the viewer’s relationship with the screen 
because not all theories discuss the very specific relationship of the viewer with 
the character in a dread atmosphere. In addition to that, Part One of this thesis 
overall sets a theoretical framework from which the case study in Part two can be 
systematically read. It makes available the characteristics which this study needs 
in order to read and describe a dread scene. 
Chapter Five, the only chapter in Part Two of this thesis, applies the theoretical 
foundations to a case study and is as such, the practical part of this research. It 
demonstrates use of the framework developed in the first part of this study and 
explains how its characteristics were used to have a deep reading of a dread 
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scene taken from The Silence of the Lambs. Since no one can define the 
atmosphere of fear until she/he lives in it, this chapter narrates a lived experience 
by adopting the phenomenal phenomenology of Shīrāzī (2013) to transfer the 
reader of this thesis into a spectator.  
The aim of Part Three is to extend the discourse and to develop the definition of 
atmospheric corporeal quasi-things. It identifies these as appearing in the dread 
atmosphere of the scene selected from The Silence of the Lambs, and shows 
them to have the ability to enhance the experience of the viewer and increase 
her/his corporeality and consciousness. The identified atmospheric corporeal 
quasi-things are discussed phenomenologically in an attempt to capture the 
essence of each phenomenon. As a consequence, the researcher extends the 
conception of this phenomenon through the means of a horizontal reading of 
other films to make the observations more objective and generalizable to thrillers 
in general and the dread atmosphere in specific, ultimately to elaborate Hanich’s 
(2010) findings regarding the cinematic dread. This part is divided into three 
chapters. While Chapter Six discusses the phenomenology of text and some 
words that can be perceived in dread atmospheres, Chapter Seven deals with 
the phenomenology of transparency and Chapter Eight discusses the 
phenomenology of surveillance. These in turn connect with other theoretical 
bodies of knowledge and help to embed the findings of the thesis in a broader 
context. 
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Part One: Theoretical Context 
Understanding the Phenomenology of Embodiment Created 
in the Atmosphere of Dread 
 
This part of the thesis is a theoretical background on the process of 
encountering and experiencing the dread atmosphere that is intended to 
qualitatively add to the findings of Hanich (2010) related to Cinematic Dread, 
which is one of the phenomenological practices in film making. In line with this, 
the researcher structured this part of the thesis in a way that answers the following 
main questions: What is the atmosphere of dread? How is the subject’s body, as 
a viewer, extended to be part of the dread atmosphere while watching a thriller 
film? And does this atmosphere allow the subject to feel its body corporeally and 
consciously?  
To answer these questions, the researcher organized this part of the thesis in 
four chapters. Chapter One presents phenomenology as the method that is used 
in this study to look with new eyes into certain spatial encounters. This chapter 
also introduces a recent study in the film research conducted by Julian Hanich in 
2010, on which the researcher builds and fills a gap in Hanich’s research. Hanich 
(2010) used phenomenology to establish prototypes of experiences to approach 
the common structure of fear. This chapter explores and clarifies one of his 
prototypes, namely, Cinematic Dread and expands it on the basis of its 
atmospheric qualities. 
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Chapter Two draws the main framework of embodiment. It illustrates how the 
subject and the object can be encountered and it describes the ontology of the 
atmosphere of dread and fear. 
Chapter Three complements the discussions of the process of embodiment given 
in Chapter Two by broadening the process of encountering between the subject 
and the object, which manifests itself in a non-ending, serial process of 
perception, movement, and action. 
Chapter Four discusses the affordances and motivations that are necessary to 
trigger the actions that establish the encounter between the subject and the 
object. Furthermore, this chapter describes the affective experience through 
which one can say that ‘this subject is completely embodied in this atmosphere’.  
This part of the study addresses the three aforementioned questions and the 
associated literature review helps the researcher create the relevant criteria to 
follow in the second part of this study which reads a dread scene and describes 
it according to the spectator’s lived experience. 
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Chapter One: Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread 
1.1 What is Phenomenology?  
Phenomenology has been employed in many fields, including architecture 
and film, both in theory and practice, as a means to describe certain phenomena. 
There is no common definition of phenomenology as a philosophical approach. 
So, different researchers have defined it in different ways. For instance, 
Heidegger (1996) defined it as a method or a way of seeing. On the other hand, 
Husserl (1999) described phenomenology as a return to the things themselves, 
whereas Merleau-Ponty (2002) described it as the essence of perception, and 
Glendinning (2007, p. 38) described it as a “description of something we already 
understand or in some way familiar with.” Hence, phenomenology may be simply 
read as a stance which seeks to answer the question: “What is going on here?”  
Merleau-Ponty (2002) understands phenomenology as a rejection of science; 
when science explains, constructs, and looks for answers, phenomenology 
describes. It describes phenomena as they occur and allows people to describe 
experiencing them as “presupposition-less” as possible (Hanich 2017b p.11). In 
that sense, phenomenology is one of the best approaches to understanding 
phenomena in architecture, film and related arts. 
On one side of the argument, architectural theorists believe that phenomenology 
can catch the essence of the things and phenomena and bring the user closer 
than before to being and existing. Seamon (2015, 2017), a phenomenologist who 
believes that phenomenology helps one to see with new eyes, a stance which 
conveys careful description. He contends that phenomenologists hope to 
understand instances of the same phenomenon in the lived experience in order 
to point out more general qualities and characteristics to describe the nature and 
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essence of the phenomenon because, as Hanich asserts, phenomenology is 
based on commonalities not on differences (Hanich 2010). On the other hand, in 
the social sciences, humanities, and the arts (e.g., film studies), phenomenology 
is used as a means to uncover aspects of everyday experiences that are “buried 
beneath habituation and institutionalization and thus are known implicitly” (Hanich 
2010 p.44). These two views are alternatively the faces of one coin and the 
proponents of both indicate the same ultimate goal. 
Phenomenology can be considered as a subjective approach since it is an 
approach that is based on the lived experience. However, as Julian Hanich 
interprets, it is not subjective in some chaotic or thin sense. Rather, “it is a thick 
description that creates the ground of lived experience and for further, if 
secondary, research” because those who follow the experiences and objects 
which arouse their curiosity go to where the experiences and objects take them, 
rather than deciding on where those experiences should go (Hanich 2017b p.16). 
He adds that what makes phenomenology the best approach is that it does not 
have closure, as through observations of experience it leads to very close 
descriptions and then interpretations of the phenomenon under consideration 
(Hanich 2017b). Moreover, according to Van Manen, phenomenology opens up 
the possibilities for establishment of creative formative associations among 
subjects and objects to relate them as phenomenology of practice (van Manen 
2007). In effect, the exceptional features of phenomenology are that it allows one 
to consider any object and that it does not act hierarchically because it is open 
and generative. In addition, it is flexible. That is, it is reflected by the lived human 
body experience and existence, and is amended by experience (Hanich 2017b; 
van Manen 2007).  
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Seamon believes that the key point of phenomenology has been identified as a 
means to allow the phenomenon to reveal itself in the ways it needs to (Seamon 
2017). Thereupon, what signifies phenomenology is that it complements other 
philosophies, such as psychoanalysis, and theories, such as the Cognitivist 
Theory and Deleuzian Theory, as Merleau-Ponty regards it to be completely itself 
(Merleau-Ponty 1983 pp.67–69) because, referring to Hanich, what usually 
happens is that the other methodologies, which are considered as objective 
methods, come after, not before, the description (Hanich 2017b).  
In order to understand phenomenology in practice and in film, this study focused 
on the phenomenology of cinematic fear as has been described by the film 
scholar Julian Hanich (2010), who, in his book Cinematic Emotions in Horror 
Films and Thrillers, developed prototypes of experiences to approach the 
common structure of fear. He used phenomenology as his methodology to find 
out and capture those types of experiences which he categorized into direct 
horror, suggested horror, cinematic shock, cinematic dread, and cinematic terror. 
For Hanich, direct horror occurs when the viewer experiences horror as a 
frightening and overwhelming confrontation with the threatening event or 
monstrous object, directly and in full vision, as in the case in the famous shower 
scene in Psycho (Hitchcock 1960). Suggested horror, on the other hand, relies 
on imagining violence or a monster through verbal description, sound effects, or 
blurry vision such as the scene in Unbreakable (Shyamalan 2000) in which the 
doctor tells the nurse before the audience sees the baby: “Inform the ambulance 
that we have a situation… I have never seen this.” In other respects, the cinematic 
shock is a highly compressed type of fear that responds to a threat of a situation, 
suddenly and unexpectedly, e.g., when a car hits the character suddenly. This 
form of fear is more common in horror films than in thrillers. According to Hanich 
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(2010) both cinematic dread and cinematic terror are the frightening versions of 
suspense, but thriller films in general focus more on dread since, it is the larger 
category of suspense, followed by terror. Thereupon, this research has 
concentrated on the cinematic dread. 
1.2 Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread 
To distinguish dread from horror, Hanich illustrates this example; if the last man 
on earth is sitting and someone knocked on the door, then the moment before 
opening the door is described as dread but the moment when he opens the door 
and faces the danger is described as horror.   
Cinematic Dread according to Hanich is a scenario called “alone in the dark 
scenario”. In terms of narrative content, dread is represented by a vulnerable 
character who is slowly and quietly entering a dark, forsaken place harboring 
threat. It works under the scenario of “here and now” (Hanich 2010 p.156). He 
considers suspense in dread scenes as responsible for creating uncertainty that 
makes the audience predict and imagine different outcomes for the character(s). 
He also believes that dread enables the strongest form of immersion in all films 
because of its role in achievement and sanctification of the spatial, temporal, and 
emotional forms of immersion. 
Hanich regards the spatial immersion to the movement into or through space, 
although the visual access in dread scenes is often strongly restricted, but he 
asserts that the filmic space plays a crucial role as an atmosphere to suck the 
viewer in. Due to temporal immersion, the dread scenes are much more extended 
than scenes of shock and horror owing to that the viewer experiences the threat 
to the same extent to which the character in the film does. Thus, the scene 
becomes a “thickening”, inner time experience (Hanich 2010 p.160). As a result 
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of emotional immersion, Hanich acknowledges that the viewer expects the threat 
and imagines the worst. Hence, she/he is glued to the screen and captivated in 
an anticipatory type of fear, as the larger category of suspense, to a higher extent 
than in the case of the scenes that use aesthetic strategies like horror or shock 
only as in the horror films (Hanich 2010; Hanich 2014).  
Hanich asserts that cinematic dread usually tends to end with shock or horror. In 
Psycho, when the detective gets inside, the audience feels dread because they 
fear for him. This fear feeds the dread and lets the audience think of either a 
shock (the lady appears) or horror (the knife).  
Hanich considers horror and shock to be boring activities whereas dread is 
regarded as an active activity because the narrative of dread works more 
cognitively than that of horror or shock as dread gives the viewer time to think 
and anticipate the outcome and forthcoming narrative events to allow for a 
cognitive activity. This delay is an “arousal by itself for more cognitive interest 
between lived body experience and direct cognition” (Hanich 2010 p.165). 
Hanich (2010) distinguished between horror and dread in terms of the time, 
intention, and emotion. Temporally, the dread points to the future while horror 
points to the present.  He adds that because of the temporal immersion in dread 
the moments are longer and more extended than the moments of horror or shock. 
Hence, the dread increases the inner time experience. Therefore, in horror, the 
character faces the danger directly from the other side in whereas in dread, there 
is a split in reaction either of shock or horror. 
Emotionally, Hanich believes that building fear through dread is more effective 
than creating fear only from shock or horror. As Hitchcock (1995) confirmed, it is 
easy to scare viewers but is more brilliant and successful to bring them into 
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suspense, that is, to involve, release, and engage them affectively (Hitchcock 
1995). 
Based on the technical issues and camera movement, Hanich concludes that the 
dread scene is often quite intense, yet very quiet. It is known for its long shots, 
few camera movements, and little movement within the mise-en-scène. 
Additionally, it is known that dread scenes lack spatial information, where the 
composition of the frame is tight and there is no establishing shot (Hanich 2010).  
1.3 Phenomenology of Cinematic Terror 
Cinematic terror, which is the fifth prototype of the fear experience 
according to Hanich (2010), is called the “chase and escape scenario”, where a 
vulnerable, extremely frightened character is escaping from a threat. While dread 
is considered as deadly silence, the terror is an experience of inner acceleration 
and agitation. However, like dread, it is an anticipatory type of cinematic fear, with 
the difference being that terror ends with horror only because the viewer knows 
the nature of the threat; actually she/he sees it and can perceive how close is the 
threat and estimate the approximate time for the arrival of the horror. Yet, Hanich 
maintains that dread and terror may overlap and that they usually do to intensify 
the moments of fear (Hanich 2010). 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced phenomenology as a reasonable approach for 
understanding the essence of the things which the subject is used to. 
Phenomenology is flexible and open to all arts, including film and architecture, 
but this research adopted the phenomenological approach in order to gain a deep 
insight into the essence of cinematic dread because it is the fear experience that 
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creates the highest degree of suspense and the strongest level of immersion in 
film. 
In his analysis of cinematic dread, Hanich (2010) extracted many common 
features of the constricted atmosphere, the camera work, and the narrative 
structure. However, as far as the atmosphere is concerned, he could only identify 
few elements in terms of the setting, architecture, and mood that are necessary 
for creating the atmosphere of fear and suspense. As a result, he has 
recommended combining theory with practice and conduction of further research 
to determine additional elements of the setting, architecture, and mood that are 
necessary for creation of the atmosphere of fear and suspense. Within this 
context, future research is due to dig deeper in the cinematic dread by further 
researching the spatial qualities of the atmosphere of fear and into how the 
spectator, as a subject, can be immersed in the world of the dread such that 
she/he will experience spatial, temporal, and emotional immersion
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Chapter Two: Embodiment 
True reflection presents me to myself not as idle and inaccessible subjectivity, but as 
identical with my presence in the world and to others, as I am now realizing it: I am all that 
I see, I am an intersubjective field, not despite my body and historical situation, but, on the 
contrary, by being this body and this situation, and though them, all the rest. 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.525) 
The previous chapter introduced phenomenology and discussed the 
example of its practices given by the film scholar Julian Hanich, namely, the 
phenomenology of the cinematic experience in horror films and thrillers. This 
chapter investigates the phenomenology of embodiment created by the 
atmospheres of thriller films, (i.e., embodiment) which is responsible for extending 
the relations of the body with itself and with the physical environment in a 
particular time and space. The next chapter clarifies how a subject can be 
converted from a passive subject into a corporeal, active one that is embodied in 
an atmosphere. Therefore, the present chapter mainly discusses three principal 
issues: engagement as the framework that controls the level of interaction 
between the subject and the object; the subject, who is the central component of 
this process; and the atmosphere, which is an object with which the subject will 
interact and is the overall experience that is responsible for creating the sense of 
fear. By the end of this part of the study (chapters one, two, three and four), one 
can have a deep insight into how the spectator can be bodily and mentally part 
of the dread atmosphere. 
2.1 Definition 
As it has been discussed earlier, the main pivot of phenomenology is the 
subjective experience and the role of the body. Although philosophers such as 
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Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have handled the body and the difficult problem of 
consciousness within the Cartesian mind-body dualism framework, it was only in 
the last few years that philosophers developed a deep philosophy of body and of 
embodiment. Dealing with subjects and their bodies was chiefly contributed to by 
cultural studies from the 1970s onwards, dominated by the work of Foucault 
(originally in 1975) who presented the body as a passive victim in institutional 
practices such as the Panopticon prison plan. For him, subjectivity is primarily an 
effect of discourse, that is, a cultural construction where the subject plays 
according to the rules established by others (Foucault 1995). In the nineties and 
thereafter, social theorists like Chris Shilling, Nick Crossley, and Ian Burkitt 
developed the construction of subjectivity and considered it as a construction 
emerging from the interaction between the individual and the society, an 
interaction that takes place within the medium of the lived body (Hale 2012). This 
shift in view on the body influenced architects like Bernard Tschumi and Peter 
Eisenman to design in such a way as to further enrich the experience beyond the 
functional performance through the sensory experience and materiality (Hale 
2012). 
The body, lived body, subjectivity, and sensory experience are the core of 
embodiment in interaction with the world. The philosopher Merleau-Ponty was 
the pioneer in the aesthetics that relate to sensuous appearance, experience, 
and the process of interaction with the atmosphere. In his book the 
Phenomenology of Perception (2002), he structured the process linking the 
subject and the object by providing a model of perception, cognition, and 
movement as a primary mode of engagement with the world, and according to 
this model, he came out with body-schema, immersion and motivation. However, 
he did not mention embodiment as a hypothesis or as a theory of consciousness, 
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it was only concerning the sensory experience in articulating, storing, and 
processing sensory responses for the lived body.  
Only in recent studies did philosophers and researchers combine Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy with that of embodiment. Accordingly, the embodiment 
hypothesis has gained some experimental support in social psychology, 
psychology, and neurophysiology (e.g., Foroni and Semin (2009, 2013), 
Oosterwijk et al. (2010), Spadacenta et al. (2014), and Portch et al. (2015)); film 
studies (e.g., Sobchack (1990) and Marks (2000)); architecture (e.g.,  Bruno 
(2002), and Kenderdine (2007)); and video games (e.g., McCardell (2001) and 
Marin and Leder (2013). 
In 2002, Naoya Hirose, a human scientist, explored the relation of embodiment 
with cognition from an ecological point of view and noted two basic meanings of 
the word embodiment. The first meaning is the state of being embodied, which is 
a static condition under which the subject is part of the world. The second 
meaning is the act of embodying, which is a dynamic dimension of embodiment 
that helps in understanding the moment to moment unfolding of the experience 
so as to help the subject to shift to the state of embodiment (Hirose 2002). 
Both the psychologists McCardell, Marin and Leder acknowledge that being 
embodied is being co-emergent with others, cultures, and the physical world as 
a consequence of going relational encounters. It means having unique history 
and situated relations with certain milieu, physiology, and perceptual perspective. 
It has to do with the relation of the body with itself and with the physical 
environment. It means inhabiting a particular time and space, i.e., a here-now 
milieu (McCardell 2001 p.36; Marin and Leder 2013). 
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Both definitions are used in discussion of video games to unpack and explain the 
complexity of the experience for players by Bayliss. “Embodiment as a state is a 
baseline from which to consider this dynamic nature of the body, and it opens up 
the moment of transition from one state of embodiment to another during the 
course of the act of embodying where the player takes up the interface as an 
extension to his body to take an action” (Bayliss 2010 p.54). In conformity with 
that, and according to Merleau-Ponty, who believes that “there is not a perception 
followed by a movement, for both form a system which varies as a whole” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.127), this defines embodiment as a process, not a result, 
where the type of experience is not an account based on a linear cause and effect 
description of the body apparatus, but an indication of the lived body experience, 
where the body is considered as the center of the experiment with all its capacities 
to interact with the environment, to exist in the world, here and now. 
In her digital museum making, Kenderdine emphasizes embodiment. She 
supports the notion that embodiment is the experience of the world through all 
the senses and that it explodes narrative and other modes of representation 
which prioritize one sense over the other or emphasize a certain aspect over the 
other (Kenderdine 2007; Schettino 2013). Also, Marchese, a theorist in 
phenomenology, addressed the fundamental premise of the importance of the 
lived body experience and suggested that the embodied subject and its ways of 
sensing, feeling, knowing, performing, and experiencing offer dynamic means of 
perceiving the object (Marchese 2012). In this context, many interdisciplinary 
researchers showed interest in the sensory and phenomenological engagement 
with the built environment. Although they both look Merleaupontian, however, 
they miss describing the process itself and looking into its essence, also they did 
not relate it to the proposed structure of Merleau-Ponty in engaging with the 
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world. Embodiment if Film and Cinema was slightly different since it relates to the 
spectator. 
2.2 Cinema Spectatorship and Embodiment  
Many recent film theorists showed interest in the audience in an effort to 
understand their embodiment with the screen such as Laura Marks and Vivian 
Sobchack. They built their theories upon Deleuze’s (1992 [1983]) theory of 
Affection- Image, which in general refers to the state of emotions. In their way of 
thinking, both theorists support the post-modern scopic regimes towards the 
sensory experience as the main approach for the sense of embodiment.  
2.2.1 Modern and Post-modern Scopic Regimes 
During the period of modernity, the concept of the self was linked with what 
it sees; the individual’s perspective was only affected by the power of vision 
(Crary 1992). In this context, any optical toy, trick, or device used to create an 
individuals’ perception such as the camera and stereoscope count only on the 
use of sight (Elliott 2011). Foucault and Freud are considered to be two of many 
theorists who follow this way of thinking. 
In the postmodern era, theories relating to the perceptual faculties of vision 
opened up to include other senses and the lived experience of the body in an 
effort to take care of the subject as well as of her/his senses (Elliott 2011). Paul 
Elliott addresses that the post-modern scopic regime supports the notions of 
embodied perception and of synesthesia. It looks for ways not only to see, but 
also to understand, taste, and feel, in order to make the subject more active and 
involved than being detached or passive (Elliott 2011). In that context, thinkers 
such as Juhanni Pallasmaa and Merleau-Ponty may fit with such a way of 
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thinking, and some means as Virtual Reality may be one of the technological 
assemblages that fits the post-modern scopic regime as well.  
In film, Elliott notes that the post-modern theories have re-defined the spectator’s 
body as “the embodied knowledge, allowing the full thickness experience to be 
examined[…] the spectator exists as a conscious self, […] a site of affect, an 
archive of bodily experience past and present, a corporeal sense-making 
machine and a surface of intensities” (Elliott 2011 p.45). 
Following is a briefing on two post-modern thinkers who studied the embodiment 
of the cinema spectator. 
Laura Marks  
Marks built her idea of embodiment on Deleuze’s affection-image concept 
to create the recollection-image notion, which was proposed to connect emotion 
and memory with sensuality. She used a wide range of sensual inputs in the 
process of spectatorship for examining how touching, smelling, tasting, and 
hearing interact to enhance the visual experience (Marks 2000). Through 
exploring avant-garde films or those of independent directors, she underlined the 
importance of embodiment by stating that the cinema viewer can undergo a 
series of, sometimes, conflicting sensual experiences. In her book The Skin of 
the Film, she focused on touch and on haptic visuality in relation to bodies and 
images. She argues that in contrast to optical visuality which “tends to be one of 
mastery, in which the viewer isolates and comprehends the objects of vision,” 
haptic visuality is tactile and kinaesthetic. Furthermore, it functions like organs of 
touch, where “viewer is more likely to lose herself in the image, to lose her sense 
of proportion” (Marks 2000 p.184). Hence, this way of interacting with the image 
changes the viewer from a passive subject into a corporeal active subject. 
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Vivian Sobchack 
As a post-modern scopic thinker, Vivian Sobchack focused in her The 
Address of the Eye (1992) on the lived body of the spectator and on how it 
grounds and formulates new theories of meaning and sense experience in 
cinema. She considers the spectator as a synaesthetic subject, i.e., a site of 
reception, where its sensorium can provide visual images with multi-sensory and 
synaesthetic thickness. For her, the body of the spectator is actively involved in 
the creation of meaning instead of being passively affected by the film according 
to the notion of the cross-modality of the senses. This involvement triggers 
cooperation of all senses, not only seeing, such that they become fleshed-out to 
make the body feel through the skin before the eye, where the spectator haptically 
anticipates the image. She thinks of cross-modality as a key tool for 
understanding the cinema experience which has been missing in many 
contemporary film theories (Sobchack 1990; Sobchack 1992). 
This research adopted Marks and Sobchack’s theories since they set the 
foundation of embodiment in film studies, believing in the role of the body of the 
viewer through the sensual experience and the cooperation of the senses to have 
a haptic experience to interact actively, not passively, with the screen. A detailed 
discussion of the sensual experience of embodiment is provided in the 
subsequent chapter when discussing perception of the process of interaction with 
the object while discussing Marks and Sobchack’s theories on Merleau-Ponty’s 
structure of the subject to engage with the world. However, their research was 
only a first step towards further discovery of the interactive relationship between 
the subject and the screen since they did not clarify how the exchange between 
the body of the viewer and the body of the character occurs. Now, the question 
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emerges: How can the viewer or the spectator engage with the screen to be 
corporeally extended and become part of the whole atmosphere? 
2.3 Engagement  
Embodiment denotes a form of participative status of the subject and the 
object, namely, the observer and the one observed. According to Merleau-Ponty, 
this interaction creates an active participation that incarnates and shapes the 
subject’s experience, and, at the point of encounter, constitutes a “new whole” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.13), but never in a static sense.  
In describing the bodily reaction in the experience of architecture, Pallasmaa 
suggests that architecture is not only a series of images and that the elements of 
architecture are not visual units or gestalt. Rather, they are defined as 
confrontations. The encounter between the subject and the object is what matters 
to complete the experience. “Architecture directs and frames behavior and 
movement” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.44). 
In this confrontation and encounter, Pallasmaa suggests “action in images in 
architecture as the moment of active encounter” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.44). What 
matters for him is recognizing the verb essence of architectural experience by 
speaking of the act. Copying his example, in Alvar Aalto’s essay From the 
Doorstep to the Common Room, he argues that what matters is the act of entering 
the room, not the formal characteristics of the door itself (Pallasmaa 2012 p.45). 
Moreover, in recognition of the essence of the verbs and as another example, 
Fred Thompson is described as using the units of architectural experience as 
verb-nouns such as using the notion of ‘spacing’ instead of ‘space’ and ‘timing’ 
instead of ‘time’ (Pallasmaa 2012 p.45). In an example of film, Pallasmaa 
described the viewers in the film Vertigo (Hitchcock 1958) as citizens of the 
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space; “we enter the haunting edifices in the steps of the protagonist, we become 
citizens” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.48) because the viewer is entering, climbing, 
walking, and running with the protagonist to complete the experience of the 
space. In addition to that, the viewer spends much effort in performing many 
action verbs to complete the experience of watching; “All experience implies the 
acts of recollecting, remembering and comparing” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.50). 
Pallasmaa is obviously influenced by Merleau-Ponty according to action and 
movement. He discussed it as immersion, although he did not declare that. 
Meaning that he focused only on one process to engage with the world, 
neglecting the motivation and the habitual body in the process of interaction. 
However, his analysis of time consuming through the verb-noun is very essential 
to this research. 
Therefore, verb or verb-noun is what matters in encountering the subject with the 
object, and this can complete Hirose’s (2002) hypotheses for defining the 
dynamic aspect of embodiment, which is the act of embodying, where the verb 
can be used to help in understanding the moment to moment unfolding of the 
experience so as to help the subject to shift to the state of embodiment. For 
Hirose (2002), engagement is a moment because it takes place when the body 
takes up the charge to act to embody, and, accordingly, motivations and 
affordances are necessary to trigger the action verb in encountering. The 
researcher discusses affordances later in Chapter Four. 
Engagement is also accompanied by attention to the context of situation of the 
subject. As Brady notes, the experience of the individual, and her/his emotions, 
values, beliefs, associations, and memories become as important as the 
aesthetic environment. Thus, the aesthetic response, including any judgments 
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the subjects make, is determined as much by what the subject brings to the 
experience as by the environment (Brady 2003, 106 as cited in (Axberg 2011). 
2.3.1 Personification and Bodily Identification 
Personification and identification are other forms of engagement of the 
subject with the object, where the body of the subject identifies with the object 
and sometimes projects part of its characteristics towards the object to identify 
with it again. Pallasmaa confirms that architecture plays a significant role in 
creating this engagement for the user or the viewer. It can serve as a metaphor 
for the human mind according to the traditional psychoanalytical view, which 
posits that the characteristics of architecture are reflected in mental structures 
and the mental structures are projected in architecture (Pallasmaa 2001). An 
illustrative example, Pallasmaa presents the fear that Kubrick built in The Shining 
(Kubrick 1980). He created the mounting fear in architectural structures and 
metaphors in the setting itself (e.g., the repeated image of blood flooding through 
the elevator doors, corridors, and twins, and the endless corridors) instead of 
being a succession of frightening events (Pallasmaa 2001). On account of this, 
architecture shifts the emphasis from external horror to an internal fear in the 
minds of the characters and the spectators.  
Holl argues that the sense of gravity could be defined as the essence of all 
architectonic structures. Great architecture strengthens verticality of the subject’s 
experience of the world and makes it conscious of gravity and earth (Holl et al. 
2007). When the subject internalizes a building in her/his body, the movement, 
balance, and scale are felt unconsciously through the body as tension in the 
muscular system and in the positions of the skeleton and inner organs (Holl et al. 
2007). Thereupon, Pallasmaa argues that when one gets in contact with the 
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space or encounters it, one mentally visualizes a complex form from all around 
oneself and in looking one feels and identifies oneself with its center of gravity 
(Pallasmaa 2001). 
Pallasmaa also highlights that Melanie  Klein’s (1979) notion of projective 
identification suggests that all human interaction implies the projection of 
fragments of the self onto the other person (Pallasmaa 2012 p.46); when 
experiencing a structure, the subject unconsciously mimics its configuration with 
bones and muscles to identify with the object. Macleod, Hanks and Jonathan give 
an example that increased the identification with the space to create an affective 
experience is keeping the diary of Anne Frank in her house until today to create 
an authentic narrative. Anne Frank hid with her family in a secret annex off the 
office of her father during World War II until the annex was stormed and the 
occupants were arrested and deported to concentration camps. Her diaries were 
found and the annex and the adjacent buildings were together converted into 
Anne Frank House Museum (Macleod, Hanks & Jonathan 2012). The rooms of 
the annex have been preserved in their original state with some personal items 
from the eight residents to recreate real event in a real physical setting in order 
to make the visitors identify with Anne and all the war victims. Steven Greenberg, 
an architect working mainly on museums, regards this kind of engagement as 
active participation, and he calls it associative identification. He indicated another 
kind of identification, namely, sympathetic identification, which is the identification 
that occurs when the visitor expresses a kind of solidarity with a figure who is 
usually suffering without recourse to active participation (Macleod , Hanks & 
Jonathan 2012). 
Another form of identification is empathy. It was used in the study of aesthetics 
to describe the way in which observers are able to project themselves into a work 
  
48 
 
of art, or a thing, or beauty. However, McCardell  notes that with the shift in the 
field of aesthetics, the indication of empathy has moved from the realm of sense-
perception to a moral cognitive one (McCardell 2001). In The Problems of 
Aesthetics (1965), Elliseo Vivas refers to the psychologist Anstruther-Thompson 
who is describing her engagement with the Venus of Milo statue noting her bodily 
reactions and describing her sensations:  
My eye falls on the Venus of Milo. . . . The pressure of my feet on the ground is 
pressure that I see in a marked degree in the feet of the statue. The lift-up of my 
body I see done more strongly and amply in her marble body, and the steadying 
pressure of my head I see in a diminished degree in the poise of the statue‘s 
beautiful head. These movements I may be said to imitate, but I should find them 
and imitate them equally in a Renaissance monument or a mediaeval chalice. 
They are at the basis of all art. Another connection that I feel with her is by the 
balance and shifting of my weight from side to side in order to follow her balance. 
 (Vivas 1965 p.320)  
This kind of identification is more bodily and is felt corporeally. It also allows an 
opportunity to increase engagement so as to offer a more embodied experience.  
In film, Hanich believes that the interpretive experience is justified by engaging 
the spectators via empathy and sympathy that are facilitated by a character to 
whom the spectators relate and whom they like, where the spectator shares with 
the character a congruent emotion (Hanich 2010). 
2.3.2 Empathy vs. Sympathy 
In film studies, Sobchack (1992) and Marks (2000) have shown, based on 
their theories, that watching a movie is an embodied and emotional experience 
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that stimulates the senses and makes the spectator react affectively and 
corporeally. Sobchack (2004) maintains that the emotional response of the viewer 
is based on the experience of its own embodiment according to its identification 
with protagonist(s), which shifts her/his gaze into a direct embodied experience 
that is responsible for the affective response in the filmic experience. 
Carl Platinga, a professor of film and media, is interested in cognitive film theory 
and the role of affect in film viewing, emphasizes the significance of the film’s 
formal and textual features for an affective and emotional engagement. 
Accordingly, narrative and technical practices such as camera angles and shot 
size are responsible for framing the spectator’s possible engagement with 
characters (Platinga 2009). He follows Murrray Smith (1995) who applied a 
combination of narrative and cognitive approaches to cinema and who made a 
central contribution to film studies of character engagement. 
From the perspective of Smith (1994), the cognitive construction of narrative is a 
process that has three levels of engagement to create a structure of sympathy; 
recognition, alignment, and allegiance. The weakest level of engagement in 
sympathy is recognition. It is concerned with identifying the characters and their 
presence on screen in terms of the number of times they show up to make the 
viewer recognize them. alignment describes “the process by which spectators are 
placed in relation to characters in terms of access to their actions and what they 
know and feel” (Smith 1994 p.41). Within this context, Smith (1994) proposed two 
interlocking functions for alignment; spatial attachment and subjective access. 
Spatial attachment is related to the capacity of the narration to restrict itself to the 
actions of a single character (Smith 1994) whereas subjective access relates to 
the degree of access the viewer has to the subjectivity of characters, which varies 
from character to another within a narrative (Smith 1994). On the other hand, 
  
50 
 
allegiance concerns the moral and ideological evaluation of characters by the 
spectator. While recognition and alignment provide the viewer with an 
understanding of certain mental states and traits on screen, allegiance comprises 
emotional and intellectual response to the characters and their actions. 
Accordingly, he demonstrates that allegiance to a character causes a form of 
engagement that positions the viewer within the discursive and textual frame of 
the film (Smith 1994). 
Merleau-Ponty states that “I can understand the function of the living body only 
by enacting it myself, and only in so far as I am a body” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 
p.75). As the other form of engagement, empathy, which is attributed to 
imagination, is the capacity for entering imaginably into the situation of another 
person or animal (Axberg 2011), and the mental entering into the feeling or spirit 
of a person or thing (McCardell 2001). In the context of movement and the 
memory of movement, Axberg (2011) confines empathy to the higher senses of 
seeing and hearing, and McCardell (2001) refers it to touching, to make it 
appreciative perception or understanding  
In Hanich’s (2010) opinion and drawing upon Smith (1994), there are two forms 
of empathy: imaginative empathy and somatic empathy. They support each other 
in the film experience and both can be separated heuristically. Imaginative 
empathy is the empathy which emerges when the viewer takes over the 
perspective of the character so as to imagine the character from inside and feel 
what she/he feels at the moment. It has a cognitive component because the 
viewer has to assess and evaluate the situation of the character (Hanich 2010). 
On the other hand, the somatic empathy works with the body physically. Hanich 
(2010) defined three forms of somatic empathy; sensation, motor mimicry, and 
affective mimicry. Sensation has to replicate the sensation of the character for 
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example when a hot needle is pierced in the character’s eye. In motor mimicry, 
the viewer mimics the muscular actions of the character, which can have a 
tension or relaxing effect, or even the character’s breathing. As Hanich sees it, in 
dread scenes, mimicry is actually fearful experience that usually results in the 
viewer’s own lived-body constriction because of the stillness in the dread. 
Affective mimicry comes from the anticipation of fear and is reflected in facial 
expressions. Thus, when the viewer mimics a fearful face, it physically feeds the 
emotional experience to increase the feeling of fear or suspense to be similar (if 
not identical) to the fearful character (Hanich 2010, 183). 
In the genre of film, Hanich (2010) looked into the somatic experience of the 
spectator, the body reactions, and the related pleasure. He suggested that the 
components of fear do not elicit fear and that the fear-related lived body 
experience of constriction supports the constrictive tendency of fear (Hanich 
2010).  
According to Van Manen, empathy and sympathy form a certain type of relational 
understanding that correspond to engagement in other people’s lives. This 
understanding is relational, situational, corporeal, temporal, and actional (van 
Manen 2007), and that is what makes the phenomenology of practice a better 
approach to understanding these relations. Hanich asserts that in empathy, the 
viewer feels with the character while in sympathy, on the other hand, the viewer 
feels for the character, not with the character, because of the vulnerability of the 
character in dread (Hanich 2010 pp.183–185). Consequently, empathy is 
powerful in feeding the action as the viewer holds the situation in empathy to act 
or to want the character to act. The shot sizes and the technical devices in film, 
in addition to the narrative, lead to generation of empathy and sympathy. In 
general, Deleuze (1992) and Hitchcock (1995) consider the close-up shots as the 
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shots that create an affection-image (Deleuze 1992; Hitchcock 1995), and, as a 
result, increase the empathy. Nonetheless, this is not a rule as the situation is 
different from film to another, from context to another. Subsequently, once the 
researcher starts describing scenes taken from different films they will be 
described in more detail. Having introduced and discussed the philosophy of 
engagement, in the next two sub-sections the researcher touches upon the 
entities involved in the encounter, namely, the subject and the object. 
2.4 Subject 
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but 
a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a 
world which the subject itself projects. 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.499) 
The main pivot of phenomenology is the subjective experience and the 
role of the body in this experience. In consequence, the subject is the central 
component of embodiment. In defining the relationship between subject and 
object, Merleau-Ponty (2002) illustrated that sensation and perception cannot 
exist except by being a perception and sensation of something. Although the 
object is determinate as an identifiable being and has an open series of potential 
and possible experiences, it only exists for a subject to carry out the identification. 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) counted the subject as a significant factor in perception 
and acting towards the world, in contrast with the empiricism researchers and 
their view on the subject. He founded his ideas on the thoughts of Kant and took 
them further. Kant has been defined by Kristensen (2015) as intermediate 
between empiricism and intellectualism. He took the empirical sense experience 
as the base for all knowledge while holding the rational thought to see the world 
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in the first place to give the ultimate value to the objective and universal way of 
seeing and understanding the world; things in themselves. Merleau-Ponty took 
this hybrid idea further and put the human body in the center. He recognizes the 
value of seeing the world as ‘we’ see it, i.e., subjectively, not objectively. He sees 
the person as a spatio-temporal creation with access to ever-changing 
perspectives and views of the world (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999; 
Kristensen 2015; Seamon 2017). 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the subject engages with the world through a 
process that includes perception, cognition, movement, and action (Merleau-
Ponty 2002; Carman 1999). In film, Elliott considers the spectator as a subject, 
who exists as a conscious self, namely, “a site of affect, an archive of bodily 
experience past and present, a corporeal sense-making machine and a surface 
of intensities” (Elliott 2011 p.45). This means that the subject is necessary in 
recording the body experience and its situation of existence, or in Heidegger’s 
term, of being-in-the-world. This takes place and stresses the constitution of the 
sense of being, in which Heidegger refers to every particular mode of being finds 
its source and ground. Knowing for him is a mode of being because every 
moment of practical acting and knowing takes place to involve the subject in the 
world (van Manen 2007; Heidegger 1996).  
For further understanding of the subject, this research progressed to investigate 
concepts of the body and its process of consciousness through the notion of a 
corporeal experience. 
2.4.1 The Body 
MCcardell states that by the 17th century the concept of the body had 
acquired cultural objecthood. Bodily experiences that drop in and out of 
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consciousness and awareness, gave rise to theories of dualism (duality in mind 
and body) for Descartes. Then, in the rise of science in the 17th century and under 
the influence of Cartesian thought, theories identified the body with all aspects 
such as mind, desire, emotions, and affordances (McCardell 2001). While in Film, 
Marks and Hanich concur that any project that speaks of embodiment speaks of 
the flesh in which corporeality speaks (Marks 2000; Hanich 2010).  
Many theorists have subsequently discussed the body and its role in experiencing 
the world, including Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl  (2001) raised attention 
to the role of the body in perception, but Carman argues that Husserl for granted 
the cognitive attitudes than the body skills (Carman 1999). On the other hand, 
Merleau-Ponty based his entire phenomenological approach and understanding 
on notions of body intentionality and skills. He did not deny or doubt the existence 
of the mental phenomena but insisted on the premise that thought and sensation 
occur only against a background of perceptual activity in which the subject 
understands in bodily terms by engaging with it (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Schmitz and Griffero concludes that Husserl’s account of the body, which is a 
field for localization of feelings, not a subject of experience, is an account of the 
personal body or the felt-body defined as (Leib in German language), not of the 
physical or material body defined as (Korper in German language) (Schmitz et al. 
2011; Griffero 2014). From his viewpoint, what locates sensations in the body is 
the tactile sensations involved in touching, not the visual or auditory sensations, 
because by means of touch, the body can locate tactile sensations, which cannot 
be located by the eye or the ear. Thus, for Husserl, the touch is the main sense 
to create the experience of the body. He clarifies that after perception, the body 
turns from Korper into Leib, then the sensations proceed to act corporeally. 
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But since Husserl concentrated only on touch and its concerns such as pain and 
cold, the body of eyes is not a body for him. In order to understand the body as a 
subject experience, the object, its perception, and awareness have to be 
considered in the process. In view of this, Merleau-Ponty broadened his look at 
the body to consider it as a “system of definite powers” that is “suddenly 
decentralized, broken up and reorganized under a fresh law unknown to the 
subject or the external witness, and one which reveals itself to them at the very 
moment at which the process occurs” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.225). in addition, 
the human body has the power of appropriating or taking up “significant cores 
which transcend and transfigure its natural powers” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.225). 
In other words, the human body, based on the different external powers, copes 
with new situations, turns into a new locus of metastable possibilities, and 
becomes the center of a world of new meanings that can call to its powers that 
the interaction of the body with the world is continuous and never-ending 
changing process. This power of the body makes it act as a work of art. 
2.4.1.1 The Body as a Work of Art: 
Merleau-Ponty proposes that the body should be understood as a work of 
art, not as an object, which implies that he thinks of the living and acting body. 
Just like the work of art, the body, as a negotiation of impersonal forces, turns it 
through a creative operation into an individual to turn the past into a harmonious 
gesture towards a future or into a physical action while interacting with the world. 
Accordingly, the meaning of the body is tied to the networks of meaning that 
surround it to make up its cultural and historical milieu (Merleau-Ponty 2002; 
Carman 1999). 
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In his study of engagement of the body with the world, Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
suggested a model of perception, cognition, and movement. He described 
immersion, the merging of the subject with the object, where there is no distinction 
between them; the movement and action happen unconsciously.  
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of body schema is developed by the Gestalt notion. 
Body schema is a group of skills and capacities that establish the precognitive 
familiarity of the body with itself and with the world it inhabits (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). This process turns the unfamiliar situation into a familiar situation. 
Merleau-Ponty interprets that the subject responds to, and anticipates, familiar 
situations as typical instances, stereotypes or habits. The body schema is, 
therefore, neither a mere copy of the existing parts of the body nor the global 
consciousness of it. Rather, he defines it as a dynamic system that “appears to 
me as an attitude with a view to a certain actual or possible task” (Merleau-Ponty 
2002 p.100). Therefore, the body schema is the reference point that establishes 
a stable perceptual background for the perceived object and it can respond to 
changes and movements in any environment. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the concept of body schema is essential to the 
concept of habit; a group of skills that are ready to anticipate the world prior to 
the formation of thoughts and judgment (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Habit, as Landes 
defines according to Merleau-Ponty, makes the body take up meanings towards 
the world through catching of a set of potentials that may or may not express 
themselves in the future (Landes 2013). Accordingly, habit is defined by Merleau-
Ponty as consisting of non-cognitive, pre-conceptual motor intentionality. This is 
considered as a manifestation of the perceptual body that understands in the 
acquisition of habit, but it does not react as a reflection to consciousness and is 
not a function of a reflective thought (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Based on the concept 
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of habit, there can be a habitual body, which is a body that performs the meaning 
unconsciously on the basis of the familiar situation. On the other hand, there is 
the actual body, which is the body that reacts to the meaning of the world 
consciously and at the moment (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999; Landes 
2013).  
The concept of habit is necessary in film. It is built from the beginning to put the 
viewer in the world of the film, in order to understand what the familiar is and what 
is not. Accordingly, in dread, the viewer can take up meanings towards the world 
and catch the potentials to be more engaged to the screen. All those meanings 
create a base for the body to act towards the narrative. 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) described how the body acquires a habit. He stated that 
“to learn to see colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a new use of one’s 
own body: it is to enrich and recast the body schema” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 
p.177). Landes notes that this implies that the acquisition of a habit is a process 
of compiling unconnected movements into a particular gesture that will remain 
hidden in the body until a situation calls for its unified powers (Landes 2013).  
In his illustrative example of how one falls asleep, Merleau-Ponty clarified that it 
is not a decision which the subject reveals, but is a process through which the 
subject enters the world to prepare its body for sleep; “I lie down in bed, on my 
left side, with my knees drawn up; I close my eyes and breathe slowly, putting my 
plans out of my mind” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.189). Those preparations have the 
potential to enact a bodily recognition of these possibilities where the subject 
acquires the habit of sleeping. Stated otherwise, the body works as art and 
negotiates to enact and communicate to be in a situation “which a moment ago I 
voluntarily maintained, now becomes my very being, and sleep, until now aimed 
at as a significance, suddenly become a situation” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.246). 
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If one tries to relate the work of the body according to Merleau-Ponty to the 
conception of Hirose, then the moment of acquiring a habit looks like the act of 
embodying, which is a dynamic process. Once the body sleeps and turns into the 
sleeping situation, its state looks like the state of being embodied, which is a static 
condition, where all the body is surrendered to that particular situation. The way 
how the body reacts to some motivations which affect its being in the world is 
enough to make the body a work of art. Now the research should distinguish 
between the felt-body and the physical body to understand the corporeal 
experience. 
2.4.1.2 Korper and Leib; the Corporeal Dynamics 
Hermann Schmitz is a German phenomenologist who outlined a non-
mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena to involve them in the human 
experience. During the period 1964-1980, he worked on a system of philosophy 
the central part of which was the felt-body (Leib). This system offers a 
phenomenology of the felt-body and other forms of embodied experience to 
produce the phenomenological theories of subjectivity, emotions, and feelings 
(Schmitz et al. 2011). The felt-body (Leib) for Schmitz manifests in the affective 
atmosphere. It lacks the surface space but occupies an absolute and non-
geometrical space and exceeds the skin contour to occasionally concide with the 
material body (Korper). For Schmitz, the material body is a stable extended object 
of natural science that is endowed with a surface (Schmitz et al. 2011; Griffero 
2014). 
Schmitz’s new approach of looking at the body created a New-Phenomenology. 
The central concept and organizing principle of his philosophy is the felt-body and 
any key idea or concept comes into focus with it. It is necessary for Schmitz not 
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“to reify the felt-body and dualistically oppose it to the material body” (Schmitz et 
al. 2011 p.244). In his New-Phenomenology, he focused on human experience 
in the felt-body by discussing the vital drive; the corporeal dynamics in expansion 
and contraction. Expansion is defined as the openness of the felt-body to the 
social surroundings whereas contraction is what happens when the felt-body 
hides itself from the gaze of the surroundings (Schmitz et al. 2011; Hanich 2010; 
Griffero 2014). This vital drive of contraction and expansion is necessary in the 
process of eliciting feelings like anger, sorrow, guilt, joy, and shame. In anger, for 
example, the felt-body hides itself from the surrounding (contraction, or 
narrowness, or constriction). Then, it expands and opens itself to the social 
surroundings (expansion or vastness). In shame, the opposite occurs, that is, the 
felt-body starts with expansion and ends with contraction (Schmitz et al. 2011). 
Hanich adds that Joy has a tendency of expansion of the lived body, while in 
sorrow and guilt the lived body experiences constriction only (Hanich 2010). 
Griffero outlines that Hermann Schmitz considers the head, the chest, and the 
sole of the foot as corporeal isles in which the felt-body identifies itself each time. 
He considers them as felt-body isles that, with the help of the bodily schema, 
merge at a certain point in a person’s development to become physical body 
(Griffero 2014). By so doing, Griffero concludes that a corporeal communication 
can be achieved with all what is perceived, be it mobile or immobile. This explains 
for him how the body can perceive and feel what is seen and how it can perceive 
the atmosphere as oppressive or elating character of a given environment 
(Griffero 2014). 
Julian Hanich has drawn upon the New-Phenomenology of Hermann Schmitz. 
He further explained that fear is mainly located at the constrictive end; the viewer 
experiences the fright of the threatening object as a constriction lived body. While 
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trying to understand Schmitz’s expansive Away!-tendency, he adopted the view 
that fear is also characterized by constricted expansion that creates tension. He 
distinguished between relative and absolute locations where the subject’s 
position in geometrical space is the relative location. In fear, the subject tries to 
escape the relative location. As an example while watching a film, looking away 
and covering the ears looks like escaping from the relative space. However, one 
cannot escape the absolute location, i.e., the lived body’s phenomenological 
‘here’, which is the absolute phenomenological location when one experiences 
constriction in the moments of fear. So, Hanich highlights that the body is trying 
to escape its skin by expanding away somewhere. However, it cannot flee the 
lived body’s constriction. This produces tension between constriction and the 
attempted expansion that feeds the experience of the viewer (Hanich 2010 
p.103). This explains Griffero’s argument that the felt-body communicates with 
the surroundings, and turns the emotion into a spatial atmosphere, presenting an 
absolute location of subjective orientation in order to create the dimension of 
surfaceless space (Griffero 2014). 
In the opinion of Schmitz, the oscillation between the lived body constriction and 
expansion and its affective involvement with the atmopshere will lead eventually 
to corporeal feelings and, accordingly, to self-consciousness (Schmitz et al. 
2011). This kind of engagement will increase the somatic empathy, since it is felt, 
and also the imaginative empathy. Subsequently, it will increase the corporeality 
of the viewer. 
2.4.1.3 The Aesthesiological Body 
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty addressed the notion of the 
body that slips underneath consciousness. As a pre-reflective, it is the body that 
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exits under the subjects’ egos, which combines sensing and thinking, where the 
mind thinks and the flesh feels. He refers to this body as the Chiasm (Merleau-
Ponty et al. 1968). Paul Elliott thinks of the chiasm as the flesh of thought, or 
perhaps the thoughts of the flesh, because it posits a body capable of 
autonomous sense making and of sub-conscious, pre-reflective action, which, in 
turn, grounds the body within the world and increases its consciousness and 
corporeality (Elliott 2011). This concept can be applied to that of the construction 
of cinematic dread. It complements experience through spatial and temporal 
characteristics, where the expectations of the viewer start to build a scenario that 
will create constriction, mainly because of fear. So, the body is corporeally 
present with full consciousness waiting for the horror or shock, or for the character 
to act.  
2.4.2 Corporeal Presence: Consciousness 
For Merleau-Ponty, objects take a relative location and they always exist 
in the world, irrespective of whether the subject does, or does not, perceive them. 
The subject always occupies a relative location in the world, but it does not exist 
the whole time. Merleau-Ponty could not be more explicit by saying that “If we 
therefore say that the body expresses existence at every moment, this is in the 
sense in which a word expresses thought” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.192). In other 
words, the body does not exist at every moment and there are moments that 
make the subject is existence to be-in-the-world, here and now. These moments 
of existence contribute to the consciousness of the subject as Merleau-Ponty 
states “Consciousness is existence for itself” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.253). 
From Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, the expression of the body is the mirror of its 
existence and its mystery spreads the obscurity to the perceived world. He 
believes that the mind is a medium for interaction between being and the world:  
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Expression, then, is both a transformation of the world and a being in 
intersubjective relationships with other embodied subjects. The body is its 
expression, and meaning exists only in the act of the body in relation to the object 
of the gesture (the word being read or spoken) and the world that is 
intended…Expression shows us that there is no ‘other’ place for meaning or ideal 
objects, and the problem of the world, and, to begin with, that of one’s own body, 
consists in the fact that it is all there. 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.230). 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) connected the expression with meaning. He illustrated that 
bodies are not like houses which have numbers that indicate their modalities the 
whole time, but the proper understanding of expression is an account of meaning 
in action. 
Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore stated in their book Body, Memory and 
Architecture, one of the first books that survey the role of the body and the senses 
in architectural experience, that each place can be unique if it affects the subjects’ 
bodies and if it creates a personal world that makes it remembered. This happens 
when there are transactions between body, imagination, and environment 
(Bloomer and Moore 1977). 
From Merleau-Ponty’s point of view, there is consciousness of the object and 
consciousness of the self. Consciousness of the object presupposes 
consciousness of the self. They may be synonyms as well. He elaborates that it 
is not enough to gaze at the object because the subject should know 
herself/himself watching or seizing in order to be conscious. If she/he is unaware 
of herself/himself, then it will look as if it is a third party who is doing so (Merleau-
Ponty 2002). 
  
63 
 
An alternative view was provided by Vivas and Krieger who addressed this 
tendency towards movement when perceiving specific shapes in architectural 
building. They ordered the process of consciousness into stages to create the 
empathic response. They stated that “when the bodily feelings are not perceived 
as localized in the body, they seem to fill the object.” If those feelings or 
sensations are too weak to induce the attention of the subject, then the subject 
will project part of itself in the object. However, when the feelings are stronger, 
then they will make the subject conscious and there will be no projections from 
the subject’s side towards the object (Vivas and Krieger 1965 P. 321) as cited in 
(Axberg 2011)). In light of this,  one can relate to Merleau-Ponty’s observation 
that when there is consciousness of something, then this is because the subject 
is nothing, and the sensations and the material of knowledge are not phases of 
consciousness, but are part of the constituted world (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.276). 
Gerald Edelman, chairman of the Department of Neurobiology at the Scripps 
Research Institute, maintains that consciousness is a fluid word. He suggests a 
list of its properties rather than a definition for it. He supports the notion that it is 
a form of awareness and that it is not a thing but a process whose personal 
property is possessed by individuals. Consciousness is a continuous and 
changing process. It deals with objects independent of the self and is selective in 
time. He also underlined that it is bound up to some degree with volition and 
decision. Therefore, he argues it relates to intentionality (Edelman 1989 p.4). 
What matters in consciousness is the moment; the time. Merleau-Ponty states 
that “My body takes possession of time: it brings into existence a past and a future 
for a present; it is not a thing, but creates time instead of submitting to it” (Merleau-
Ponty 2002 p.279). He considers the gaze and the look at the object as they give 
the subject a segment of time; “the synthesis which it effects are themselves 
  
64 
 
temporal phenomena which pass, and can be recaptured only in a fresh act which 
is itself temporal” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.279). He confirms that the act of looking 
must be renewed, otherwise it falls into unconsciousness. 
The act of looking as Merleau-Ponty thinks of it is both prospective, and 
retrospective. It is prospective because the object is the final stage of the 
subject’s action of focusing. On the other hand, it is retrospective because it will 
present itself in its own appearance and as the stimulus, the motive, or the prime 
mover of the process from the beginning (Merleau-Ponty 2002). In this case, the 
object is based on this idea of unfolding in time, which, in turn, justifies creating it 
instead of submitting to it. Building on that, one can consider the time in dread 
scenes to be extending according to the oscillation between what is understood 
to be a conscious and an unconscious subject. 
The concept of habit has been discussed earlier as a group of skills that are ready 
to anticipate the world prior to the formation of thoughts and judgment (Merleau-
Ponty 2002). By definition, this means that habit does not meet with 
consciousness. It is absolutely what the subject does and what she/he perceives 
and does unconsciously. Merleau-Ponty points to some objects that appear to 
act as an extension of the body, as in his famous example, the blind man’s stick, 
which he considers as an extension to his body, not as an object, that is no longer 
perceived, that is an example of withdrawal from consciousness into 
unconsciousness.   
This issue of tools has been explained by Heidegger. He distinguishes between 
two kinds of tools. The first type of tool is one which he calls present-at-hand if 
they are used as tools and Ready-to-hand if they are used as extension to the 
body (Heidegger 1996). In the light of this,  the blind man’s stick starts as a 
present-at-hand tool which he feels, then, after getting used to, it disappears from 
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the his consciousness, and becomes part of her/his body. The withdrawal of the 
object as a tool has attracted some theorists to put theories to relate the action 
with awareness. Examples include Flow Theory and the Immersion Theory which 
the researcher discusses in Chapter Four. 
To sum up, in dread, consciousness of the subject increases the corporeal 
presence of its body because of fear. Fear involves bodily and cognitive 
preparation according to the felt-body constriction and expansion, which create 
tension in return. Tension increases with uncertainty in terms of when and how 
the threat is anticipated as coming. Accordingly, it does not include any aspect of 
habit. This uncertainty and tension increase the level of consciousness, and once 
the body feels the tension in its corporeal isles (e.g., the chest and the feet) this 
tension turns into a corporeal presence of fear. If there is any mimicry with the 
characters, then the viewer will experience the somatic empathy, which is also 
reflected corporeally. 
2.4.3 The Logic and Structure of Existence 
Merleau-Ponty set a structure for existence depicting the subject’s 
experience of being inside and yet shaping a metastable structure of potentials. 
The notions or aspects of existence pass through three stages: ambiguity, 
indeterminacy, and transcendence (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Ambiguity is the essence of human existence, where everything the subject lives 
or has in her/his mind has several meanings (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196). The 
indeterminate nature of any situation is not an imperfection of knowledge, but 
rather “[e]xistence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental 
structure, and in so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless 
takes on meaning… in so far as it is the act of taking up a de facto situation” 
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(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196). Transcendence is the process by which existence 
takes up to its own account and transforms from a volunteer into a situation 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196). 
Expression according to Merleau-Ponty, as it has been discussed above, is 
regarded as the subject’s taking up of a position in the world of its meaning 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.225). One can also consider that in order to reach a state 
of embodiment, the act of embodiment, as has been defined by Hirose (2002), is 
making another form of transcendence because the subject interfaces to take an 
action. Therefore, these three stages can be considered as the gate to an 
embodied experience that will eventually result in consciousness and corporeal 
presence. 
To summarize in conclusion, the process that occurs when engaging with a dread 
scene as follows: the subject perceives the world; she/he enters the ambiguity 
and indeterminacy stages because of the uncertainty; the felt-body identifies itself 
and, through the corporeal isles with the help of the bodily schema, merges to 
become a physical body; with contraction or expansion, the subject is conscious; 
she/he feels, exists, then takes up; and she/he then expresses an expansive 
Away!-tendency to act, because it cannot escape the relative space. On that 
ground, thriller films and dread spaces can count on using this structure to 
manipulate the body of the viewer both consciously and corporeally.  
2.5 Atmosphere 
So far, this chapter introduced two major components of the process of 
embodiment. It started with analysis of the process of encountering, namely, the 
process of engagement, which is responsible for extending the relation between 
the subject and the object as well as with their mutual encountering. Then, it 
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introduced the subject and how it can be read as a corporeal entity to be 
embodied. Subsequently, this section addresses the object which the subject 
encounters through the medium of atmosphere.  
The object can be one thing and it can be a whole situation. What matters in this 
study is the issue of encountering the subject (the viewer) with the screen. 
Physically, the screen is an object, but it contains a series of images, narratives, 
and motion that affect the body of the viewer. For that reason, the object will be 
discussed as an atmosphere. It can be understood both as an object and as the 
whole experience produced by the process of engagement. 
2.5.1 Definition and Ontology of Atmosphere 
The phenomenologist Dufrenne (1973) reflected on the concept of 
atmosphere. Although as Anderson points out, he did not settle on a clear 
definition of what atmosphere is, he used approximations to support the 
description of experience. For him, the atmosphere of the aesthetic object elicits 
feeling or emotion in the viewer. Hence, he counted atmosphere as a singular 
affective quality through which the subject creates an intensive space-time 
because the atmosphere creates a space of intensity that overflows into a 
represented world combined from subject and objects or other subjects 
(Anderson 2009). 
Böhme (1993) developed the concept of atmosphere. He viewed it spatially as 
the ambience where things, situations, and surroundings appeal to the subject. 
He underlined three aspects regarding the atmosphere. First, the ambience 
works and creates a specific relation between object and subject. Second, 
ambience is experienced as a coherent unit; no one can separate the 
surroundings from the perceptual background and the sensuous experience, 
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which is the reason why atmosphere can be understood phenomenologically. 
Third, ambience cannot only be experienced, but it can also be made or 
manipulated aesthetically to give things or people a certain quality to be perceived 
in a certain controlled way (Bohme 1993; Norman et al. 2010). 
Holl, Pallasmaa, and Perez-Gomez (2007) describe atmosphere as a synthesis 
of foreground, middle ground, and distant view with the interlocking of time, light 
material, and details, in addition to the subject to create the whole where no one 
can distinguish the individual elements. They named it the Enmeshing 
Experience, the final condition that makes it impossible to break the perception 
into a simple collection of geometries, activities, or sensations. 
Griffero (2014) developed the concept of atmosphere in his book Atmospheres: 
Aesthetics of Emotional Spaces. He built his ideas on those of Hermann Schmitz 
and Merleau-Ponty. His book is a key reference for this research regarding 
Schmitz’s philosophy since most of his writings are in German. Griffero considers 
the atmosphere as emotions arguing that they lose meaning when someone tries 
to describe them. On that basis, one has to live in them in order to understand 
them. He described the atmosphere as external feelings effused into a “not yet 
clarified” spatial dimension and tied to situations (Griffero 2014 p.31).  
To clarify the definition of atmosphere, Griffero (2014) listed some characteristics 
of the atmospheric ontology. First of all, he argues that atmospheres do not act 
as cause of the influence because they are the influences. The atmosphere lies 
somewhere in-between the co-presence of a subject with her/his felt-body and 
the object. Consequently, they are not a third party. However, they enter the 
corporeal communication and are interpreted by both of them. Second, the 
atmospheres are pure phenomena that exist only when they coincide with their 
appearance, unlike properties, which exist if they are only thinkable. As a 
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consequence, atmospheres can have boundaries; fiat boundaries, established by 
the subject’s cognitive activity dependent on the perception, or bona fide 
boundaries, due to an immanent qualitative and spatial discontinuity. This makes 
any change or replacement in the details of the atmosphere threaten that the 
atmosphere could be changed (Griffero 2014 p.126). Third, atmospheres are not 
the property of some object, they coincide with their own phenomenic character. 
Atmospheres most condensed with objects coincide and show themselves 
through situations. These situations can arouse the atmosphere or take charge 
of it. Griffero (2014) confirms that anything can be mentioned as atmospheric, 
only when it grasps a feeling in the surrounding space, i.e., when it makes a 
difference in the felt space, filled by atmosphere not as material object, but rather 
as a vibration in which the perceived entity and the perceiver meet and merge. 
2.5.2 Perception of Atmosphere  
From the standpoint of Schmitz (2002), perception is a “communication of 
the felt-body [Leib] with meaningful impressions” (Schmitz 2002, 38 as cited in 
(Griffero 2014 p.17)). Griffero (2014) stresses that through the external situations 
the atmosphere can arouse affective and corporeal conditions in the subject in 
order for it (the atmosphere) to be perceived. Griffero (2014) adds that the 
situation is intensely perceived when it escapes ordinary pragmatic relationships. 
So, what is perceived according to him, and in agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s 
framework, is the significance and the sensible properties of the situation, 
disjointed from the physical stimulus with emotional salience. 
According to Griffero, perceiving the atmosphere is not the elementary sensing 
of data that happens after the state of things, but is being involved in the things 
themselves. In other words, it is a holistic and emotional being-in-the-world with 
what is now-here-for me, both affectively and corporeally. He also argues that the 
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intuitive perception of situation is a seventh sense that develops through 
synesthetic and sensory unity of experience (Griffero 2014 p.17). 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) qualifies that the atmosphere works as one unit and cannot 
be segmented. In this regard, the viewer perceives the atmosphere of dread as 
a whole, which helps to increase the engagement without segmenting it, to be 
more embodied while watching. However, Merleau-Ponty states that the subject 
can divide the atmosphere or describe it according to the moments and meanings 
that make the objects recognizable to allow its sensible properties to appear 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002). Then, how those moments affect the subject? 
2.5.3 Affect of Atmosphere 
Griffero argues that what the subject perceives is an atmospheric quality, 
based on the aesthetics of empathy which the subject refers to. Thus, the 
atmosphere can be the antagonist that the subject resists or surrenders to. On 
the other hand, it can be supportive of the subject (Griffero 2014).  Griffero argues 
that sometimes, there are feelings that fill the sentimental space. Such feelings 
are called objective feelings that is, a halo in determined objects, and are felt 
among one another, such as the bliss of an evening sky or the silence of a gloomy 
house. He argues that these atmospheres give rise to reactions (i.e., the image-
motor effect) to create the mood of the subject (Griffero 2014 p.101). 
He argues, that the most affected atmosphere is the one connected to 
corporeality, and he calls them corporeal atmospheric affections. According to 
him, those affections occur even through the corporeal isles, and they can be 
produced kinesthetically and synaesthetically (Griffero 2014). 
 From Schmitz’s point of view, the felt-body has corporeal isles through which 
one can feel the atmosphere and express it through the physical body which 
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attributes an external and semi-objective existence, not to all feelings, but to the 
atmospheric ones (Schmitz 1967, as cited in (Griffero 2014). Griffero interprets 
the bodily affection through this example, “sadness weighs down the heart and 
breaks one down, the object of admiration cancels the space that separates us 
from it, the shame leads to lower one’s gaze and contraction[…]the object of awe 
pushes us to withdraw and leave[…]the euphoric leads to jump” (Griffero 2014 
p.102). Griffero stresses that what matters is the atmospheric qualities not the 
metaphoric ones. For instance, the qualities rugged, massive, heavy, light, hard, 
and soft are not metaphoric, metrical, or measurable, but are corporeal 
atmospheric affections that can only be compared in language. As an example, 
“admiration is less deep than reverence” and “aversion is less deep than despair” 
(Griffero 2014 p.110). He concludes that in addition to the corporeal isles, 
corporeal atmospheric affections can be produced kinesthetically in muscles, 
skin, and eyes to introduce the state of mind. For instance, in pride, the subject 
straightens up the backbones to produce a muscular sensation akin to the attitude 
of pride (Griffero 2014). He acknowledges that when the subject experiences 
spaces that enlarge her/his heart, this happens kinesthetically, not 
metaphorically; in walking in the forest, the subject breathes freely to expand the 
thorax, which increases the size of the heart (Griffero 2014 pp.118–119). In 
another example, Griffero (2014) shows that the corporeal atmospheric affections 
can be produced synaesthetically like the case of the atmosphere of brightness 
in which brightness is not metaphorical and is not measurable since no one can 
identify the amount of the solar radiation, but it is given by optical-auditory, 
olfactory climatic corporeal, where one describes it as the free expansion of the 
felt-body and, as a result, opens the absolute location (Griffero 2014 p.111). The 
ultimate purpose of those atmospheric affections is existence. As Böhme states,  
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 [there is] the environment that irradiates a qualitatively specific mood, on the 
other hand [there is] me, who, by feeling a certain way, participate in this mood 
and realize that I am here now.  
(Böhme 1995, 96) as cited in (Griffero 2014 p.118)). 
2.5.4 Energizing Atmosphere 
Theorists in geography, criminology, and environmental management like 
Emma Waterton, Jason Dittmer, Ben Anderson, Tim Edensor, Jennifer Turner, 
and Kimberley Peters suggest that atmosphere can be engineered along with the 
effects it is intended to induce, and that the atmosphere can be shaped and co-
produced according to the subject as individuals or as groups (Edensor et al. 
2015; Waterton and Dittmer 2014; Anderson 2009; Edensor 2012). They suggest 
that this can be achieved by creating and arranging the light, sounds, and 
symbols. In fact, Anderson asserts that the atmospheres can also be enhanced, 
transformed, intensified, and shaped (Anderson 2009). Waterton and Dittmer 
(2014) maintain that the atmosphere becomes known as it stabilizes subjects to 
feel its effect and grasp its meaning. In harmony with Duffrenne (1973), Anderson 
(2009) sees that atmospheres are perpetually forming and deforming, appearing 
and disappearing, as bodies enter into relation with one another since they are 
never finished, static, or at rest, and that through this they give the rhythm for 
movement. 
Shaping spatial constructs and imagination is conceived by Labelle as 
pluralization. It is no longer a visual perspective or a graphical language of 
architecture, but a collaboration of the dynamics such as temperature, weather, 
lighting, and other sensorial motifs to thicken the atmosphere (Labelle 2011). In 
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consequence, all kinds of details, in addition to the spaces and their occupants, 
engineer the atmosphere. 
2.5.5 How the Screen and Watching a Film Constitute an Atmosphere 
Griffero considers the atmosphere a virtual movement in that it 
unconsciously “excites in the subject the stimulus to make the same movement” 
(Griffero 2014 p.49), and he confirms that the intensity of the atmosphere refers 
to some elements or moments that work as anchor points to create a field of 
condensation that make it perceived. One can consider those anchor points in 
film as the points that are generally perceived by the majority of viewers, such as 
stairs, doors and walls, that filmmakers always work around them to support the 
film’s atmosphere. As Hanich (2010) sees it, the dread atmosphere is very 
intense in its story and in its environment and is endowed with an emotional tone 
in order for fear and anxiety to be presented in an objective space. But the 
fundamental questions for this thesis are: How, and to what extent can the subject 
surrender to atmosphere? Can this surrender guarantee all the subjects to 
experience the same atmosphere? Griffero notes that although the perception of 
an atmosphere does not imply the recognition of the object in its entirely, but 
simply its perception happens according to its assessment of its important 
aspects (Griffero 2014 p.131).  
Hanich states that the experience of watching a film is almost guaranteed for the 
majority of people (Hanich 2010). But how is it guaranteed? Griffero (2014) 
confirms that no two people can perceive the atmosphere in exactly the same 
way, but this does not mean that ten people will perceive ten different 
atmospheres. He refers to the coincidence between the form of perception and 
its content, for example where there is a common spatial-sentimental-
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atmospheric quality that intimidates vastness or contraction. In addition to that, 
and in agreement with Hanich (2010), he confirms that it is rare for the 
atmosphere to be completely different and that there is always a common point 
of view but that it may vary in its extent. 
2.5.6 Constricted Atmosphere 
From the perspective of Hanich, the atmospheres exist as diffuse emotive 
colorations of the lived body without concrete object. But some atmospheric 
elements suggest viewing an experience of constriction and isolation. Hence “the 
atmosphere of constriction and isolation do not create but facilitate and enhance 
dread and are therefore almost always part of it” (Hanich 2010 p.171). He 
describes confined spaces, endless spaces, and labyrinths as examples of 
constricted atmosphere (Hanich 2010). Hanich notes that the constricted filmic 
space can be confined through tangible elements, such as a cave or a tunnel, or 
through shots that enclose the character as the technique of frame within a frame 
as in Dark Water (Salles 2005). He also considers desert as in The Hills have 
Eyes II (Weisz 2007), oceans as in Open Water (Kentis 2003) and woods as in 
Blair witch Project (Daniel Myrick 1999) as examples of endless spaces. Hanich 
describes endless space as evoking immediate immensity, which is going deep 
in the space and staying in real film time with the characters, e.g., in their 
swimming, walking, or fighting under water (Hanich 2010). As another example, 
He (2010, 171) counts the labyrinth in its bewildered arrangements as a 
constricted atmosphere because of the disorienting arrangement and the 
disturbing feeling they evoke. 
 Although Hanich in his book pointed briefly to some constricted atmospheres 
used in dread, but his perspective counted only on architectural settings, without 
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getting deep in the concept of atmosphere and its relation to the subject or the 
felt-body as Schmitz and Griffero consider to contribute to the atmosphere. In 
order to fill this gap and to grasp specific elements of atmosphere 
phenomenologically, and realize their affect in creating an atmosphere, the 
research has to address the concepts thing, quasi-thing, space and place, in 
order to enhance the experience of the dread atmosphere, and to come out with 
other perspectives towards the constricted atmosphere. 
2.5.7 Thing and Quasi-thing 
It has been argued that atmosphere is a whole and that it is perceived as 
a unity. Nevertheless, there is/are always specific item(s) that make(s) 
atmosphere more perceived in specific moments. Some of the philosophers call 
such items the bridge (e.g., Heidegger), anchor point (e.g., Schmitz), motif (e.g., 
Hitchcock), or encapsulated object (e.g., Ng).  
Heidegger (2001 [1971]) explored the notion of the bridge that manifests events 
and creates places; where the bridge connects between banks to make the bank 
manifested as a bank. In this regard, he notes that the bridge preserves the banks 
against each other and links them together. However, it does not link in a single 
way, but in a changing and unique way. As such, bridges are always different. 
Thus, for him, the bridge can gather the environment; the earth, sky, divinities, 
and mortals. This combination is defined by Heidegger as the thing (Heidegger 
2001; Shīrāzī 2013). Hence, not every single object in the atmosphere can be 
called a thing, but one can assume the atmosphere of fear as a thing in its totality 
according to its nature and the affect it creates for the audience and the character 
in film. Underneath that thing can be other things that manifest themselves the 
atmosphere of fear.  
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Sometimes, there is a situation that makes an atmosphere be perceived in a 
specific way that cannot be segmented to specific thing. This is what is referred 
to as the quasi-thing. Griffero defined it as a situational constraint demonstrated 
by motor reactions and traced or suggested by the situation itself (Griffero 2014, 
35). In this context, Merleau-Ponty (2002) defined the situation as a horizon of 
significance, where the sensory system gives a certain theme and style to look. 
Drawing from this, Griffero formulated a new definition for atmospheres stating 
that they are feelings poured out into space; “they are modes of a corporeal 
communication that at times super subjective and super objective; at times it is 
dependent on the subject, or condensed into (or anchored to) preferential objects” 
(Griffero 2014, 108). As a consequence, he concluded that atmospheres are 
quasi-things “whose ecstasies are expressive characters or qualities; these 
qualities belong where we find them” (Griffero 2014 p.109). This motivates the 
research to look for quasi-things in dread atmosphere, since the atmosphere is a 
whole and cannot be segmented, in order to collaborate on the constricted 
atmosphere of Hanich’s (2010). The question now is, how can these qualities 
affect the subject’s perception of the space?  
2.5.8 Place and Space 
Seamon states that phenomenologists have become interested in the 
phenomenon of place, “because it is a primary contributor to the spatial, 
environmental, and temporal constitution of any lifeworld, past, present or future” 
(Seamon 2017). Bloomer and Morre (1977) highlighted that each place can be 
unique, depending on what effects it creates in the subject to be remembered 
(Bloomer and Moore 1977). In view of that, understanding the difference between 
space and place is of high importance for this research because the main goal of 
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embodiment is to engage the subject with the environment here and now, where, 
in turn, memories, desires, and emotions are created in the experience. 
The meanings of space and place are relative to the user and the moment of 
experience.  
As concluded by Shīrāzī (2013), Heidegger focused more on place than on 
space, because he considers the originality of place-making in the bridge 
establishes a place over there. The thing that gathers the four elements of sky, 
earth, divinities, and mortals establishes the place, and, consequently, a space 
is provided. Space for Heidegger is where there is a room for something to exist 
within a boundary, not the boundary at which something stops, but when 
something begins its process of presenting itself. Therefore, the space finds its 
essence in locations, not in spaces. Shīrāzī concludes that the space is existential 
not physical. He points out that making room is the yielding of places to arrange 
and prepare an openness in which things belong together and make dwelling 
possible (Shīrāzī 2013). 
Pallasmaa (2001, 2012) contended that the space is not necessary to be 
geometrized within good shapes and forms, since the most important issue for it 
is to be habituated and full of emotions within physical boundaries to be 
considered as lived space. He states that when one perceives the memory, the 
fear and desire, the value and meaning, then she/he can perceive the lived space 
(Pallasmaa 2012; Pallasmaa 2001). Pallasmaa (2001) pointed out two kinds of 
architecture; the architecture of image and the architecture of essence. The 
architecture of image is the architecture which gives less in the actual encounter 
than in its photography picture; it offers mere images of form and leaves the 
audience as spectators only (Pallasmaa 2001). He notes that this is what 
Lefebvre (1991) was interested in and what he called the abstract space. On the 
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other hand, the architecture of essence is defined by Pallasmaa as rich when 
experienced in an embodied manner; it projects narratives of culture, history, 
tradition, and human existence, and turns the audience into participants 
(Pallasmaa 2001).  
Seamon (2017) pinpointed the difference between phenomenological definitions 
of place and environment. For him, the environment always exists, regardless of 
whether there is, or there is not, a subject to engage with, and as a result, it 
suggests a separation, objectively and subjectively. But the concept of place he 
argues is more apt phenomenologically because it offers means highlighting that 
the subject is always immersed in its world that makes it a lived body (Seamon 
2017). For that reason, he defined place as “any environmental locus that gathers 
human experiences, actions, and meanings spatially and temporally” (Seamon 
2017). In light of that, the definition of place ranges from the intimate to the urban 
scale. For him, the bench in the park can be considered as a place, and a 
geographical location for regular vacation can be a place as well. However, he 
argues it is not only the spaces that are appreciated that can be called place but 
also the spaces that are not appreciated (Seamon 2017). 
Fiddler is a philosopher in Criminology at the University of Greenwich. His recent 
research focused on spaces associated with crime and punishment. He looks at 
the reality of the lived experience in what he terms vacant space in the meaning 
of concepts of space and place in prisons. He argues that space is the more 
abstract of the two notions due to the fact that it corresponds to areas and 
volumes and relates more to the sense of the geometry of an area. Consequently, 
he counted corridors and doors as places and regarded the cell as a space only, 
unless it has a lived experience for the prisoner. Moreover, he suggested that 
through intervention the space turns into a place (Fiddler 2009). 
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In Short Introduction to Geography, Creswell (2004) suggested two ways to turn 
a space into a place: those of naming and movement. Naming, he argues is one 
of the ways by which the space can be given meaning and become a place. 
Movement through a space and the way in which various patterns build-up 
become meaningful and make a value for space to change it into a place 
(Cresswell 2004). The movement in dread becomes part of a time-space routine. 
Hanich determines that the dread atmosphere in film is well known for its spatial 
immersion, which involves movement (Hanich 2010). According to that, the 
hesitating movement of the character while walking in the dark makes the viewer 
experience part of this movement and, in consequence, make meanings for those 
moments and the attached places in the film. 
Movement helps the subject to exist and to be-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is 
suggested by Heidegger to express the subject’s existence, he argues that it can 
be achieved by two ways; through de-distancing and through the sense of 
directionality; in order to create what he termed the spatiality of Da-sein 
(Heidegger 1996). In the German language, Da-sein means being there; to bring 
things close in the sense of bringing them within the range of its concern. In 
English Oxford dictionary, it can be translated to mean existence (Press 2018).  
Heidegger highlights that the act of bringing near requires de-distancing, i.e., 
moving towards the things to shorten the distance. This requires directionality in 
movement, namely, to move to the right or to the left, and/or up or down. Da-sein 
employs these directions together to be grounded in-the-world (Heidegger 1996; 
Shīrāzī 2013). As for the distance and the moment of existence, Merleau-Ponty 
states that “besides the physical and geometrical distance which stands between 
myself and all things, a ‘lived’ distance binds me to things which count and exist 
for me, and links them to each other. This distance measures the ‘scope’ of my 
  
80 
 
life at every moment” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.333). One can conclude that the 
distance which sums up according to not moving in the space absolutely does 
not create any engagement between the subject and the world, and, 
consequently, it will not turn the space into a place. Consistent with that, this Da-
sein, through movement in space, enhances the potential for turning the space 
into a place. 
Definitions of space and place can be a little bit different according to Schmitz, 
because he considers them with reference to the material body (Korper) that 
belongs to the space of surfaces, and the felt-body (Leib) that belongs to 
surfaceless space (Schmitz et al. 2011 p.245). Griffero summarized his definition 
through three levels of experiencing space. The first level is Local Space, which 
is founded on relative dimensions devoid of their own features like surfaces, lines, 
and distance. This space develops its own potentiality to influence the feelings 
and this potentiality can be called atmosphere, which entitles it to be a lived 
space. The second space is Directional Space, which is a pre-geometrical state 
of motility, that is, the starting point of a corporeal communication with the 
surrounding environment, which works according to a motor suggestion to move, 
but not yet reduced to be a local space. It is a space that is founded on the 
narrowness and vastness dynamic that is able to create a vector atmosphere, 
one which can be described as “unilateral, omnilateral, centrifugal, centripetal, or 
undecided atmosphere” (Griffero 2014 pp.45, 47). The last space is the Absolute 
Space. This space is devoid of surfaces and dimensions. It is the space of the 
felt-body that has no surfaces and cannot be measured, such as climatic space, 
the space of silence, and the space of the corporeal isles. Corresponding to this 
space, Griffero suggest to name those atmospheres as moods. If these moods 
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are full, then they express a satisfaction. However, if they are empty, then they 
may express desperation (Griffero 2014). 
Phenomenal Zones: Heidegger’s Things in Film and Architecture 
In another way to change space into a place, Shīrāzī defines phenomenal zones 
as those which address realms or places where the thing is manifested as a thing; 
a gatherer or materials by which a phenomenon reveals its essence (Shīrāzī, 
2013). Walls, tunnels, corridors, doors, windows, cellars, basements, staircases, 
and many other phenomenal zones have been discussed and used by both 
filmmakers and architects to attach an associational meaning (e.g., Evans (1982), 
Furuyama (1996), Pallasmaa (2001, 2012), Jacobs (2007), Hanich (2010), Pike 
(2010), Pheasant-Kelly (2013), Shīrāzī (2013), Eleanor et al. (2015), and Benson-
Allott (2015)). As things, phenomenal zones are named motifs by Hitchcock, or 
encapsulated elements defined by Ng (2002, 2009), and termed phenomenal 
zones by Shīrāzī (2013). The following introduce some of the phenomenal zones 
that have been used both in film and architecture.  
STAIR [ness] 
The film director, Peter Greenway calls the composition of the scene that 
contains stair as stairness (Bruno 2002). The stair is not an architectural element, 
but rather one of the primary architectural images. It is a powerful architectural 
threshold that is employed for linking the exterior with the interior of a building 
and connecting different living zones. It can provide a place for lingering and 
loitering (Bruno 2002 p.311), a place for encounters and clashes (Schaal, 2010 
as cited in (Eleanor et al. 2015)), and as defined by Shīrāzī a place where man 
is awakened to his body and when he senses his corporeality, and through 
moving, he encounters other bodies and other people (Shīrāzī 2013). For 
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example, the staircase in Chikatsu-Asuka Museum leads to nowhere but is meant 
to intensify the sense of the body and stimulate an experience of space in the 
physical realm (Shīrāzī 2013). 
In literature or film, this architectural feature holds considerable power. In many 
forms of narrative, the staircase may lead up to a frightening secret locked behind 
a closed attic door or may descend to a dark mystery cellar, and offer a setting 
for communication. The meaning may vary and the mise-en-scène and 
cinematography are responsible for supporting its meaning to serve the narrative 
(Eleanor et al. 2015). As noted earlier, Hitchcock used the staircase as a 
technique of suspense where “each step advances but also delays the 
denouncement” (Jacobs 2007 p.28). 
Pallasmaa considers the image of a staircase to resemble the imagery of a 
vertical labyrinth, like David Lynch who looks at the staircase from the point of 
view of ascending and descending in addition to the camera location while 
shooting it (Pallasmaa 2001; Martin 2014). Ascending or descending may have 
semantic meanings, which are referred to as an expressive space; rising stairs 
end in heaven whereas descending stairs lead down to the underworld (Hanich 
2010; Pallasmaa 2001; Eleanor et al. 2015). The stairs may also signal a passage 
into an entirely private and forbidden realm, or a final journey for disclosing a 
secret. Descending a stairway expresses self-presentation, joining a group, and 
entry into the public sphere (Martin 2014; Pallasmaa 2001). 
The formal characteristics of stairs may have further representational meanings. 
For instance, the form, height, material, and location of stairs can create a 
dangerous platform and pose a threat. The staircase in Psycho (Hitchcock 1960) 
is an example where the staircase was leading to unfamiliar, threatening place 
for both the detective and the lady. Jacobs and Eleanor note that the location of 
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the staircase in this Victorian house helped to make the staircase both unknown 
and unfamiliar for the victims (Jacobs 2007; Eleanor et al. 2015). 
Corridors  
The director and the film scholar Caetlin Benson-Allott (2015) considers 
the use of corridors in film as a form of dreadful architecture based on their spatial 
gravitational pull towards an ending, in addition to the lighting, materials, and 
dimensions. She argues that they make a non-structured narrative before any 
character’s interpretation in the frame. As an example, she discussed the corridor 
of Alien (Scott 1979). She described the scene as an atmosphere where every 
component counts to create fear such as the long shots of the camera and the 
tracking shots which embody the spectator and pull her/him towards an endless 
space. Benson-Allott (2015) added that those corridors pull the spectator to 
become physically embodied in the uncanny space until she/he occupies an 
anthropomorphic space and views it from an anthropomorphic height. She claims 
that the darkness in the corridor invokes the unknown and that it is, thus, a type 
of dread architecture (Benson-Allott 2015). The corridor of Alien has a visible 
ceiling that makes it more confined and constricted to look more like a tunnel than 
a hallway. She describes that this, by turns, affects the perspective and the 
vanishing point to create a compressed space, providing the viewer with a feeling 
of entrapment and claustrophobia to accompany a perceptual uncertainty. 
Thereupon, there is no way else to go but to go in deeper (Benson-Allott 2015). 
In architecture, Fiddler (2009) discussed the corridor as a growing complex 
component of movement in prisons in the 18th century. He contends that the core 
logic of the prison is for keeping the individuals within a clearly-bounded area and 
that the corridors create a series of discrete events when the individuals move 
within them. In this regard, corridors are considered as places, not spaces, more 
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than their individual cells, because of those moments of intersection and 
congregation that are reflected there (Fiddler 2009). Pallasmaa (2001) thinks of 
the corridor as one path of many doorways that carries a meaning of escaping 
and a suspense of surprises (Pallasmaa 2001). 
Doors and the Illusion of Choice 
Doors, as exits and entrances, become highly important in film and 
theatrical scenographies. In this respect, Ernst Lubitsch is a director who uses 
doors in a specific way in his films, considering them as charged motifs and as 
surprise elements. As a theatrical scenography, doors are key scenic elements 
to be used to frame narrative, suggest circulation, and mark transition.  For 
Macleod, Hanks and Jonathan, they signal beginnings and endings (Macleod, 
Hanks & Jonathan 2012). Pallasmaa (2001) considered revolving doors as 
elements of horror. He argues that they generate a feeling of a disorientation and 
dizziness because of their added motion and surprises. 
Walls 
Walls are one of the most common elements that are used in different 
genres of films. For Henri Lefebvre, the ‘wall’ manifests the Cold War principle of 
a divided world in the lived space of the city. It expresses a conceptualized 
representation of space that cannot impose its conception as a spatial reality. The 
contingence of the division of the city was symbolized physically and 
psychologically through the wall. Pike explains that it was symbolized physically 
in the way it is represented as a form and material as a fortified, escape-resistant 
medium. For example, in film, the ‘shoot to kill’ orders as in many examples of 
the old castles are set against walls. On the other hand, walls are symbolized 
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psychologically in cases like the Great Wall of China as a visible distinction of 
bounded space to protect its people from invasion (Pike 2010). 
Shīrāzī describes how the wall is considered as a central and basic element in  
architect Tadao Ando’s work Architecture of Wall (Furuyama 1996). For him the 
wall symbolizes the sense of separation, and, thus, creates domains and places. 
The wall affects both rejection and acceptance; rejecting what is needed and 
accepting what is vital (Shīrāzī 2013). He notes that Tadao Ando gave walls 
different functions; to cut the sky, light, wind, and landscape, and accept them 
under powerful conditions, thus allowing natural phenomena to appear. He shows 
how he used to create subtle openings in the wall to allow the light to be 
manifested, to allow the landscape to be seen through it as a frame of specific 
scenery, and to perceive the darkness through the composition of thick walls 
(Shīrāzī 2013). 
In the Fabrication of Virtue, Evans (1982) categorized the wall as architecture of 
barriers, apertures, and interception, and as volume and surface of distance in 
prisons. As an example, he described some of the prison walls stating that the 
walls are battered and buttressed on the exterior where no foot can go inside and 
the tops of the walls left few courses of brick in loose mortar that make the 
penetration possible only through or from below the wall itself. The wall was 
heavy because of the dense bricks which offer no option to go through it but only 
for water to go beneath it to make the floor more muddy (Evans 1982 p.143). As 
another point of view related to the prison, one can perceive the conflicted 
function of the wall as the separation of people affected by Berlin’s wall and that 
affected by the proposed wall between the United States and Mexico.  
In film, the purpose of presenting the wall varies. It can be a symbol of separation 
between two worlds, e.g., death and life. Thus, it is described as the blockage of 
  
86 
 
any passage between the worlds as in Der Tunnel (Bernhardt 1933), or the 
protector of a city from invasion as in all the historical and phantasy films (e.g., 
The Lord of the Rings (Jackson n.d. 2001; 2002; 2003)), where every single wall 
expresses the city architecturally and metaphorically (Abuhassan 2009). 
Hanich (2010) considers the wall as an isolator; the sound is absorbed within it 
to create no sound in the outside, which makes it a restricted place. He 
exemplifies a scene from the Silence of the Lambs(Demme Jonathan 1991) when 
Clarice was getting down to Lecter’s cell, where the walls of the cellar were buried 
and five metal doors were shut behind her to become totally isolated an on her 
own. 
Tunnels 
In contrast to walls, tunnels can provide the underground connections 
across a division that is caused by walls or other similar barriers. The tunnel is 
used as a means of escaping in real life and in some films. It is sometimes used 
as a trap because of its constricted atmosphere. For example, Pike traces in 
symbolic history that the underground has always functioned as the negative 
image of the world above, as an agitation, and as a homeless place (Pike 2010) 
as in The Third Man (Reed 1949). 
In film, Pike argues that the function of the tunnel differs according to the genre it 
follows and the condition of the tunnel. For instance, in war films and in prison 
films the tunnel serves as a metaphor for the resonance of a rebirth (Pike, 2010), 
e.g., The Shawshank Redemption (Darabont 1994) and Les Misérables (August 
1998). In regard to its condition, a dry tunnel means an un-conflicted passage 
while a wet, muddy, and smelly tunnel is a space with moral issues. In his article, 
Wall and Tunnel: The Spatial Metaphorics of Cold War Berlin, Pike (2010) 
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confirms that the metaphor of underground passage asserts the equality of 
everyone, either negatively or positively (Pike 2010). 
Basement 
Eleanor argues that the basement is different from the cellar in that it is an 
underground floor that has windows whereas the cellar is an underground floor 
that functions as storage place and does not have windows. However, in film both 
words are used to denote the meaning of cellar ( Eleanor et al. 2015). 
Lefebvre equates basement with the space of death since “it has a secrecy”  
(Lefebvre 1991 p.236). He highlighted that the secrecy of the basement creates 
a horrific effect for its occupier as in Psycho and The Silence of the Lambs. 
Eleanor points out that Gaston Bachelard argues that darkness, as a feature of 
the basement is what makes it horrifying (Eleanor et al. 2015). Mulvey (1996) and 
Pheasant-Kelly (2013) describe the basement as an abject space that has 
allegories and metaphor. Psycho, for example, uses the metaphor of Pharo’s 
tombs, where the basement was the real identity, not the super ego or even the 
ego (Jacobs 2007). In view of this, the basement was the space for threat, 
caution, and illicitness for what it corresponds to in terms of its phenomenology. 
In addition to the darkness and metaphor, the location of the basement adds 
another factor to help in identifying its role and affordances. Martin (2014) 
underlined that those factors steer the character to perform in a specific way and 
that they frame her/him an activity as a performance. For Lynch, the basement 
functions as “a sanctuary, attitude and behaviors allow the protagonist to break 
free from the restrictions placed on them and it becomes a site of expressivity 
and performances, belies their social status outside of that space”  (Eleanor et al. 
2015, 56). 
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The aim of employing phenomenal zones confirms the concept of the thing and 
its effectiveness in creating a place instead of a space. But does having 
phenomenal zones in any space guarantee the wanted experience? And how can 
using the same elements create different experiences every time?  
Answers to these two questions will be discussed in the subsequent section in 
the light of the concept and practice of creating an event. 
 2.6 Phenomenology of Event 
The concept of event was introduced in architectural terms by Bernard 
Tschumi in 1980. He defined it as the activities that actually happen in the space. 
He argued that architecture and its social relevance and formal invention cannot 
be disconnected from the events that occur in it (Tschumi 1994). He explored the 
event of architecture through the theme of violence and did this under two 
scenarios: formal violence and programmatic violence. Programmatic violence is 
related to occasions when actions, events, and programs, by accident or design, 
serve evil purposes like designing narrow corridors for a big crowd of people. On 
the other hand, formal violence deals with conflicts between objects and forms, 
which take place when the forms attack each other geometrically to create some 
gaps (Tschumi 1994).  
What relates to this thesis, is the perspective of the psychologist Rune Mølbak 
who had further elaborated the process of creating the event architecturally. He 
defined the ‘event’ as a creation of place, i.e., bringing something into being in a 
period of time (Mølbak 2012). As such, the event transcends the subject with its 
perceivable experience and the object as a state of affairs into something that 
can happen within space-time. In Mølbak’s opinion, the phenomenology of the 
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event can be created by means of an experience between the subject and the 
object. The subject may have an experience, but in order to create the event, 
Mølbak (2012) suggests creating the experience which the subject undergoes, 
not the experience she/he has. He considers surprise, shock, and similar 
experiences are important factors to create the experience, and this strengthens 
the relationship between the subject and the object in an encounter (Mølbak 
2012). Ahmed defined the term encounter as a meeting between the self and the 
unknown (stranger) that involves surprise and conflict (Ahmed 2000). Oakley 
considers shock and conflict are able to change the subject to create a new 
experience, which is, in turn, able to violate the familiar view; to unsettle, to 
challenge and transform the subject (Oakley 2001 as cited in (Mølbak 2012)). 
Paul Carter, a pioneer in sonic ambiguity research, confirmed that having the 
phenomenal nature of shock and surprise is necessary to produce the productive 
ambiguity in order to energize the atmosphere (Carter 2000 as cited in (Labelle 
2011)). This is interesting in the context of film, especially in dread, because the 
ambiguity and uncertainty grab the viewer’s body forcing it into action to go into 
a new situation. With the help of empathy and sympathy, this ambiguity will 
increase the corporeality and the consciousness of the viewer. Subsequently, the 
ambiguity can be productive in creating the experience, which in turn, engages 
the viewer, creates places more than spaces, and eventually embodies the 
viewer. 
Mølbak (2012) holds that every event is unique and never repeated exactly the 
same because of the different interactions between the subject and the object. 
He also supports that every event is a transformation of another event; it is a pure 
creation and that is why it is called experience. That justifies how using a 
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phenomenal zone, such as stairs or a door, is different every time it is designed 
and can create a different experience every time it is used.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
Diagram 2-1: Process of Embodiment 
 
Diagram 2-1 summarizes the process of embodiment used in this thesis, 
which structures the relationship between the viewer and the screen, to turn the 
subject into a corporeal, active subject and extends her/him to be part of the 
world. This chapter discussed three main elements of the process of 
embodiment: engagement, subject, and atmosphere. Engagement is the process 
of encountering between the subject and the object, which is necessary for a lived 
experience. This chapter introduced some notions of engagement in architecture 
and film, but what matters for the purpose of this thesis is the engagement 
through sympathy and empathy. The subject is the viewer or the spectator and is 
the central component of the engagement process. The literature reviewed in this 
chapter paved the way for a realization of how the body can exist in-the-world. 
The atmosphere is the object and the whole experience produced by the 
engagement process. This chapter presented some situations and objects that 
have the ability to enhance the dread experience by virtue of their motor reactions 
so as to create an atmosphere of fear to create a corporeal experience. 
Discussion of the phenomenology of place was necessary because it is a primary 
contributor to the spatial, environmental, and temporal constitution intended to 
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engage the subject with the world. When a space turns into a place, this indicates 
that the constitution affected the subject consciously and corporeally.  
This chapter also mentioned phenomenological characteristics of some elements 
that are generally used in film and architecture, such as stair, wall, door, and 
corridor. These elements have the quality to be named phenomenal zones 
because they have a corporeal effect and can turn the space into a place if 
energized by the whole atmosphere, but what matters to create the experience 
within an event of fear, is not only the thing, but the situation of the thing; quasi-
thing. The following chapter elaborates on the process of encountering that 
connects the subject to the atmosphere.  
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Chapter Three:  Structure of Encountering 
The previous chapter discussed embodiment as a process involving the 
subject, and the object/atmosphere. It also introduced philosophical readings of 
their engagement in film studies; as means to evoke sympathy and empathy. 
Understanding the phenomenology of embodiment entails an understanding of 
the process of encountering between the subject and the object. The relationship 
between the subject and the object passes through three reciprocal, never-
ending processes: perception, movement, and action. This chapter deals with the 
embodiment of the spectator while watching a dread scene in a thriller film where 
the subject is the spectator and the object is the screen. It addresses the issue of 
how the subject can have a lived experience through perception, movement, and 
action while she/he is sitting on a chair and is embodied in the dread atmosphere. 
To begin with, it establishes the phenomenological reading of perception by 
Merleau-Ponty in the context of other theorists to relate its role in film 
construction. 
3.1 Perception  
Merleau-Ponty (2002) described perception as the key for all knowledge. 
For him, perception is seeing, tasting, hearing, and sensing, or doing any act to 
provide the subject with knowledge about the world. He considers perception as 
a process of  knowledge-bringing event (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.35). Merleau-
Ponty (2002) calls for finding the value of anything by perception, which opens a 
fundamental foundation to all knowledge, and the key is in describing knowledge, 
not constructing it (Carman 1999; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Seamon 2015). 
In order to get access to the knowledge-bringing event, one has to know the 
relationship between subject and object; the more the subject interacts with the 
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object, the more knowledge she/he gets (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Many theorists 
agree with Merleau-Ponty and describe this kind of perception as active 
perception and relate it to early learning. Some of them consider toddlers as 
providing the best example of active perception as they do not just touch their 
toys while playing, but they also bite them and try to decompose them so as to 
learn more about them (Macrae et al. 2013; Duncan and McCauley 2008; Holl et 
al. 2007; Whitney 2014). 
3.1.1 The Structure of Perception 
Merleau-Ponty focuses on the relation between the subject and the object 
as an intertwined and non-separable relationship that exists in order to grasp 
meaning from the context. He concentrates on perceptual consciousness since 
the subject is a conscious being and also on the structure of the object itself 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002; Landes 2013).  
As a gestalt concept, structure is defined by Landes as a whole whose parts 
cannot be defined independently of their place within that whole. It points to a 
certain unity or internal harmony that is held by a system (Landes 2013). In this 
context, it is important to mention that Merleau-Ponty uses the terms structure, 
form, system, and even order interchangeably to refer to the structure. However, 
as Whitney points out, he uses the word structure when he speaks of higher level 
behavior or consciousness (Whitney 2014). For Merleau-Ponty, the structure of 
perception is the structure of the seen and the structure of subject’s 
consciousness, where this combination guides the subject to grasp what 
perception is and to describe the essence of perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002; 
Landes 2013).  
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For further realization of the concept of structure, one has to differentiate between 
two kinds of perception: natural perception and analytical perception. Merleau-
Ponty (2002) gave an illustrative example to determine the difference between 
these two kinds of perception by describing a landscape on a misty day where 
the sky is not clear and is gradually becoming a monotonous grayness. From the 
analytic perception perspective, as discussed by the Cartesian empiricists and 
intellectualists, he argues that the landscape is there and it is determinate on the 
basis of logic and the rational thought, and the object exists, even if there is no 
one to interact with it. However, temporarily, at the moment, based on the thick 
grey mist, the landscape does not exist in the natural perception and is, thus, 
indeterminate, unclear, and vague. This form of perception refers to the subject, 
not to the object, and follows the experience of the subject. Merleau-Ponty does 
not neglect the role of the mind since by discussing the concept of analytical 
perception, augmented by paying more attention, he highlights that the subject 
can perceive the landscape even if it is misty (Merleau-Ponty 2002 pp.35–37). 
Natural perception is not the opposite of Analytical perception, but it is different, 
and the subject’s perception differs from day to day and from person to another. 
So, natural perception is indeterminate and the perceived object is vague, 
uncertain, and undefined. Furthermore, the object cannot be seen as separable 
from its context and can be understood in more than one way (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). In conclusion, Merleau-Ponty argues that the structure of perception is 
constructed of the whole perception between the structure of subject’s 
consciousness and the structure of the seen. The structure of the object is 
contextual and equivocal in its meaning. This denotes the ambiguity and the 
shifting of the structure of the subject consciousness as an opening towards the 
process of learning. According to a phenomenological approach, describing is the 
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path for knowledge rather than construction or explanation of it (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). 
The indeterminate action or event is a positive phenomenon for Merleau-Ponty 
because “It is in this atmosphere that quality arises. Its meaning is an equivocal 
meaning; we are concerned with an expressive value rather than with logical 
signification” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.7). 
3.1.2 Complete Perception vs. Incomplete Perception 
In Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Architecture, Holl, 
Pallasmaa, and Perez-Gomez (2007) clarified that complete perception is formed 
by the synthesis of foreground, middle ground, and distant view, taken all 
together, with the subjective qualities of material and light. They added that the 
merging of all these details creates the final condition and that this makes it 
impossible to break an atmosphere into a simple collection of geometries, 
activities, or sensations. They call this condition the enmeshing experience. On 
the other hand, they consider experiencing a city as an example of incomplete 
perception because the perspective is fragmented and incomplete, that is, its 
parts are not equally represented (Holl et al. 2007 p.48). But, they point out, this 
does not stop the subject from perceiving it because of the bodily schema that 
completes its spatial layout. Therefore, perception of the object changes 
continually as the viewer shifts its attention (Holl et al. 2007). This framework 
does not contradict Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual structure since the concept of 
incomplete perception supports and confirms the ambiguity and uncertainty of 
perception based on the subject’s consciousness. It also explains why perception 
may be different from one person to another. However, the idea of complete 
perception can oppose Merleau-Ponty’s understanding if it is considered as a 
 Part One: Structure of Encountering 
99 
 
state of determinate and concrete perception. However, if one understands it as 
the enmeshing experience, then it will still support the concept of the perceptual 
engagement of the subject with the world. 
3.1.3 Perceptual Engagement 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) regards perception as the manifestation of 
consciousness in one’s daily bodily engagement with the world. This interaction 
occurs according to the sensory mode of engagement with objects and spaces. 
In Affective Atmospheres, Anderson (2009) confirmed that what is most important 
is to create more sensed than understood architecture, which can be achieved 
by revealing smell, touch, movement, and walking, or even dark voids, to create 
memory because creating new sensations creates memories. 
Merleau-Ponty confirms that senses and sensory experience are the first reasons 
and methods of knowledge acquisition, which is a reading that opposes and 
undermines Cartesian-based intellectualism and empiricism as sources of true 
knowledge, where they consider rational thought as the first reason for knowledge 
and that the senses come second. 
3.1.4 Synaesthetic Perception 
The Phenomenology of Perception investigates the existence of a 
person’s body that refers to the sense experience. Merleau-Ponty stated that the 
“sense experience is the vital communication with the world which makes it 
present as a familiar setting of our life” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.61). He thinks of 
the ears and eyes as only instruments of bodily excitation, not of perception, 
because they cannot ensure any cognitive power for the notion of perception. 
Therefore, the eyes see and the hand touches (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.246), but 
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alone they do not contribute to the world of experience (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
So, what about blind or deaf people? How can the senses contribute to their 
perception?  
Merleau-Ponty (2002) maintains that all the senses are spatial if they are to give 
accessibility to the form of existence and being and that they are not separable 
in terms of the sense of communicating. They, all, must open up to the same 
space. For example, if someone sees a blue ocean and hears the sound of 
movement of its water, then she/he will perceive it as a whole, without connecting 
it to relevant sense. The unity of the space can be discovered only in the interplay 
of the sensory realms, and this can create “concrete moments of a 
comprehensive configuration which is the one and only space, and the power of 
going to it is inseparable from that of cutting oneself from it by the sequestration 
of a sense” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.257). 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) argues that the senses are spatial, but not equally so. For 
example, sight is more spatial than the sense of touch. This has been pointed out 
after a blind man performed an operation and expressed his enjoyment at seeing 
the space. But what conclusion does that draw? Merleau-Ponty confirms that 
each organ explores the object in its own way; the blind person uses touch 
instead of sight because it opens up to the setting of the visual data. Hence, it is 
argued by Merleau-Ponty that sight is nothing unless the subject uses it.  
Merleau-Ponty states that colors are the first thing captured by the blind person 
after she/he is enabled to see. Once colors are learned, the gaze shifts, but the 
subject deals with them in the way she/he uses her/his hands for touch. What 
proves this is for Merleau-Ponty is the fact that to distinguish a circle from a 
rectangle by sight the person runs her/his eyes round the figure. She/he will do 
that with the hands. Thus, the blind person tends to take hold of objects by the 
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hands before the eyes, which explains why touch presupposes a setting for visual 
data to exist (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.259). 
The study of the blind person’s experience of vision led Merleau-Ponty to the 
conclusion that touching is not seeing and that tactile perception never has the 
fullness of visual perception and never presents its visual parts. In addition, he 
concluded that touch has another structure which neither sight, nor any other 
sense, has and which influences its presentation, and that each sense has a type 
of synthesis that transfigures the object. Merleau-Ponty believes that the senses 
are distinct from each other and from intellection as each sense brings with it a 
structure of being which can never be exactly transposed. However, he assures 
that there is no threat in the unity of the senses. He thinks that even one sense 
can be unstable and alien to natural perception. He cited the example of looking 
at white sheets (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.263) to support his point of view. The 
sheets are white, but if the gaze gets closer, then the subject will not see them 
as purely white. Likewise, if one looks again at the big picture, then these sheets 
will not be equally white and will appear to be grey. He justifies this by stating that 
the sensory experience is unstable and is alien to natural perception, which is 
achieved by the whole body at once, and which opens up a world of interacting 
senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Merleau-Ponty defined the perceptual field by stating that “[T]he perceptual 
‘something’ is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 
‘field’” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.4). So, Seamon acknowledges that the perceptual 
field means that the lived experience is not the sum of isolated sensory inputs, 
but an integrated lived possibility in each moment of experience where the senses 
mutually resonate to create a synaesthetic perception, which, by its nature, 
evokes and engages meaning from the world (Seamon 2017). 
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Moving on from this in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the sensory experience is defined 
as a synaesthetic experience because sometimes one can see or listen to an 
instrument. Further, it speaks directly to all senses and, then, at a subsequent 
stage, the subject can distinguish the appropriate sense. Merleau-Ponty calls the 
first stage the primary level; a sense experience that precedes its division among 
other senses. For example, when a flute or violin is playing, “an atmospheric 
sound between the object and my body, a sound vibrates in me and finally as a 
last stage in which the acoustic element disappears and becomes highly precise 
experience of a change permeating my whole body” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.264). 
Merleau-Ponty relates directly to movement image experience in stating that the 
synaesthetic experience is responsible for creating this ambiguity of experience. 
When “such that an audible rhythm causes cinematograph pictures to run 
together and produces a perception of movement whereas, without auditory 
support, the same succession of images would be too slow to give rise to 
stroboscopic movement” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.264). Similarly, sounds have the 
ability to modify pictures and colors; “a louder note intensifies them, the 
interruption of the sound produces a wavering effect in them, and a low note 
makes blue darker or deeper” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.265). In light of this 
argument, Merleau-Ponty (2002) opposes the Cartesian constant hypothesis, 
which allocates one sensation, and only one, to each stimulus because it is less 
verifiable as natural perception and because the subject cannot limit the stimulus 
to its specific sphere (the acoustic one in this case). 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) attempted to show that senses intercommunicate up 
opening on to the structure of the thing that appeals to all senses besides sight. 
“One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, 
it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible glass. One sees the springiness 
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of steel, the ductility of red-hot steel, the hardness of a plane blade, the softness 
of shavings” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 pp.266–267). He refers that to the data 
acquired by different senses that belong to separate worlds but communicate 
through significance core properties of the thing. He also underlined that via a 
synaesthetic experience the object expresses itself in the Ipesity of the thing; 
“each aspect of the thing falls to our perception, is only an invitation to perceive 
beyond it as a moment in the perceptual process. And if the thing is reached as 
‘reality’ it will be that moment that snatches our grasp” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 
p.271). 
From the standpoint of Griffero (2014), all the qualities of the synaesthetic 
experience discussed by Merleau-Ponty can be considered as atmospheric 
qualities, not metaphoric ones, since they are not measurable but corporeal 
affections that can only be compared by language. Griffero (2014) calls these 
qualities Sinaesthesias. He, accordingly, states that the “sharp noises, the bright 
sounds and the sweet events” have synthetic nature and are atmospheric 
(Griffero 2014 p.113). From his viewpoint, the atmospheric coldness of 
environment can be a sound, a color, or a temperature. Griffero interprets that it 
is an inter-subjectivity of effective involvement that expresses emotional and 
corporeal involvement, which is not a cause-stimuli or the merging of the five 
senses. Rather, it denotes the “possibility of a significance that [gives itself] 
immediately on the sense level” (Hauskeller 1995, 69 as in (Griffero 2014 p.113). 
As a consequence, and concordant with Merleau-Ponty, based on this kind of 
experience and by means of the atmospheric synaesthecity, Griffero describes 
the sound as “velvet, voluminous, earthy, grinding, polished” than high and low 
(Griffero 2014, 113). 
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3.1.5 Multi-Sensory Experience: 
Pallasmaa agrees with Merleau-Ponty that the senses intercommunicate 
to complete a synaesthetic perception and each sense opens to the other to give 
a spatial atmospheric corporeal relation with the body for it to engage with the 
world. He confirms that every touching experience is multi-sensory. The space, 
scale, and qualities of matter are measured equally by the eye, ear, nose, skin, 
tongue, skeleton, and muscle (Pallasmaa 2012). He states that the “sense stimuli 
seem to shift from the more refined senses towards the more archaic , from vision 
down to hearing , touch and smell, from light to shadow” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.33).  
Few psychologists (e.g., James J. Gibson) regard the senses as aggressive 
seeking mechanisms rather than passive receivers. Therefore, instead of thinking 
of the five senses as detached senses, Gibson (1954) categorized them into five 
sensory systems: visual, auditory, taste-smell, basic-orienting, and haptic. 
Thereupon, in this framework, Elliott asserts that perception cannot be merely 
reduced to sight alone and to what the subject sees because it is also related to 
what she/he smells, tastes, touches, and hears to specify the sense of closeness 
or distance to some extent (Elliott 2011). 
Benjamin (2007) deliberated on the connection between film and architecture. He 
stated that both are communicated primarily through the tactile realm. He 
suggested that the cinematic space is a powerful kinesthetic experience that “hit 
(s) the spectator like a bullet” (Benjamin 2007) and is felt in the muscles and skin 
as it is seen by the eyes. Elliott explains that sound, for example, does not have 
to be loud to invade the body. For example, a whisper in a soundtrack in a film 
hints to the timbre and breathiness linked to a face and its sweat, which 
subsequently offers a smell, and so on, as a kinetic point of mimesis (Elliott 2011). 
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Sobchack (1992) counted the spectator as a synaesthetic subject. That is, a site 
of reception, where its sensorium can provide visual images with a multisensory 
and synaesthetic thickness. For her, the body of the spectator is actively involved 
in the creation of meaning instead of being passively affected by the film on the 
basis of the cross-modality of the senses. This triggers cooperation of all the 
senses, not only sight, such that they become fleshed-out to make the body feel 
through the skin before the eye, where the spectator haptically anticipates the 
image (Sobchack 1992). 
Although sensory experience is synaesthetic and the senses intercommunicate 
to come up with the structure of perception, the related research separates the 
components of the senses from the whole so as to understand the role of each 
sense in perception. Looking at each sense independently is necessary for the 
next discussion to grasp the effect of the whole. 
3.1.5.1 Sound and Acoustic Intimacy: 
In comparing sound to sight, Pallsmaa states that sight alone makes the 
subject’s body solitary and unsocial because it is about the gaze, whereas sound 
creates a sense of connection and solidarity because it measures the space and 
makes its scale comprehensible. He adds that every sound has its intimacy or 
monumentality, rejection or invitation, and hospitality or hostility. In other 
respects, sound reflects other dimensions than information itself. For example, 
the sound of a vacant, unfurnished house is totally different from that of a 
furnished one. It reflects the other surfaces of the house (Pallasmaa 2012). 
In film studies, many theorists have written about sound and its experience. For 
instance, Doane (1980) discussed projected sound in film and how it alters the 
perception of characters. Some other theorists have written about the relationship 
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between vision and hearing, such as Pudovkin (1929) who was concerned with 
sound as a carrier of semiotic meaning (Elliott 2011). What is of particular interest 
to this research is the use of sound as a factor of embodiment that affects 
consciousness and corporeality. 
In the context of horror films, Anna Powell states that “sound waves, as well as 
light waves, travel through us and work strongly on the sensorium, bypassing the 
cerebral cortex and mainlining into our central nervous system.” (Powell (2006) 
as cited in (Elliott 2011 p.146)). Therefore, sound is a motor stimuli and an 
atmospheric energy. 
The film study of Sonnenschein (2001) dealt with the physical aspect of the 
reception of sound, namely, sound energy transformation; where sound is a 
carrier of meaning and a flow of physical energy. He investigated how different 
frequencies can be utilized in film and illustrated that “Sound can affect our body 
temperature, blood circulation, pulse rate, breathing and sweating. Loud music 
with a strong beat can raise body heat, while soft, floating, or detached abstract 
music can lower it” (Sonnenschein 2001 p.71). Thereupon, sound has a 
significant effect on the body and on its conscious and reaction, and, accordingly, 
on its movement. 
Elliot (2011) pointed that sound can be characterized by two features: its pitch, 
which is measured in Hertz (Hz), and its intensity, which is measured by decibels 
(db). Humans detect sounds in the range of 20 to 18,000 Hz and 0 to 120 db. 
Sonnenschein (2001) clarified that low frequencies such as 65 Hz will resonate 
in the lower back, thighs, and legs and Elliot (2011) highlighted that the lower the 
frequency, the lower down in the body the subject feels. 
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In the famous shower scene in Psycho (Hitchcock 1960), the music supported 
the picture and fed the pain. Within this context, Eisenstein (1994) discussed the 
movement in the picture and the accompanying music. He employed a pictoral 
diagram to show the synchronisation between Norman’s arm and the violin’s 
score on Ez, which continues to drop until Norman’s face is seen in the bath. 
Eisenstein (1994) argued that montage is important in that it touches every sense, 
except taste, in addition to supporting the sense of movement. 
Elliott (2011) described the spectator’s body reaction to sound in cinema as a 
process to form a corporeal mimesis and transitivism based on a mimetic rather 
than a semiotic process. He analyzed the experience of the subject when hearing 
a loud scream in cinema and reported that the subject first receives the sound at 
the top of the neck (a physiological experience). Second, the subject associates 
the sound with various social and cultural codes, like the body schema, in an 
attempt to familiarize the sound (e.g., pain, stress, and fear), which makes the 
body react physiologically, e.g., by changing the heart rate, creating tension in 
muscles, or probably sweating. The last step is understanding the initial stress, 
not through a physiological process but through a form of corporeal mimesis, 
where the spectator mimics the character(s) (Elliott 2011). Marks (2000) 
discussed the idea of haptic sound which is experienced internally, not 
semiotically or interrogatively, in which vision and sound work in union (Marks 
2000). Based on her study, she found that sound provides a corporeal knowledge 
for the spectator and eventually results in conversion of a corporeal experience 
into a haptic sound (Marks 2000). 
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Sound Synonyms  
Silence 
Much like high-intensity sound and high-pitch sound, Hanich and Žižek 
point to the fact that the absence of sound creates tension and provides a special 
moment in film experience, especially in dread (Hanich 2010; Žižek 1992). 
Hitchcock is one of the filmmakers who plays on silence with his audience to 
produce tension and nervousness (Hitchcock 1995). 
Hanich (2010) pointed to the use of sound as strategy to underscore off-screen 
space. He argued that silence by itself is a form, or synonym, of sound and that 
silence in films stands out as a void that the viewer can fill, especially in dread 
scenes. “Distant birds, chirping crickets, ticking clocks or dripping faucets” and 
reverberations add to isolated sounds, for instance, footsteps in a street. 
Furthermore, he underlined that these synonyms of silence can have the same 
effect of silence because they raise the viewer’s expectations that there will be a 
break in the silence anytime soon (Hanich 2010). 
Hill and Hanich note that suspension and suppression of sounds are other forms 
of silence that exist when there is a regular sound which the viewer may not 
consciously realize but she/he feels emptiness without it and starts to behold the 
image “more actively and interrogatively” (Hill 2003; Hanich 2010 p.166). 
Sonsign 
Deleuze (1992) defined Sonsign as a “pure sensory image” that signals 
the collapse of the sensory motor process and seeks other paths towards filmic 
involvements. As an example of that, Elliott points to the sound of the birds in The 
Birds (Hitchcock 1963) invites the viewer to experience a film in a more sensual 
way as it spreads between the viewer and the film rather than facilitating or adding 
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visual aspects (Elliott 2011; Deleuze 1992). What is special about sound is that it 
has no boundaries within a frame in contrast to visual effects, it can be off frame 
and still effective. As a result, its impact in feeding a sense of dread is very high. 
The sense of hearing is an embodied sensation. It can be experienced and 
internalized when it envelops the subject. It may hurt if too loud, it frustrates if too 
low, and carry a meaning or freezing the subject when it does not exist. It is a 
form of knowledge and, above that, it is a haptic and bodily sense. 
3.1.5.2 Smell 
Pallasmaa highlights that odor is considered as the strongest sense 
connected to the memory of space through surfaces, textures, and materials. 
Indeed, it is this what makes the smell of abandoned houses different from old 
towns and a theatre (Pallasmaa 2012). So, smell is connected to place and 
identity. 
Smell is very natural and tied to other senses. It leads to colors, taste, touch, and 
sight. Elliott states that “It is not just based on a chemical character but is linked 
to socio-economic and socio-political discourses. It is known as a post-modern 
sense as a way to fight against modernity with its transparent and spatial 
atmosphere” (Elliott 2011 p.125). Smell motivated many post-modern 
philosophers as a subject. For example, in their classic work AROMA (2011), 
Classen, Howes, and Synnot described the power of smell in invading private 
and public spaces without contest (Elliott 2011). 
Marks (2000) studied the reception of smell images in cinema. She considers 
smell as a mimetic sense that uncovers a “continuum between the actuality of the 
world and the production of signs about that world” (Marks 2000 p.139). In order 
for smell to be registered, she pinpointed that it needs to be physically absorbed 
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into the body. Afterwards, it creates a time-space memory (Marks 2000; Elliott 
2011). 
The spectator cannot actually smell what is in the film. Marks (2000) suggested 
some tools supporting the idea that smell can be conveyed in film. One tool is 
identification with a character that is actually smelling or sniffing on screen. Based 
on her belief in gestalt and the synthetic nature of some images, she argues that 
the audio-visual scene can grasp smell because the “mimetic and synesthetic 
relationship to the world underlies language and other sign systems. Once that 
relationship is mediated through an image, multisensory experience is 
condensed into visual form” (Marks 2000 p.214), e.g., scene of sizzling sausages. 
This constitutes the second tool for conveying smells in film.  Elliott presented the 
third tool for conveying smells in film, which is through close-up images on any 
scent object are able to stimulate a sense of smell (Elliott 2011). 
Elliott (2011) realized that the interaction of the physical body with smell was 
important in film. He indicated that smell was the only sense that the subject feels 
and thinks of at the same time because of the cerebral cortex and limbic system 
in the body whereas in other senses feeling and thinking are separable “even 
exclusive or sequential” (Elliott 2011 p.133), which justifies the strong relation 
between memory and smell. Elliott (2011) cited an example from Shadow of a 
Doubt (Hitchcock 1943), where pollution was behind the smell and behind the 
narrative. Before the arrival of one of the main characters (Uncle Charlie), the 
town was framed with apple trees and blossom. Upon arrival of this character 
with the train, the frame was covered with smoke as if he brings the city smoke, 
the crime, and money pollution to the other family in the town. 
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3.1.5.3 Taste 
Pallsamaa (2012) suggested that some visuals (e.g., the marble of the 
statue) and certain colors may transfer to taste. In film, Elliott (2011) 
demonstrated that there are two concepts connected to taste. The first one is 
abjection and rejection. He relates having bad cultural habits in eating or actions 
like vomiting being used to keep the audience away from the character. This is 
exemplified in The Exorcist (1973) and Super Size me (2004). The second 
concept relates eating to feminism and sexuality. It is more about introducing the 
character. The camera decoupage and the editing techniques help in showing 
how the character is eating in a way that produces disgust for the spectator. Prior 
to a rape scene in Frenzy (Hitchcock 1972), the rapist was filmed eating in front 
of the female character who was raped at the end. The spectators, much like the 
character, “suspended their physical selves for a moment to avoid the full 
corporeal horror of the situation, and this accomplishes Deleuze (Affection-
images) where perceptions extends the action into the feeling and emotion” 
(Elliott 2011 p.111). 
3.1.5.4 Touch and the Skin Ego 
Touch is the sense most frequently argued in most of arts including film 
and architecture because of its capacity in creating a haptic memory. It has been 
argued that touch is a medium for perception, for feeling and for thinking. 
Likewise Husserl, Pallasmaa (2012) considers touch as the main sense. He 
regards vision as an extension of the sense of touch since it is the interface 
between the skin and the world. He also states that vision reveals what the touch 
already knows, hence agreeing with Merleau-Ponty (2002) in that touch 
presupposes the setting for visual data. As a consequence, he sees the senses 
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as not only information mediators, but also as channels that explode the 
imagination and articulate other sensory thoughts, thus confirming the 
intercommunication by the senses that create the synaesthetic experience. Holl, 
Pallasmaa, and Perez-Gomez (2007) contended that every touching of 
architecture is a multi-sensory experience. Their justification was that the qualities 
of matter, space, and scale are measured equally by all the five senses in addition 
to the skeleton and muscles to make the architecture involve seven realms of 
sensory experience that interact and infuse each other. 
In his analysis of the work of Bernard Berenson, Samuels highlighted the tactile 
values that describe those qualities in paintings which he regarded as stimulative 
of the sense of touch, namely, qualities that relate some visual images to the 
knowledge and experience of the flesh and skin. He holds that tactile values exist 
in representations of solid objects which let the subject come closer to look, touch, 
and walk around, or to understand (Samuels 1981).  In that sense, Pallasmaa 
claimed that the eye touches in the sense that gaze implies unconscious touch 
and that the haptic experience seems to penetrate the visual regime through its 
tactile presence. He described this experience as walking in the city in a car, 
which does not allow the subject to follow the images for analytic observation but, 
instead, enhances her/his haptic sensation (Pallasmaa 2012). 
In film, Elliott points out that close-up shots are considered as images that 
increase tactile value like the money in Psycho (Hitchcock 1960), the knife in 
Blackmail (Hitchcock 1929), and the glass of milk in Suspicion (Hitchcock 1941). 
Such images increase the empathetic narrative and enable the spectator to 
recognize the physicality and tactility of a murder (Elliott 2011). 
Recent film theorist such as Vivian Sobchack and Laura Marks link tactile values 
with the haptic vision concept developed by Deleuze and Guattari who used this 
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term for discussing nomadic arts such as carpet making and metal working in 
which the hands and touch support the eyes to see (Sobchack 1992; Marks 
2004). Consequently, Elliott argues, vision is not only a method for recognizing 
shape, color, light, and spatial relationships, but is also a sense “twinned with 
touch, in discerning texture, movement, three dimensional form and even kinetic 
energy” (Elliott 2011 p.168). In this theory, the notion of vision is expanded.  
Elliott concurs that what makes touch a remarkably important sense is that it is 
the first sense the subject develops and the last one the subject loses (Elliott 
2011). In addition to that, touch is a means to establish a sense of reality. For 
instance, Samuel notes that the subject cannot persuade herself/himself of the 
unreality of a looking-glass until she/he has touched the mirror (Samuels 1981). 
Moreover, in addition to texture, both Pallasmaa and Elliott confirm that touch 
gives a spatial depth because it senses the weight, temperature, density, 
sharpness, and distance so as to orient the subject in the world (Pallasmaa 2012; 
Elliott 2011).  
If the eye is the sense of separation, then Pallasmaa argues, touch is the sense 
of nearness, intimacy, and affection (Pallasmaa 2012). Benjamin (2007) 
suggested that bringing things closer is a challenge for the optic-cognitive 
process which evokes the other senses, especially touch, and memories. In other 
words, what is near motivates the subject to move and get closer towards the 
object to touch. Samuels confirms that this movement is sensed by the muscular 
sensations that teach the subject to appreciate depth in space (Samuels 1981). 
Relating this to Heidegger’s (1996) term Da-sein, which means being, and which 
happens through de-distancing and manipulation of directionality, one can 
conclude that touch is a very essential sense to increase embodiment and 
corporeality for the subject.  
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Not only touch is twinned with vision to create the notion of haptic vision, Marks 
highlights that there is also the concept of haptic sound that is used to suggest 
the closeness and the distance of the surroundings (Marks 2000). In this context, 
touch is twinned with sound, as an example, Elliott (2011) illustrated how 
Hitchcock used to combine empathy and identification with mimesis and 
embodied affect through the tension made apparent between closeness and 
distance in film Rear Window (Hitchcock 1954); the sound in the dark scene 
suggested the proximity of the intruder; his weight over the steps was felt, which 
increased the anxiety of feeling him very close to Jeffry (Elliott 2011).  
In dread, the spaces are mostly dark, the visuals are limited and sight is paused. 
Under these circumstances, the synaesthetic nature of the senses, as Merleau-
Ponty (2002) clarified, opens up the other senses and evokes them to 
intercommunicate to perceive qualities that help the subject fill some blanks in 
the images in order to complement the experience of fear.  
In another perspective of embodiment, touch is related to skin and its effect on 
the subject. In 2000, Marks studied the importance of the skin and touch. She 
elaborated on the haptic vision of Deleuze and Guattari and used this term in very 
specific sense. Her haptic vision involves thinking in skin, for cognition and a 
sensation, not only for information. Consequently, haptic images have to be 
experienced, not analyzed (Marks 2000).  Also Elliott  maintains that touch is an 
embodied sense that cannot be localized in any one part as it is a shifting 
experience that spreads itself over the skin, forming an interface with the 
environment (Elliott 2011).  
Tarja Laine is a recent film theorist who built her ideas on those of Laura Marks 
and Vivian Sobchack. She argues that corporeality can only be experienced by 
touch owing to the fact that when touch is felt by skin haptically, the haptic 
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experience increases the kinesthetic consciousness and, in turn, increases the 
corporeality, to make the skin a synonym of touch (Laine 2006).  
In this light, touch in the context of film, does not mean a physical touch, but a 
haptic sensation that is felt on the skin. Laine (2006) advocated the idea that 
camera movement is a way of creating proximity of touch for the spectator of the 
film. The movement of the camera is the way by which the spectator encounters 
the world of films and by which it discovers the tactility that increases her/his 
consciousness (Laine 2006). According to that, camera movement, sound, and/or 
image in film can invade the space of the spectator to contribute the experience 
of dread. It can cause a physical sensation felt on the skin. Hence, what matters 
in perception for the complete experience is the haptic perception. 
3.1.6 Haptic Perception 
Marks stated that “while optical perception privileges the representational 
power of the image, haptic perception privileges the material presence of the 
image” (Marks 2000 p.163). She focuses in her research on haptic visuality, 
which is in contrast with optical visuality, the haptic visuality is tactile and 
kinaesthetic, and it functions like touch (Marks 2004; Marks 2000). 
Vision may be the sense used the most in the cinematic experience. However, it 
is not isolated from the other senses. Sobchack argues that it is the cross-modal 
activity that makes the world meaningful, not only by vision, but also by 
cooperation with all the sensorial means (Sobchack 1990, 1992). Thereupon, she 
argued that the cinematic experience is felt by the entire body, not only by the 
eyes. 
Laine argues that haptic perception is not vision that is translated to other senses, 
but is a mode of seeing through all modes located on the skin and therefore is a 
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mode of bodily consciousness and corporeality (Laine 2006). She argues that 
what happens to the body of the spectator when watching a scene of horror or 
disgust, for instance, is shivering. The body defends itself by multiplication and 
the skin transforms into a kind of resonating membrane (Laine 2006). As to this 
transformation, Connor (2004) said:  
Why do we say that things give us the creeps, or that they make our skin crawl, 
unless it is that we sense a commingling, a commensality, a mimetic charming or 
fascination of the skin by the movement that it finds so aversive? Sensing the 
crawling taking place over it, the skin itself begins to crawl: it squirms into the 
shape of an insect or the worm—or rather, the multiple form of the insect or 
worm—in order to escape the touch of insect or worm” 
 (Connor 2004, 247) as cited by (Laine 2006)). 
Accordingly, Laine defines skin, then, as no longer primarily a membrane of 
separation between subject and object, inner and outer, or the self and the world, 
but as a medium of intersubjective connection (Laine 2006). Laine (2006) 
concluded that skin is what structures the perception beyond the inside and 
outside and gives the shape of affective engagement with a film, i.e., spreading 
an affect over the entire body. Since the skin has no optical point of view, then 
the subject sees through the entire skin. As a result, she argues that the skin 
becomes an entire environment and a visual tactile surface that is inseparable 
from the sense of embodiment. It becomes the ground against the other senses 
and the platform where the inside and the outside encounter one another (Laine 
2006). This interaction of the inside and the outside makes the body a subject of 
encountering and also an object in the world. Therefore, it is no longer clear 
where the outside of things is to be found, which is, in Laine’s (2006) opinion, 
what creates the corporeality for the haptic perception. Furthermore, the senses 
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are fully embedded in each other, which, in turn, supports the subject’s being as 
a body and increases the sense of consciousness (Laine 2006). As a 
consequence, when watching a horror or a dread scene, all what matters for the 
spectator is that the antagonist does not touch the protagonist. This touch, 
according to Laine (2006), is the reason behind fear and fear is the moving force 
that is experienced as touch and the force with which the subject’s body responds 
and starts to crawl. 
Fear, as has been discussed earlier by Hanich and Schmitz, is characterized by 
expansive Away!-tendency; it enters the felt-body to experience constriction. The 
body then tries to escape the skin, but it cannot. And so, tension is produced 
(Hanich 2010; Schmitz et al. 2011). In light of this, the fear of touch and the 
experience of touch during which the body starts to crawl, in addition to the 
expansive Away!-tendency to escape the skin, constitute a very affective 
engagement that increases the sense of corporeality and of consciousness, 
which, by turns, increases the level of embodiment.  
3.1.7 Deleuze’s Perception-Image 
Before moving on to the other procedure that relates the subject to the 
object, this research introduces Deleuze’s (1992) philosophy of the image, since 
it is related to film studies. The Movement-Image for Deleuze is the “a centred 
set of variable elements which act and react on each other” (Deleuze 1992 
p.217). He refers to all the variable elements that act and react in the frame and 
in the narrative. He developed this concept while criticizing the classical cinema 
that centered more on the human beings than on images, which, accordingly, 
created a gap between the received movement and the executed movement on 
the screen, namely, a gap between the action and the reaction (Deleuze 1992; 
Harris 2016). As a response to that gap, Deleuze (1992) proposed a set of 
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variables that are connected to human action in an additional stage. First, they 
are linked through the perception-image. Deleuze (1992) defined this as 
ensemble of elements which act on a center and which have a relation with it.  
The perception-image is then assembled from what the spectator hears and sees 
and what the character(s) see(s) or hear(s). The subjective point of view of a 
character reflects what and how she/he sees things. So, there is what the 
character sees and then there is what the spectator sees. Harris states that the 
point of view shots are necessary for the spectator to see what the character 
sees, but there are other shots that are necessary to give the spectator the illusion 
of seeing what the character sees (Harris 2016). Thus, the perception-image is 
not a single image, but is a sequence of images that put together point of view 
shots, the subjective shots, and external shots (the objective shots or the third-
person shots) to create the world of the scene. The perception-image then uses 
subjective and objective shots in combination, in order to let the audience 
perceive what the character perceives. Then, the spectator’s mind takes the 
image coherently to know what the character sees. Deleuze (1992) confirms that 
this image does not reflect feelings, but it is an objective experience concretely 
realizing the character’s subjective experience, and he names it the perception 
of perception.  
According to Deleuze, those perceptions have effects on characters, they are 
shown in the affection-image, which is usually a close-up shot that reflects the 
impact on the character, which fills the gap between action and reaction, to end 
the sequence by an action–image; the reaction of the character to the world of 
that scene (Deleuze 1992). 
Because of the way that dread scenes are shot, perception as a process of 
encountering between the spectator as a subject and the screen as an object is 
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considered in this research as an interpretive lived experience that interacts with 
the characters. It contains an individual perception of the spectator and a shared 
perception with the character when the camera movement represents the eyes 
of the character, or as Hitchcock names it a subjective treatment shot.  
After illustrating the phenomenology of perception from Merleau-Ponty’s 
perspective and its expansions in film studies, in the following section the 
researcher discusses the phenomenology of movement and its role in increasing 
corporeality and consciousness in an effort to elaborate on the embodiment 
process in dread scenes of thriller films. 
3.2 Movement and Kinesthetic Experience  
The definition of movement as a phenomenon differs from one theorist to 
another. However, it is always tied to a change, internally or externally. According 
to Husserl (2012 [1982]), the natural attitude of movement means the ordinary 
way of being-in-the-world. It is the physical change in the location of particular 
object between two points, where under the absence of movement the subject 
will be at rest (Husserl 2012). 
Merleau-Ponty et al. (1968) were conservative about Husserl’s (1913) definition 
of movement since it destroys the unity of the movement. They defined 
movement as a phenomenon of locomotion, which is the awareness of one’s own 
motion in the world, and interior flux, and a revolution of being other than 
changing position in place or displacement (Merleau-Ponty et al. 1968). Merleau-
Ponty (2002) viewed it as a power of locomotion that extends the intention of the 
subject to be-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.169). He looked at the body of 
the subject and pointed to the significance of consciousness for experiencing 
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movement. He also confirmed that the basic bodily unity in movement is learned 
or processed when it is incorporated into the world; 
A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has 
incorporated it into its 'world', and to move one's body is to aim at offering us a 
representation, presents itself to our body as a specific practical possibility. 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.160).  
In addition to that, Landes highlighted that Merleau-Ponty looked at movement 
as a structure of expression, a whole that cannot be divided and which is based 
on consciousness (Landes 2013). Merleau-Ponty (2002) strived to overcome the 
natural attitude of movement. Consequently, movement, as he conceives it, 
cannot be considered as a qualitative happening, but as an event that must be 
harmonized with moving objects and with points in time. Then, movement is in 
the end tied to the displacement of an object through space and time. 
Considering being entails recalling the concept of Da-sein. Heidegger (1996) 
counted being or being-in-the-world as a key point on the line of movement. He 
considered movement with its two aspects; de-distancing and directionality, as 
an engagement with the world, or as encountering process where the moving 
body acts with the world by walking, holding, lifting, or any bodily movements and 
actions to engage with the world (Heidegger 1996).  
Heidegger noted that elimination of the distances such that the object will be 
closer to the thing and the orientation towards it make the object appear here and 
now or there and then (Heidegger 1996). Merleau-Ponty touched upon this issue 
by highlighting that “our body and our perception […] take as the centre of the 
world that environment in which they present us” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.333). 
For the architect Tadao Ando, this is a point of existentiality and spatiality 
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because when distance is perceived the “surrounded space becomes manifested 
as a thing endowed with various meanings and values” (Ando 1995, 453) as cited 
in (Shīrāzī 2013)). Then, that movement, as Heidegger highlighted, is a process 
of giving space or making room in which the space is discovered in the world 
(Heidegger 1996; Shīrāzī 2013). 
Shīrāzī noted that the architect Tadao Ando (1995) concentrated in his studies 
on the body. He believed in the union of the subject and object, that is, the body 
and mind, and used a Japanese concept, Shintai, to express the body. Shintai 
means the union of flesh and spirit to acknowledge the world at the same time of 
acknowledging the self (Ando 1995 as cited in (Shīrāzī 2013)). Ando (1995) was 
of the opinion that to perceive an object, the distance between self and object 
must be changed, which is fulfilled through movement. Shīrāzī notes this is very 
obvious in his building designs, especially in his museums, where he never 
reaches the main entrance directly, he always celebrates moving towards it to 
make room and so as to create spatiality for the subject for the purpose of 
increasing its existentiality in the space (Shīrāzī 2013); “Spatiality is the result of 
multiplicity of directions of vision from a multiplicity of viewpoints by the movement 
of the Shintai.” (Ando (1995) As cited in (Shīrāzī 2013)). In other words, the 
process of movement in different directions creates different viewpoints and 
eventually creates spatiality. 
In regards to spatiality, Sheets-Johnstone (2011), a phenomenologist and dancer 
who built her philosophy on the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and other 
phenomenologists in looking for the primacy of movement, agreed with 
Heidegger and added that if the subject does not move in space, it qualitatively 
creates certain spatial characters by the nature of its movement, for instance, 
“large space, open space, tight space, resistant space” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 
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p.124). This issue will be further explained in this thesis in the Structure of Self-
Movement section. But before proceeding to elaboration of Sheets-Johnstone 
(2011) on the phenomenology of movement and its structure, it is necessary to 
identify two concepts concerning movement that collaborate to form a shape of 
body awareness: proprioception and  kinesthesia. 
3.2.1 Proprioception 
Proprioception is described in neuroscience and cognitive science by Cole 
at al. as the position sense, i.e., a sense that has to be delivered by receptors 
inside the muscles and the nerves to the tactile sub-cortical regions of the brain 
to tell the brain how contracted or how relaxed every muscle is in the entire body. 
Consequently, it tells the brain where the body’s position is in space. A loss of 
proprioception causes the loss of sense of position (Cole et al. 2002). 
Gallagher, an Irish-American philosopher who works on embodied cognition, 
social cognition, agency and the philosophy of psychopathology, states that 
proprioception is a cognitive and a sub-conscious sense that one can feel it if 
she/he focuses on it (Gallagher 2006). 
In phenomenology, as a contribution of embodiment to cognition, proprioception 
is used by Merleau-Ponty and Gibson in the same definition of the sense of 
position, but in a different mold; it is used as a perceptual system and as a mean 
of knowledge (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Sheets-Johnstone 2011; Gibson 2014 
[1979]).  
Merleau-Ponty (2002) considered proprioception as a sense that provides the 
perceiver with a sense of locomotion while motion, while Gibson considered it in 
static positions. James Gibson is a psychologist and an important contributor to 
the field of visual perception. In his book, The Senses Considered as Perceptual 
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Systems, he recognized the perceptual system of proprioception and proposed 
the concepts of muscular, articular, vestibular, cutaneous, auditory, and visual 
proprioception. His notion of proprioception is both static and positional, and is 
not tied to movement as a dynamic experience that is bodily happening as in 
running, pushing, kicking, and stretching (Gibson 1966). His major work is thus 
related to the idea of visual proprioception. On this account, he considered 
movement as an instrument enfolded in perception itself, which is the means the 
subject uses to pick up information from the world. Hence, he describes 
movement as kinetic affordance (Gibson 2014). Sheets-Johnstone (2011) 
criticized Gibson for focusing only on the senses for proprioception and for 
overlooking the qualitative structure of movement. In view of that, she judged his 
work as having made a  limited contribution to the definition of the experience of 
movement because it neglected the idea of motion (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 
p.205).  
3.2.2 Kinesthesia 
Kinesthesia shares with proprioception one common thing, which is the 
awareness of the body in space. But if proprioception concerns balance in 
position, Gallagher and Sheets Johnstone argue that kinesthesia concerns 
movement more as a behavioral activity than proprioception. By kinesthesia the 
body learns to detect how to move, unconsciously, as in sports, or walking on 
stairs, or eating with a spoon, where the body moves in a way that serves the 
action it does without thinking of it (Gallagher 2006; Sheets-Johnstone 2011), 
which also serves Heidegger’s (1996) concept of ready-to-hand which occurs 
when the body uses any tool available as an extension to it and moves 
accordingly (e.g., the spoon or the bat). 
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Although kinetic has directionality definitions, Sheets-Johnstone notes that 
kinesthesia is a sensory function or content with no clues of directionalities, it 
does not give hints of ups, downs, tilts, or horizontals. What is most important in 
this regard is that kinesthesia is a sensation of the perception of motion; a 
perception of one’s own body, through a muscular effect felt in its limbs and 
muscles (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
As for the foundational significance of kinesthesia, Sheets-Johnstone (2011) 
referred to Landgrebe (1977) who placed emphasis on kinesthesia and who 
referred to movement as kinesthetic motion. She argued that through kinesthetic 
motion the subject makes itself be-in-the-world. By this, she confirms that the self-
movement is experienced kinesthetically and that kinesthesia is at the core of 
consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.128). 
Husserl (2012) discussed kinesthesia and compared it with touch in that it has an 
indeterminate localization. In other words, the body can be constituted only in 
tactility and in everything that is localized with the sensation touch (Husserl 2012). 
In a closer look at the philosophy of Husserl, Sheets-Johnstone (2011) argued 
that he did not actually consider self-movement and that he only considered 
movement with respect to external perception, namely, movement relating to 
perceived objects in the world. In addition to that, she found that his kinesthetic 
flows are connected only to eye movement. On account of this, she concluded 
that his estimation of kinesthesia is restricted. Therefore, she elaborated on the 
self-movement by correcting and amplifying Husserl’s discussion (Sheets-
Johnstone 2011). However, Husserl’s philosophy meets part of this thesis in 
considering the eye movement for the viewer because its movement creates a 
virtual spatiality which leads to a sense of being-in-the-world. 
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Maxine Sheets-Johnstone suggested a structure of movement that has a 
qualitative nature that fills the gaps in Husserl’s and Gibson’s views. She also 
shed light on the significance of those qualities in order to have a corporeal 
consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). Understanding the qualitative nature of 
movement will justify the effect of the character’s movement in film upon the 
viewer. 
3.2.3 The Structure of Self-Movement  
In the view of Merleau-Ponty, Landes notes that structure is both a process 
and a whole, and the use of the word structure signifies the role of consciousness 
in the process (Landes 2013). The structure of movement, according to Sheets-
Johnstone (2011), has four main phases. It starts with a kinesthetic experience 
and ends with corporeal consciousness. Diagram 3-1 below illustrates visually 
Sheets-Johnstone’s structure of movement. It has been drawn to make it easier 
for the reader to follow and understand her phenomenology of movement, which 
will be discussed soon. 
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Diagram 3-1: Sheets-Johnstone’s Structure of Movement 
 
Along with the body’s role as the center of orientation, Husserl (2012) considered 
some verbs to act as a verbal expression of kinetic movement and corporeal 
consciousness. As an example, for him, I am expresses a corporeal 
consciousness and I can indicates a kinetic possibility of movement (Husserl 
2012). On the basis of the structure of movement proposed by Sheets-Johnstone 
(2011), the body is then oriented from I can to express the kinesthetic experience 
to I am to express its corporeal consciousness. The following four sub-sections 
elaborate on the major phases of the structure of self-movement concluded by 
Sheets-Johnstone: kinesthetic experience, transcendental subjectivity, 
kinesthetic consciousness, and corporeal consciousness.  
Self-movement
Body-Movement
Kinesthetic 
Experience
Transcedental 
Subjectivity
(sense making)
Kinesthetic 
consciousness
corporeal 
consciousness
(action) verbs
(Verbal 
experience?)
I can
(Volunteer)
I am
(Situation)
A dynamic process: 
where we bring certain 
forces to encounter the 
environment. Those 
forces have spatial and 
temporal qualities and 
aspects. 
When we turn our 
attention to into our 
movement.  
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3.2.3.1 The Kinesthetic Experience 
Sheets Johnstone defines kinesthetic experience as a dynamic process 
that evolves during movement or when one is about to move, where the body 
brings a certain play of forces to life to encounter the world. She argues that those 
forces have spatial and temporal qualities and aspects that have the ability to 
affect the senses and the corporeality. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) identified four 
essential qualities of movement: tensional, projectional, linear, and amplitudinal 
qualities. She argues that those aspects of movement are qualitative, not 
quantitative, characters inherent in movement and experienced unconsciously, 
but in general, they bear upon effort, space, and time (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
The kinesthetic experience is a key for creating a corporeal experience. It works 
in the domain of I can. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) confirmed that it is not necessary 
to have a change in position to create a kinesthetic experience and maintain 
consciousness. Only in standing can the subject have these spatio-temporal 
qualities to have a kinesthetic experience and, consequently, a kinesthetic 
consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
Before proceeding to the next phase in the structure of movement of Sheets-
Johnstone, namely, transcendental subjectivity, the research discusses the 
spatio-temporal forces and aspects of kinesthetic experience, discussed by 
Sheets-Johnstone, to identify their roles in creating the proprioception and 
kinesthesia that affect the senses in the transcendental subjectivity phase. 
Tensional Quality and the Projectional Quality 
Sheets-Johnstone states that the tensional and projectional qualities of 
movement describe a temporal aspect of movement because they are expressed 
kinesthetically. Tensional quality relates to the sense of effort since any effort to 
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be produced (e.g., walking or lifting) awakens the kinetic energy that drives the 
movement of the subject (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). Copying her example, if a 
subject wants to lift a case and she/he expects it to be heavy but it was actually 
lighter than expected, then this awakens the kinetic energy of the body. Sheets-
Johnstone (2011) describes this as making the familiar strange. In this case, the 
subject generates less energy and, eventually, it produces a fluid and smooth 
movement. The temporality is different in this example in light of the time 
difference between expectations (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.123). 
The reliable expectation in the previous example is necessary to build the sense 
of I can so as to stimulate the ability to move, but what if the subject does not 
have any reliable expectation of the weight of the case? In this case, Sheets-
Johnstone argues that the subject will be kinesthetically at a loss to move the 
case effectively. However, in this case too, the kinetic energy in the body is 
awakened and a higher energy than normal is required to lift the case. Thus, the 
process will be more time consuming (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
It is necessary to mention that the movement is not of a single part of the body 
but of the whole body. To lift, push, pull, or climb, the whole body is engaged in 
the movement. Another related key point raised by Sheets-Johnstone (2011) is 
that the tensional quality is not only connected to movement, but also to stillness, 
or being still, because in stillness the body prepares itself to move, irrespective 
of whether now or later. 
So, how can watching a dread scene produce the tensional quality of movement 
for the spectator who just sits and watches? Hanich and Smith set out that the 
first effort the spectator makes is to follow the narrative and the character. The 
second effort is paid within the framework of engagement as the subject can have 
somatic empathy and/or imaginative empathy with the character (Hanich 2010; 
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Smith 1994), depending on the narrative and/or the camera techniques, which 
ensure(s) reflecting up on the spectator the same effort of the character in 
moving, swimming, climbing, or descending the stairs, especially since dread is 
still relative to other cinematic experiences and the associated movement of the 
character is very cautious.  
From another perspective of embodiment, it has been documented in different 
fields such as social science, psychology, and neuroscience that observing an 
action can create a mirroring in motor movements, such as a smile. Perceiving a 
smile activates the facial muscles to produce a smile (Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; 
Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000) as cited in (Foroni and Semin 2009)). This 
also suggests that a tensional quality can be transferred from the character to the 
spectator in film. 
The projectional quality of movement is the description which Sheets-Johnstone 
gives to the effort produced in the previous example, e.g., ‘a sharp and even 
striding’ or ‘flat but heavy clumping’. This projection of force is measured 
qualitatively, not quantitatively, and is deliberate and unhesitant (Sheets-
Johnstone 2011 p.126). 
This projectional quality can be referred to the synaesthetic experience discussed 
by Merelau-Ponty (2002), where the senses intercommunicate to open to the 
structure of the thing that appeals to senses, such as seeing the hardness of 
glass (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.267), and to the atmospheric qualities discussed by 
Griffero (2014), which are metaphoric qualities and corporeal affections that can 
only be compared by language. Griffero argues that these qualities are inter-
subjectivity effective qualities that express an emotional and corporeal 
involvement, which is not a cause-stimuli or the merging of the five senses, but 
an expression of the “possibility of a significance that [gives itself] immediately on 
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the sense level” (Griffero 2014 p.113). Understanding this quality in Merleau-
Ponty’s and Griffero’s points of views is necessary to read how this quality and 
the other qualities proceed to the next level in the structure of movement, that is, 
transcendental subjectivity.  
After this explanation of the two temporal aspects of the kinesthetic experience, 
namely, the tensional and projectional qualities, the next sub-section addresses 
the spatial aspects of movement, i.e., the linear and amplitudinal aspects.  
Linear Quality 
Sheets-Johnstone outlines that linear and amplitudinal qualities describe 
the spatial facets of movement. The linear quality has to do with the paths that 
the subject senses while describing the process of movement such as linear, 
curved, twisted, diagonal, zig-zag, straight, and circular paths, and a felt linear 
contour of the moving body, such as bending the body, turning the head, leaning 
the body forward, walking or marching with vertical body, and bending the body 
in a circle. All these aspects are directional aspects that orient the body and the 
movement (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.264). The directional, linear, and spatial 
aspects of the movement have been discussed in a very interesting way by Yudell 
(1977) through an analysis of the dancers’ body movement and a discussion of 
the axiality of directions.  
Yudell (1977) traced the importance of the body’s corporeality by discussing its 
role from the perspective of the dancer’s experience in movement. He discussed 
the feeling of space which the dancers use their entire bodies to touch. He viewed 
their movement not as a vague set of reflex actions, but as an “articulately felt 
interaction with the positive stuff of space,” and, hence, the effect of dancing on 
their outer and inner movements (Yudell 1977 p.58). He argues that a dancer’s 
maintenance of a sense of body center while moving in space was a 
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manifestation of their continuous awareness of the pull of gravity; describing it as 
if their response to gravity is always intense and almost obsessive (Yudell 1977). 
Yudell also (1977) connected the spatial characteristics of body movements with 
the haptic sense and tactile qualities of surfaces. For instance, “smooth surfaces 
invite closer contact while the rough materials generate movement in wide radius 
around corners” (Yudell 1977 p.71). Additionally, he argued that a change in 
texture has the ability to slow or quicken one’s pace. 
Axiality  
Another interesting concept of movement that was discussed by Yudell 
(1977) is that of axiality; how many axes does the subject use to move physically 
or visually? And does the number of axes affect the experience of space? 
Yudell (1977) supports the idea that all human movements trace complex spatial 
configurations, each having its own significance and meaning. First of all, there 
is a vertical axis and a horizontal one. The vertical axis has relationships with sky 
and earth. So, moving up is a metaphor for growth, longing, and reaching, whilst 
moving down is a metaphor of absorption, submersion, and compression. On the 
other hand, the horizontal axis refers to earth and, hence, relates to 
communication and social interaction (Yudell 1977). 
The number of axes of movement from Yudell’s (1977) point of view is necessary 
for delineation of spatial configuration. He regarded the curvilinear and diagonal 
movements as movement on two axes; only horizontally and only vertically, 
respectively, which are the most common movements as in the case of walking, 
running, or diving. Each motion has its own meaning or refers to a special 
character. As an illustration, a diagonal motion, which is the most common 
motion, appears to be related to a quick change in, or an upset of, an existing 
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order. Diving, as another example, is very tightly defined and restricted referral of 
movement, accordingly, one can conclude that its description can be applied to 
corridors as well, and probably that is the reason behind using corridors a lot in 
dread scenes.  
On the other hand, spiral and helical motions are examples of three-axis 
movement. Yudell (1977) considered the spiral motion as the most spatially-
complex configuration for body movement. He gave an example of Tatlin’s 
monument in Russia, where the movement is in two axes and then it shots out 
vertically and symbolically into space and the future (Yudell 1977 p.66). This 
example points to vision which acts as a call for moving. Thereupon, it is not 
necessary to have a physical movement to create spatiality, which is a conception 
that is in line with Husserl’s philosophy of the eye movement and spatiality. 
In another example, that of the foyer of Berlin Philharmonic concert hall, Yudell 
(1977) elaborated on the relationship between orientation and the sense of order, 
arguing that in this space there is a slipping cascade of stairs with diagonal 
relationships. Yudell argues that this complexity of relationships challenges the 
sense of order and orientation, which, in turn, heightens the subject’s senses and 
quickens bodily responses because the spatial configuration is energized and 
awareness of one’s own movement and of spatial relationships to one another is 
increased (Yudell 1977). In other words, the multi-axis directional space creates 
disorientation forces in the senses and awakens them to be aware of movement, 
which, subsequently, creates a bodily response. 
Architectural Promenade  
The linear aspect of movement is the aspect used the most in the work of 
architecture. There are many names behind the concept of an architectural 
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promenade. The action of movement was an icon in practice and theory for some 
filmmakers and modern architecture pioneers. Eisenstein (1994) established a 
crucial link between the architectural ensemble and the moving spectator. He also 
created the concept of the path to guarantee the best location for a viewer to 
perceive the Acropolis in its best frame. The path, according to him, can be a 
physical or imaginary path that is followed by the eye.  
Bruno notes that Eisenstein’s (1994) concept of path influenced many architects 
to celebrate movement, including Le Corbusier in his axis in Villa Savoye and 
Bernard Tschumi in his cinematic promenade in The Manhatten Scripts (Bruno 
2002). The movement through space becomes such an engaging experience that 
without it one cannot experience the compositional arrangements in the same 
way. All these promenades; path, axis, and ramp, are another face of Heidegger’s 
bridge concept that was discussed earlier. The movement on that bridge 
facilitates the experience of de-distancing and directionality, which, by turns, 
helps the subject to exist, namely, to be-in-the-world. 
The architectural promenade has been one of Ando’s central devices to 
encourage and celebrate movement, such as the large staircase in Chikatsu-
Asuka Museum as noted by Shirazi. The sense of movement, in conjunction with 
a large staircase, is meant to stimulate a physical reaction by the visitor. Ando 
regarded the staircase as a place which itself intensifies the sense of the body 
and stimulates an experience of space in the physical realm; a place where one 
is awakened to her/his body and where she/he senses her/his corporeality 
(Shīrāzī 2013). 
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Amplitudinal Quality 
It was underlined earlier in this chapter that Sheets-Johnstone (2011) was of the 
opinion that the movement of the subject creates spatial characters that can affect 
the atmosphere, such as large space, tight space, and constricted space. This 
can be realized more in the other spatial aspect of movement; the amplitudinal 
quality, than in its spatial quality. Spatial characters are associated with both the 
felt expansiveness or contractedness of the subject’s moving body and the spatial 
extensiveness or contractedness of the subject’s movement (Sheets-Johnstone 
2011). For example, when the subject sits down, she/he contracts herself/himself 
into a smaller volume. On the other hand, the subject expands her/his body to 
reach something high. Running creates an extensive space, but if the subject 
paces down, the movement creates a tight and constricted space. For Sheets-
Johnstone, the amplitudinal quality can be described as a magnitudinal quality in 
terms of “controlled but unconstrained bodily spatiality, controlled but unimpeded 
range of movement” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.127). 
After this review of the spatial qualities of the kinesthetic experience, namely, the 
linear and amplitudinal qualities. It is possible to extend the reading of these 
qualities by combining them with Schmitz’s (1974 to 2005) definitions of 
directional space and its vector atmosphere existing in Griffero (2014). The 
directional space is described as a pre-geometrical state of motility. It is the 
starting point of a corporeal communication with the surrounding environment, 
which works according to a motor suggestion to move, but not yet reduced to be 
a local space. The directional space aligns the character’s movement and is 
responsible for creating felt properties such as the narrowness or vastness of the 
atmosphere so as to create a vector atmosphere, which can be described as 
“unilateral, omnilateral, centrifugal, centripetal, or undecided atmosphere” 
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(Griffero 2014 pp.45, 47). Consequently, the space can be described as large or 
tight as in the amplitudinal aspect. From the viewpoint of Yudell (1977) and 
Husserl (2012), the eyes are enough for completion the perception of spatial 
movement. Therefore, directional space in film is what matters in cinematic 
experience since it has the aspect of a linear quality. However, Schmitz argued 
that directional space is expressed and experienced internally as a reproduction 
of movement because of the directional tensions that are perceivable in static 
lines and forms, where the felt-body and the perceived form coincide (Schmitz 
1996:42 as in (Griffero 2014 p.48)). In view of the foregoing discussions, the 
gravity pull in the mise-en-scène of a film can be a shape, a path, something that 
pulls the character’s movement, or even the character’s movement itself.  
To sum up the previous discussions of the spectator’s experience in 
movement, it can be stated that the spectator experiences temporal qualities of 
movement, e.g., tensional quality, through the effort which she/he produces to 
follow the character or to be the character when empathy with her/him is very 
high. The effort produced awakens kinetic energy and stimulates it to move, 
physically, as in holding breath, or visually, e.g., when moving the eye to 
somewhere else on the screen. The effort then provokes the senses. The 
projectional aspect of movement also imparts importance to the level of sensing 
because it refers to the synaesthetic experience and the corporeal atmospheric 
qualities connected to the effort it produces. 
The spectator also experiences spatial aspects while watching a film through the 
vector atmosphere because of the linear quality of the movement which is 
responsible for prompting the body or eye to move. The spatial configuration of 
the scene, even if it is produced by shapes and lines of the mise-en-scène or 
according to a character’s movement, has the ability to awaken and heighten the 
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senses, especially if it has a complex configuration. This eventually is reflected 
on, and by, the body of the viewer, where she/he feels the narrowness and 
vastness of that space. This contributes to the awareness of body locomotion, 
which, in turn, feeds kinesthesia in the motion of the character and proprioception 
in stillness. 
Sheets-Johnstone (2011) highlighted that kinesthesia is the core of the 
kinesthetic experience. This research has a contribution to her philosophy 
according to the foregoing discussion and in relation to Schmitz’s philosophy; 
while watching film, especially a dread scene, when stillness is a major aspect, 
proprioception is the other significant core of kinesthetic experience because it 
provides the perceiver with locomotion and a sense of balance and position. 
3.2.3.2 Transcendental Subjectivity 
With reference to kinesthetic experience, research has shown how spatio-
temporal qualities have the ability to awaken kinetic energy in the body by 
producing kinesthesia and proprioception which in turn stimulate the body to 
move. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) defined movement as an action by which the 
subject discovers its sense of aliveness and of being grounded. It is the source 
of the senses in space and time to create the subjectively felt-time (Sheets-
Johnstone 2011 p.134). Transcendental subjectivity is then the second phase in 
the structure of movement discussed by Sheets-Johnstone. It occurs when the 
senses are evoked and heightened. It can be manifested in spatio-temporal 
qualities, such as the effort in stillness, or when there is a complex spatial 
configuration. In relating this phase and its role of existence, with Merleau-Ponty’s 
logic of existence, one concludes that the name of this phase, namely, 
transcendental subjectivity, is actually linked with the third act of existence 
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according to Merleau-Ponty (2002), that is, transcendence, which is the act that 
transforms the volunteer into a person in a situation. 
3.2.3.3 Kinesthetic Consciousness 
Sheets-Johnstone defines kinesthetic consciousness as the 
consciousness developing when the spatio-temporal aspects of movement 
awaken the senses and the subject transforms her/his attention to movement. In 
such cases, “Movement awakens transcendental subjectivity in the form of 
kinesthetic consciousness[...] when we turn our attention from the world into our 
own movement of our bodies, we experience ourselves kinetically” (Sheets-
Johnstone 2011 p.119). This sort of consciousness is the foundational source of 
the subject’s concepts of space, time, and force (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.206). 
Time, then, is another facet that thickens the lived-body experience. It was 
addressed by many philosophers including Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, 
and Hanich. 
Deleuze utilized Henri Bergson’s philosophies in discussing the movement-
image. He stated that in the phenomenological field, Bergson in his Matter and 
Memory (originally in 1896) defined time not as a clock or a calendar, but as a 
duration. Duration is about a lived moment that can last for a year or for few 
seconds. Deleuze referred to lived time as a real time, which he termed as the 
“impure combination of homogenous time” (Deleuze 1992 p.22). What signifies 
duration in comparison with time is that duration can be mathematically described 
and broken down, but cannot be divided into segments. Deleuze argued that 
duration can be divided only spatially according to the lived moments, which can 
be expressed as a memory (Deleuze 1992).  
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Sheets-Johnstone (2011) extended the understanding of time and categorized it 
into ordinal time and cardinal time. The ordinal time is quantitative. It can be 
described by such expressions as now, at some time, lately, and just now. She 
argues that the word now, for example, is sophisticated. In addition, it imposes a 
“division that does not exist, a division that disrupts the qualitative dynamic 
experience” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.156).  
On the other hand, cardinal time is a qualitative experience of temporality that 
can be described using such expressions as creeping, rushed, prolonged, and 
suddenly. Furthermore, she argues, it is more felt than non-felt time. Sheets-
Johnsone (2011) discussed the adverb suddenly and included it in the category 
of qualitative temporality because it is not an interval of time and is qualitatively 
experienced, much like the terms rushed or creeping (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 
p.156). What matters for her is the feeling of movement which expresses a felt-
time. For example, the evenness in walking and the unevenness in walking with 
a limp are examples of a movement that is described temporally (Sheets-
Johnstone 2011). Hence, what the subject experiences as a kinesthetic 
consciousness via self-movement is cardinal, not ordinal, time. This clarifies why 
kinesthetic consciousness is the foundation of time; in the unevenness of walking 
with a limp, the body turns its attention to the movement and experiences it 
temporally. Thus, the time can be felt and the body increases its subjectivity. This 
also clarifies the argument of Deleuze when he stated that that duration for 
Bergson (1896)  produces subjectivity (Deleuze 1992), which is created when an 
attention to bodily movement is felt because the subject feels herself/himself and 
the experience then becomes corporeal and conscious.  
Pallasmaa (2012) suggested using action verbs in images as a device to denote  
an active encountering, e.g., to use the noun verb entering instead of the verb 
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enter  (Pallasmaa 2012). The action verbs express time in addition to the action. 
They have qualitative temporal characteristics that point to the process of 
entering more than the image of the door, which is what matters in film, especially 
in the formulation of dread scenes. 
Hanich (2010) pointed to the time experienced in film, which is similar to the 
concept of duration in that neither can be measured. He argued that the 
experienced time can only be described in relation to other categories. He 
considered it to be central to the pleasure of watching frightening films. What is 
significant in the movement of dread is that the character’s movement is full of 
pauses in addition to some (limited) flow. Husserl (2012) argued that the 
subjective body experience in the now does not correspond to mathematical 
models of separation in time, but are “varying forms of continuous flow, of 
permanent goings-on, and when more moment are outstanding, they are 
experienced as thicker than others” (Husserl and J 2012 pp.188–189). Within this 
framework, and drawing upon Pallasmaa’s (2001) view on action verbs in dread 
(e.g., walking), the pause of the character gives rise to heaviness in walking or in 
going on in the action. This heaviness expresses an extended experience of time; 
lived time, and the duration of a moment that can be memorized. Moreover, it 
expresses an effort in the stillness whilst preparing to move. Besides, on the basis 
of the restricted movement options that are common in dread spaces, only 
contractedness and narrowness are produced in the felt-body and in the absolute 
space. This pause gives time for the spectator to think and feel his or her position 
and balance in the space. It also increases the locomotion of its body to create, 
eventually, a corporeal consciousness. In addition to the oscillation between 
consciousness and unconsciousness in watching a dread scene, as was 
discussed in Chapter Two, this notion can provide a fair justification for the 
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extended time experience felt through fear and the temporal immersion of dread 
scenes in thriller films. Once the character moves, all the effort mentioned in the 
pause will be relatively released and time will be less clearly experienced, unless 
a moment of shock coincides with the flow to create a qualitative aspect of felt-
time. 
3.2.3.4 Corporeal Consciousness 
Corporeal consciousness is the last element in the structure of movement 
that follows the notion of  kinesthetic consciousness of Sheets Johnstone 
(Sheets-Johnstone 2011). It is what happens when the action verb I can turns 
into I am. It is what happens when the volunteer turns into a person in a situation. 
It is the highest level of existence because when it occurs, it reflects pure 
subjectivity according to the movement and the senses awakening, reflecting a 
thick felt-time experience, an effort, and a kinetic energy, and, eventually, it 
creates a corporeal experience.  
In short, according to Sheets-Johnstone (2011), the body learns by moving. It 
creates and constitutes spatio-temporal dynamic aspects that stimulate 
movement. Movement is the ground for sense-making, the originating ground for 
transcendental subjectivity, where the subject turns its attention to its movement 
and constitutes time and space in her/his kinesthetic consciousness of 
movement. Ultimately, this creates a corporeal consciousness. Sheets-
Johnstone’s structure of movement guided this research to develop a deeper 
insight into the corporeal consciousness that occurs in the creation of a dread 
atmosphere in the case study section in the second part of this thesis, with one 
addition; conceptualizing the movement as a process of embodiment in film that 
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is connected to the character’s movement; the character’s movement in dread is 
responsible for creating the sense of vastness and narrowness for the viewer.  
3.3 Action-Reaction 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) developed many models for understanding the 
body, mind, and the world. Influenced by the gestalt idea, he developed the body-
schema concept to identify the relationship between perception and action. 
According to the body-schema concept, the subject has a group of skills that 
establish the body’s precognitive familiarity with itself and with the world it 
inhabits. This familiarity turns any unfamiliar situation into a familiar one and, as 
a consequence, the subject responds, or acts (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 
1999). 
As a process of encountering between the subject (the spectator) and the object 
(the screen), the action takes different shapes since the subject does not move 
physically in the screen. Therefore, the question arises as to what kind of acts 
does the subject then produce? 
As a start, one has to recall the action-image act as the third act in the 
construction of the movement-image with respect to the reaction of the character 
that has been suggested by Deleuze (1992). According to him, the reaction of the 
actor has a duality of impacts; a large form of action-image and a small form of 
action-image. The large form of the action-image is the impact that flows from the 
environment towards the actor, which is indeed Deleuze’s point of view and the 
one that characterises most classical films and most of genres like gangster and 
noir films. On the other hand, the small form of the action-image is the impact that 
flows from the actor into the environment, i.e., when the character tries to change 
the world (Deleuze 1992).  
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The action-image is an image that pertains to the character, not the spectator. It 
is not within the scope of this research to justify the character’s actions in the film. 
All what matters is how the character guides the spectator by her/his actions and 
stimulates her/him to act or respond for the construction of dread atmosphere. 
Various studies in psychology and neuroscience have adopted the Perception-
Action Model (PAM). Examples include Preston (2007), Foroni and Semin (2013), 
Macrae et al. (2013), and Spadacenta et al. (2014). In view of the findings of 
these studies, this research found a way to relate cinema spectatorship to this 
psychological model. 
As a motor behavior, Preston interprets that the Perception-Action Model 
addresses the fact that there are representations shared in common by the 
subject and the object for perceiving and generating action (Preston 2007). The 
term representation has been used in psychology to express the pattern of 
activation in the body and the brain that corresponds to a particular state that 
attempts to repeat the same pattern (Preston 2007). 
Under the philosophical reading of empathy and sympathy that has been formerly 
discussed in this part of the thesis, activation and representation in the brain can 
now be related. This is especially true when the spectator spends a lot of time 
with the main character to reach to an alignment of sympathy. Smith argues that 
sympathy occurs when the spectator is placed in relation to the character through 
being given access to the character’s actions by spatial attachment and also 
subjective access (Smith 1994). In addition to the alignment of sympathy, Smith 
argues that there is an allegiance sympathy by which the subject makes an 
emotional and intellectual response to the characters and to their actions. For 
Smith (1994), this form of sympathy positions the spectator within the discursive 
and textual frames of the film. 
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Then, what kind of action does the spectator experience while watching a film? 
Preston argues that according to the notion of activation of shared 
representations, and if the situation is strong enough to generate a response or 
to lead to conscious awareness, the action refers to overt acts and imagined acts 
(Preston 2007). As an example of an overt act, if the object displays a facial 
expression, such as smiling or breathing, then the areas in the subject’s brain will 
represent those movements and, as a result, create a similar act (Foroni and 
Semin 2009, 2013; Preston 2007). The overt act can be not only be a mirror of 
the object, but it can sometimes also be a representation of an expected behavior 
of the object. Consequently, the subject creates ideomotor actions. For example, 
Preston illustrates if a soccer fan watches a player running toward the goal and 
then stopping, the expected action is for the player to kick the ball. If the action 
does not fit the expectation, then an error signal is generated in the mind of the 
subject, resulting in an actual kicking movement being generated by the subject 
(Preston 2007).  
Ierna, Jacobs and Mattens highlighted the imagined act according to Husserl’s 
(1976) philosophy, which is an object or a theme of the subject’s consciousness 
(Ierna et al. 2011). To grasp the imagined act concept within the framework of the 
internal emotions and images, this research discusses the concept from the 
perspective of Schmitz’s philosophy. 
When the spectator perceives an action that cannot be mirrored by the subject, 
the subject will experience it internally in the felt-body, where the corporeal 
dynamics of expansion and contraction are elicited based on the situation. The 
dread atmosphere is motivated by the fear emotion, which in turn constricts the 
lived body. This constriction or narrowness is identified by the corporeal isles of 
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the body, in Schmitz’s terms, head, chest, and feet. But what actions will this lead 
to?  
In light of the elaboration of Hanich (2010) on the thoughts of Schmitz (1964 to 
2005), there are two apparent actions. The first action is related to the relative 
space of the subject, in which the subject tries to escape by looking away or by 
covering the eyes. The other action occurs internally; when the subject cannot 
escape the relative space and cannot escape the absolute space, it tries to 
escape its skin “by expanding Away somewhere, but cannot flee the lived-body’s 
constriction” (Hanich 2010 p.103). The action in this situation turns into a feeling 
(e.g., tension) that can be felt in the head, chest, or feet, that is, a corporeal inner 
act. 
Since the spectator is following the character in a dread scene and the character 
carries out actions such as walking and hiding, then each action performed by 
the character will be transferred to the spectator, based on empathy and 
sympathy, and then moves her/him into a new situation. This situation is what 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) called the transcendence stage, namely, the stage at 
which the volunteer enters into a situation that increases the existence of the 
subject. In other words, each action performed by the character transfers the 
subject into a situation and as it does this, an inner dynamic process of 
contraction and expansion in the felt-body turns finally into an emotion or a 
feeling. This is exactly Griffero’s (2014) definition of the atmosphere, that is, 
emotions and feelings that loose meaning when someone tries to describe them. 
Thereupon, he argues one has to live in these emotions and feelings in order to 
understand them. “They are effused into a not yet clarified spatial dimension and 
tied to situations” (Griffero 2014 p.31).  
 Part One: Structure of Encountering 
145 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This study drew on the concepts of the phenomenology of perception and 
of lived experience that were developed by Merleau-Ponty (2002). It extended 
the definition of this concept by using other philosophers’ interpretations in an 
effort to elaborate on the relationships that emerge among those of perception, 
movement, and action, as fundamental processes in achieving embodiment 
through the encounter between the subject and the object.  
Sobchack’s (1990) phenomenology of cinematic experience stresses the 
interactive character of film viewing as an exchange between two bodies; the 
body of the character and the body of the viewer. She states that the relationship 
between spectator and film is fundamentally mimetic in that it is experienced 
through the body. However, she did not clarify how the exchange between the 
two bodies occurs.  Accordingly, the spectator in this research is considered as 
a subject who has an interpretive lived experience that interacts with the 
character when enveloped by the dread atmosphere in a thriller on screen. This 
encountering is related to an individual’s perception and a perception shared with 
the character. The relationship is also based on the movement of the character 
in the scene and how it is reflected on the viewer’s internal movement to create 
a sense of expansion or contraction. Finally, it is based on the character’s action 
which is responsible for creating the transcendence of the viewer to exist in that 
moment corporeally and to be in full consciousness, namely, to transfer her/him 
into a situation in which to act or to wish to act.  
It should be borne in mind that perception, action, and movement happen in a 
reciprocal, never-ending, non-sequential process involving the subject and the 
object. As Merleau-Ponty states “there is not a perception followed by a 
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movement, for both form a system which varies as a whole” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 
p.127). This means that perception can precede an action and that action can 
precede the perception of something else, and so on. That is the reason behind 
naming this chapter the Structure of Encountering, i.e., consciousness is behind 
the encountering process. 
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Chapter Four: The Affective Experience  
The previous chapters presented the phenomenology of embodiment as 
the process of encountering that take place between the subject and the object 
and discussed its three main stages: perception, movement and action. What 
matters in understanding the process of encountering is the concept of 
engagement because it takes place when the body takes up acting in order to 
embody the object. Hirose (2002) stresses that affordances and motivations are 
necessary for triggering the act of encountering in order to help with the act of 
embodying.  
This chapter gives an account of the theories of immersion and of flow theory and 
discusses affect and the affective experience as the ultimate limit of embodiment. 
The chapter also discusses affordances and motivations and emphasizes the 
difference between them using examples from different fields.  
4.1 Affordances and Motivation 
Affordance is an ecological psychological term set out by James J. Gibson 
originally in 1954. It describes how people visually perceive their environment 
and considers any resource encountered by the subject in the environment such 
as surfaces, objects, substances, and events that might provide an opportunity 
for action (Gibson  2014). For example, a flat horizontal surface supports walking 
or standing and a smelly rotten apple provides intentions for throwing. 
Based on movement, Yudell (1977) categorized affordances into two types: static 
fit and dynamic fit. Static fit is the affordance that informs the subject where and 
how to sit while dynamic fit is the affordance that informs the subject where and 
how to move (Yudell 1977). 
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Gibson was influenced by Koffka’s (1935) work on Gestalt psychology. He states 
that “each thing says what it is.” (Gibson 2014; Good 2007). Zaff argues that by 
looking at objects, people perceive their affordances, not their physical qualities 
such as size or color, and in turn perceive a push to act. Therefore, what is 
particular in the concept of affordances is their focus on the realization of action-
relevant properties of the environment (Zaff 1995). 
Good notes that many researchers (e.g., Lakoff (1987), Norman (1988), and 
Gaver (1991)) believe that Gibson’s theory is incomplete because it neglected 
the role of cognition and focused only on the role of perception. As a 
consequence, these researchers updated the theory of affordance in such a way 
as to derive from it a mental interpretation of things based on people’s knowledge 
and past experiences in addition to the roles of the culture, social setting, and 
intentions that determine the perception of affordances (Good 2007). On the other 
hand, although researchers disagree on the beginning of the process; whether it 
starts from the information the subject has or the affordance the environment has, 
all of them agree that affordances end with an action. 
From a phenomenal perspective and influenced by Husserl (1976), Merelau-
Ponty (2002) relied on the notion of motivation, not of affordances, as motivation 
describes the unity of movement and perception. He considered motivation as a 
continuous unconscious process of a balance in the body orientation that adjusts 
it to integrate experience and engage with the environment (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). 
As Carman and Griffero note, in Husserl’s (1976) theory of perception, the 
concept of motivation was introduced in his account of signs and indication. 
Indication, he argued is neither rational, nor causal, but phenomenal. For him, it 
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is perception and judgments that define it. In his book Ideas I and II, he expanded 
the concept of motivation to cover kinesthetic sensations but limited it to tactile 
sensations; only those aspects of tactile sensations involved in touching were 
deemed responsible for rendering the perceptual object in the subject’s 
consciousness and corporeality (Carman 1999; Griffero 2014).  
Consciousness is a very important entity in perception structure for Merleau-
Ponty. He stated that the subject “becomes fully aware of itself only through the 
experience of certain natural signs” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.49). The natural sign 
mediates the subject’s perceptual experience that lies in her/his precognitive 
bodily engagement with the world, and he argues that what mediates the 
synaesthetic experience is that the object expresses itself in the Ipesity of the 
thing; “each aspect of the thing falls to our perception, is only an invitation to 
perceive beyond it as a moment in the perceptual process. And if the thing is 
reached as ‘reality’ it will be that moment that snatches our grasp” (Merleau-Ponty 
2002 p.271).  
As a conclusion, it is clear that what mediates perceptual and synaesthetic 
experiences is a motivation for Merleau-Ponty. Motivation, as he states, is a 
raison d’etre that orients and “guides the flow of phenomena without being 
explicitly laid down in any one of them, a sort of operative reason” (Merleau-Ponty 
2002 p.57).  
After this review of different perspectives of affordance and motivation, the next 
sub-section highlights some of their applications in different studies. 
 Part One: The Affective Experience 
 
153 
 
4.1.1 Attributes, Shapes, and Surfaces as Affordances 
In the human environment, Reed identified some of the basic properties of 
affordances that constitute elements in systems of “combination, recombination 
and transformation” (Reed 1996 p.123). He divided the properties of affordances 
into three main categories: attributes, shapes, and surfaces. Attributes, such as 
durability, might give the subject reason for pounding and chopping, while 
massiveness gives her/him reasons for crushing and breaking and sharpness 
gives her/him reasons for scratching, drilling, and cutting. Shapes of lines might 
point to tying, and binding, concave shapes indicate holding liquids and making 
sounds. On the other hand, smooth and rough surfaces suggest rubbing, 
polishing, and smoothing while the shape of a naked furry animal suggests a 
need for keeping it dry and warm (Reed 1996 p.120). 
4.1.2 Tactile Values as Affordances 
Theorists such as Bernard Berenson (2005) formulated tactile values that 
describe the qualities of affordances in paintings which he regarded to stimulate 
a sense of touch by relating some visual images to the knowledge and experience 
of the flesh and skin. Samuels has noted that the tactile values, from his point of 
view, exist in representations of solid objects, such as motivations, and let the 
subject come closer to look, touch, and walk around, or to understand (Samuels 
1981). Elliott highlighted that in film, close-up shots are considered as the images 
that increase tactile value (Elliott 2011), for instance, the money in Psycho 
(Hitchcock 1960).  
One may conclude that motivation can be thought of as affordance in so far that 
they lead to action. However, the main acts for motivation are movement as a 
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perceptual experience and feeling as a synaesthetic experience whereas the 
main act for affordance is action and/or thinking. 
4.2 Immersion and the Flow Theory 
Affordances and motivations are triggers to engage with the world and act 
accordingly. Once the subject acts according to them, the affordance stops from 
being a trigger and turns into a background of the atmosphere where the subject 
can lose the self-consciousness and be embodied in the world until a new trigger 
awakens its consciousness. Seamon states that Merleau-Ponty understands the 
relationship between the body and the world it encounters and perceives that 
through a continuous immersion, awareness and actions (Seamon 2017). 
In phenomenology, Seamon highlights that immersion-in-world is a term used to 
describe the lived embeddedness of human beings in the world in which they find 
themselves (Seamon 2015). In video games, Salen and Zimmerman  developed 
the notion of immersion, they considered it as a mental process of engagement 
based on the approach of “transporting the participant into an illusory, stimulated 
reality” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004). But experiencing video games requires a 
limited understanding and more experience. Hence, immersion does not fit with 
the definition of the means to construct a state of playing since it turns the player 
into a state of passive surrender. As a consequence, flow theory is applied to 
video games. Bayliss points out that video game is a type of active engagement, 
that doesn’t require any effort of attention to the activity of playing or the tools that 
engage all aspects of the interface, accordingly, the player plays in unity with the 
game, but with full awareness (Bayliss 2010). 
Bayliss confirms that the loss of self-consciousness is an aspect that is shared 
between immersion and flow theory. However, in flow theory the player’s action 
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and awareness merge for a more an expanded experience; the player is unified 
with the game in a way that keeps her/him aware of the contextual situation, and 
she/he is not lost, but expanded and aware (Bayliss 2010). 
It has been discussed in Chapter One that Hanich (2010) regarded the 
significance of cinematic dread to its spatial, temporal, and emotional immersion. 
But in light of understanding flow theory, the spectator is expanded and aware. 
He probably has used the term immersion to express the lost self in the film, as 
a character within the framework of empathy and sympathy, not according to loss 
of consciousness, or unless, he will be contradincting himself. 
4.3 Affect and the Affective Experience 
The architect Peter Zuthmor (2010) stated that architecture can be 
experienced differently from one person to another and that experiences are often 
charged by the flow of energies that contribute to the atmosphere, which 
eventually contribute the meaning and the feelings for a place and its effect on 
the subject. 
According to Griffero (2014), the first impression is always atmospheric. It is an 
affective corporeal involvement “interrupting the habitual observational and 
pragmatic flux” to give the subject an identity (Griffero 2014 p.29). It is important 
to question what affect or affective experience is in this context. 
Affect is a Freudian theory that has been used by many philosophers such as 
Deleuze (1992) who employed this theory in coining his affection-image concept. 
Deleuze (1992) considers affect as an internal phenomenon through which the 
self is called into presence in relation to an encounter with the outside world, and 
Green relates that moment of affect as the moment that snatches the body from 
silence (Green 1995). The affect, then, is inherently embodied. Matthews adds 
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that it is not only a mental state but a feeling or emotion of bodily nature, such as 
the heart rate and muscle tension (Matthews 2013). 
Matthews highlighted Freud’s indication of affect, which has two overlapping 
dimensions; it is both somatic (of the body) and psychical (of the mind) 
phenomenon. It is an emotion encountered but not yet named as emotion 
(Matthews 2013). In light of this, Bayliss pointed out that researchers refer it to a 
way of describing the feeling or the intensity of the experience (Bayliss 2010). 
Although the role of affect and emotion in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is ignored, 
some researchers (e.g., Sue Cataladi) could identify the role of affect and emotion 
in his philosophy. Cataladi (1993) noted that Merleau-Ponty defined affect as a 
mode of embodied meaning allied to movement and spatiality. Thereupon, affect 
is always connected with a situation of kinesthetic consciousness that leads to 
corporeality. The questions emerge: how is affect created in film? And what is the 
cinematic affective experience? 
In the film experience, and drawing upon the thoughts of Sobchack (1992) and 
Marks (2000), Laine (2006) considers the skin as the medium that “we see, we 
feel and we think”, and, accordingly, skin is the medium of affect that gives shape 
to the subject’s affective engagement with the film and spreads affect over her/his 
entire body (Laine 2006). She clarified that in the way in which skin relates to 
cinema it works as “perceptual surface that travels through the senses and 
between the self and the world,” where one cannot define the border between 
inside and outside (Laine 2006). 
Some researchers have connected the affective experience with immersion, but 
flow theory has enhanced this thinking by adding to it the sub-cognitive aspect 
and the notion of the expansion of the body aspect. In relating this to Sheets-
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Johnstone’s structure of movement, one concludes that this expansion of the 
body includes proprioception and kinesthesia, which refer to the awareness of 
the body in position and in movement that can be felt on the muscles, which, in 
turn, create kinesthetic consciousness and corporeal consciousness eventually. 
In addition to movement, senses and sensual experience are considered to be 
key players in creating an affective experience. Anderson (2009) confirms that 
the most important issue is to create more sensed than understood architecture, 
which can be achieved by means of revealing smell, touch, movement, and 
walking, or even dark voids, to create the memory because creating new 
sensations creates memories. 
Grifferro (2014) concluded that atmospheric affection is corporeal and that it can 
be produced kinesthetically by muscles, and synaesthetically by the expansion 
and contraction of the felt-body that can change the absolute space. This is then, 
the affective experience (Griffero 2014). 
4.4 Conclusion 
Cinema provokes a range of experiential and affective potentialities that 
fuel all kinds of movements and feelings. This chapter handled the concepts of 
affordance and motivation because they promote potentials for acting, moving, or 
feeling in order to create an affective experience. 
This research considered motivation similar to affordance as both are 
stimuli that evoke the subject to act, but the kind of action it prompts is different 
from the one which affordance stimulates, since motivation is more phenomenal 
than affordance. Accordingly, actions associated with motivation are movement 
as perceptual experience and feeling as a synaesthetic experience whereas the 
act(s) concomitant with affordance is/are action and/or thinking. 
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It was illustrated in Chapter Three that the anticipation of touch is the motivation 
behind fear in thriller and horror films and that fear is the force that is experienced 
as touch and to which the subject’s body responds and starts to crawl (Laine 
2006). This motivation is responsible for influencing the spectator to live with the 
character spatially, temporally, and emotionally, hence identifying with the 
character under the framework of empathy and sympathy, this then turns into a 
kinesthetic corporeal experience because fear awakens the senses and 
stimulates a state of proprioception to create a transcendental subjectivity that is 
felt on the skin. All this experience will be reflected as a contraction the felt-body, 
which will tighten the absolute space of the spectator. This constitutes an affective 
experience felt kinesthetically and synaesthetically that can turn any space into a 
place that cannot be forgotten.  
The foregoing discussions mark the end of this part of this thesis. The 
elaborations given on the process of embodiment and on how the subject 
experiences a corporeal conscious experience have laid foundations for reading 
a scene to describe a lived experience and to capture its associated corporeal 
moments. 
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Part Two: Methodology 
Introduction 
In Part One, the research has drawn upon the phenomenology of 
perception and lived experience developed by Merleau-Ponty (2002), and 
extended the structure of embodiment through understanding the relationships 
among perception, movement, and action, where the viewer is considered as a 
subject who has an interpretive, lived experience that interacts with the character 
who is encountering the dread atmosphere in a thriller on screen. This 
encountering, that happens here and now counts on empathy or sympathy as a 
process to blend the viewer with the character and its environment. The process 
of encountering is related to the individual’s perception of the events and a shared 
perception with the character. The relationship is also based on the movement of 
the character in the scene and how it is reflected on the viewer’s internal 
movement to create expansion and contraction. It is also based on the character’s 
action that is responsible for the transcendence of the viewer to exist in that 
moment corporeally and to be in full consciousness, that is, to transfer her/him 
into a situation to act or to wish to act. 
Phenomenology as a Methodology 
Phenomenology is commonly used as an approach to opening to the thing itself 
through a qualitative evidence as a descriptive and interpretative basis for 
substantive conclusions and discoveries. Seamon, Shirazi, and Pallasamaa, to 
name but a few, are phenomenologists who used description as a method to 
approach phenomenology, e.g., in describing A Passage from García Márquez’s 
One Hundred Years of Solitude (Seamon 2017), The Langen Foundation 
Museum (Shīrāzī 2013), and the case of Villa Mairea (Pallasmaa 1998).  
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When using phenomenology as a method, Seamon (2017) summarizes the steps 
of phenomenology research in three steps. The first step is about looking and 
trying to see. This involves an empathy with, an openness to, and kindness to the 
thing; one allows the thing to present itself as if it can speak. He states that the 
aim of using phenomenology is empathetic awareness and engagement that 
allow the thing studied to be as fully present, describable, and understandable as 
possible (Seamon 2017). The second step is trying to describe what one sees. 
The description is intensive and thorough, and is mainly given through a first-
person description of one’s own experience, namely, reading and describing an 
experience with all its details from the moment of walking to entering, seeing, 
smelling, hearing, touching, encountering, and so forth, will lead to a 
comprehensive and articulated understanding of the lived experience. Using one 
whole experience to describe through one main case study is called by Husserl 
(2012) phenomenology from within, which, according to Shirazi (2013), is better 
to use than having separate phenomenological concerns from many case 
studies. Seamon states that this reading of one main experience through one 
person can help other researchers to look for other patterns or observations and 
it may open other possibilities of phenomena (Seamon 2017). The third step is 
interpreting the description by using specific instances to identify the underlying 
structure and order in order to seek for commonalities in the midst of the individual 
experiential descriptions. 
Hanich (2010) used phenomenology to look for the prototypes of experiences in 
an effort to approach the common structure of fear. He mainly considered the 
multi-observations and commonalities in films to come out with the five prototypes 
mentioned in Chapter One. His method of discussing the constricted atmosphere 
in cinematic dread was more into suggesting phenomenal concerns than a 
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phenomenology from within. This means that he performed latitudinal and 
horizontal readings and observations of many films instead of discussing one film. 
Thus, this thesis employed phenomenology as a tool for description of one dread 
scene in an attempt to understand the phenomenology of dread. 
While conducting a phenomenological interpretation in architecture, Shirazi 
(2013) tried to make a comprehensive reading, taking into consideration the 
shortcomings of some existing methods, and to consider common 
phenomenological concerns during the interpretation. He mainly proposed a 
framework to transfer his lived experience to the reader by considering the reader 
as a traveler in a phenomenological journey. He provided the traveler with some 
phenomenological concerns and characteristics to keep in mind for her/him to be 
able to see and feel what Shirazi is experiencing. Shirazi’s lived experience was 
presented in the Langen Foundation Museum. His study began from the macro 
level; from reading the environment, its characteristics, and specialties. By 
approaching the building from the outside to the interior, keeping in mind the 
phenomenological concerns, the traveler experiences the environment 
phenomenologically from varying positions and views via movement. The careful 
reading, which considers all aspects and dimensions of the work, enables the 
traveler to develop numerous feelings and draw her/his own image. As a result, 
sub-images are created that, eventually, lead to the overall image in the mind of 
the traveler (Shīrāzī 2013). 
Phenomenal Phenomenology 
Shirazi’s method of reading the Langen Foundation Museum is referred to as 
phenomenal phenomenology. This study followed Shirazi’s phenomenal 
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phenomenology approach in order to read a dread sequence from a thriller film 
and, ultimately, transfer the reader into a viewer.  
By adopting Shīrāzī’s (2013) method, and following the theoretical framework of 
the present research, which places the viewer (as a subject) in the position of 
encountering the screen (as an object) via the processes of perception, 
movement, and action, the phenomenal reading is intended to develop a narrative 
with careful reading of the details. In addition, this reading took into consideration 
multiple aspects systematically, including the multi-sensory experience and the 
synaesthetic perception that let the senses intercommunicate by opening on to 
the structure of the thing that appeals to all senses to capture the haptic 
perception. The expansion and contraction of the felt-body [Leib] that reflect the 
kinesthetic and corporeal consciousness, which is guided by the movement of 
the character are traced. It can be argued that the first impression (viewing) is 
necessary to grasp the atmosphere, which is true, but the second, third, and 
fourth impressions are necessary as well because they give rise to less intense 
atmospheres. 
Reading a building is, to a great extent, similar to reading a film. They both count 
on a lived experience, a body in movement, a multi-sensory body, and action and 
reaction. However, to guarantee that the lived experience is lived as it should, 
and because of the changing nature of cinematic atmospheres, one has first to 
fix and control the subjectivity of the viewer and, then, the objectivity of the screen 
in order to overcome any subjective projections of the atmosphere. Therefore, 
the following section discusses the factors that can control the atmosphere as a 
first step to discussing its embodiment. 
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Factors for Controlling the Atmosphere of the Screen 
Griffero stated that “It can be argued that atmospheres are changing according 
to the atmosphere itself and the subject mood” (Griffero 2014). However, for the 
purpose of this study it can be claimed that the atmosphere of the screen is 
controlled. It is not a changing situation because the objective space is controlled; 
the intentionality of the subject who wants to watch a film prepares the body to 
perceive it as it is, and the intensity of the object is itself a guarantee that this 
atmosphere overcomes the subjective feeling and any projection from the 
subject. The following discussion supports these claims. 
Atmospheric perception is at least partly cognitively penetrable and not totally 
deterministic according to Griffero (Griffero 2014). The researcher agrees with 
this and underlines that the atmosphere is prototypical for the first impression 
(viewing) whereas the second, third, and fourth impressions give rise to less 
intense atmospheres. Although Griffero (Griffero 2014) supports the idea that the 
impact of the spatial context suffices because of adding factors or changing the 
perspective, this research maintains that the atmosphere of the screen is 
controlled and that it cannot be changed unless the viewer did not intend to come 
to watch a film, which is very unlikely. The following discussion supports how the 
intentionality of the subject and the intensity of the material of the screen create 
controlled atmospheres. It should be noted that for the purpose of this study, the 
researcher assumes an unbroken experience in watching films, i.e., an 
experience without any distractions.  
Intentionality (of the Subject) 
There is a duality in the atmosphere between the introjection (feeling 
outside spread inside) and the projection (the feelings from inside spread outside) 
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(Griffero 2014). This research considers that the viewer who watches thrillers has 
the intention to gain pleasure from fear and to live a different experience. So, 
projection from the subject is very unlikely and most of the experience will be 
introjection. This has been discussed by Hanich (2010), who discusses the 
aesthetic attitude of the viewer to complete the aesthetic experience in cinema. 
The aesthetic experience for Hanich is the experience of the pleasure of horror 
that is produced by the aesthetic attitude of the viewer. He considers this sort of 
experience as a voluntary encounter with the screen as an object to become an 
aesthetic object, which, without the perceiver, remains a mere object. He adds 
that constituting the aesthetic object requires a self-constitution, that is, a 
deliberate placement of the viewer-self in a position to be attached to the screen 
whereby it can open itself to be affected more. This deliberate decision s/he 
makes sets the aesthetic attitude apart from other activities, it temporarily sets 
aside everyday life, and allows herself/himself to be “sensitive and vulnerable to 
what the aesthetic object might do” (Hanich 2010 p.53).  
To understand the way in which the body prepares itself for a situation, Merleau-
Ponty (2002) stated that the body has the potentials to acquire certain habits to 
help it act, as in the example of how a person falls asleep, where it has the ability 
to surrender itself for sleeping. “[…] which a moment ago I voluntarily maintained, 
now becomes my very being, and sleep, suddenly become a situation” (Merleau-
Ponty 2002 p.246). Consequently, going to the movie theatre, waiting in line, 
paying money for tickets, and switching cell phones off to watch a film, or buying 
a DVD to watch a film at home, are only deliberate decisions the individual takes 
to prepare herself/himself for the aesthetic object. Hanich (2010) described this 
process as an active attention coming from the aesthetic attitude of the subject. 
One can advocate a different, and more favorable, experience in watching a film 
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at the theatre, a non-stop flow experience, more than the experience of watching 
the same film on DVD at home, but the active attention and aesthetic attitude to 
watching the film are still considered the same. But to avoid the undesirable and 
unpredictable effects of distractions to having a continuous lived experience, in 
this study the researcher only considers a non-broken watching experience. 
Intensity (of the Object) 
One cannot reduce atmospheres to mere products of subjectivity,  Griffero 
adds: “but the intensity of the atmospheric is the best proof of the objective 
effectiveness of the atmosphere we react to” (Griffero 2014 p.135). Film, as well 
as architecture, video games, and Virtual Reality, focus on condensed 
preferential objects and the intensity of the objects so as to guarantee the 
maximum effectiveness and effect on the viewers and the users. Colors, forms, 
style, organization, and the visual and audio effects are only few examples that 
these media can manipulate to intensify the aesthetic experience. 
The intensity of the object (the thriller film itself) comes from two main resources. 
First, the time, where one hour and a half to two hours of experience of a whole 
story with a beginning, middle, and end obliges the viewer to hypothetically be 
absorbed. Within these two hours, the sequence of events and power of pushing 
and pulling the viewer towards the plot by empathizing and sympathizing with the 
character create an internal intensity in the subject which makes the object 
become in charge of the atmosphere. Second, the appearance of the object (the 
total look of the film from the picture, sound, special effects, performance, 
directing, and camera angles besides their pace, rhythm, and exaggeration in the 
time the viewer is just sitting) makes the film itself what is responsible for affecting 
the viewer without being interrupted from her/his projection. Hence, the intensity 
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of appearance is important to create the aesthetic perception to enhance its 
presence and its perception. 
Exaggeration in forms, music, or any representation within the film has one main 
goal; a desire to be perceived here and now in order to create the right ambiance. 
For instance, in 1920, German Expressionist filmmakers brought intensity to film 
settings in order to express more inner and outer forces to threaten the characters 
and, sometimes, to reflect their inner moods (Schaal 1996). The Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari (1920), The Golem (1920), Nosferatu (1922), and Metropolis (1927) are 
few examples of German Expressionist films in which Gothic architecture was 
used as a reference for fear. Some other films used mixed architectural styles to 
suggest the timeless background of the setting and to intensify the atmosphere 
such as the description of Gotham City in Batman Begins (2005), which used 
modern brutalist, Gothic architecture, Italian futurist, and early brownstone 
buildings (Abuhassan 2009). Moreover, some films intensify their forms so as to 
give an authentic historical appearance such as the use of the spiral shape for 
Minas Tirith in The Lord of the Rings (Lee 2003). 
When the ambiance and the total work of art of film have the pervasive quality of 
a situation as a whole, as Thibaud describes them, he argues that they get inside 
the perceiver to catch her/him up towards particular actions and expressions 
(Thibaud 2011, 209 as cited in (Edensor 2012). Thus, through various aesthetic 
techniques, e.g., editing, lighting, camera movement and position, sound design 
and performance, these various factors make the film itself and its context of 
screening responsible for controlling the relationship with the viewer. 
Subsequently, the screen atmosphere is controlled and not changing. 
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Extending Phenomenal Phenomenology 
The aim of Shirazi’s reading was only to create images in the mind of travelers 
that are only originally and fundamentally phenomenological. His reading did not 
aim at highlighting new phenomenological concerns that have not been 
discussed. In response to that, and with reference to the third step in 
phenomenology as methodology, according to Seamon (2017), the researcher 
highlights specific situations after the phenomenal reading where the atmosphere 
was injected more into dread. 
Based on that, the following chapter; Chapter Five, discusses the characteristics 
that can guide transfer of the reader into a viewer, followed by a phenomenal 
reading of a dread scene. Chapters six, seven, and eight present few situations, 
or quasi-things, that were responsible for increasing dread in the analyzed scene.   
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
Implementing Phenomenal Phenomenology 
The Silence of the Lambs 
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Chapter Five: Implementing Phenomenal Phenomenology  
This chapter paves the ground for relating some theories of phenomenology and 
embodiment of the subject encountering an object, through presenting a 
comprehensive reading of a dread scene from film The Silence of the Lambs. 
This particular reading has been developed through the framework provided in 
Part One in order to describe the lived experience under the notions of 
perception, movement, and action, in order to interact with the screen. Thus, it 
adds to film analysis and criticism by establishing a new method for 
understanding dread atmospheres and describing them, it then uses this method 
to enhance the spatial atmospheric qualities of any experience that requires 
suspense. As such, this method extends Julian Hanich’s (2010) concept of 
cinematic dread and elaborates on finding its essence, namely, the 
phenomenology of the atmosphere of cinematic dread. 
After this reading, it should be possible to determine the most memorable 
situations that caught the body up and affected its existence and corporeality to 
come out with new quasi-things. By so doing, the researcher attempts to develop 
a deeper understanding of the phenomenology of atmosphere of dread that was 
created and designed by the filmmaker and the writer so as to ultimately elaborate 
on Hanich’s characteristics of the constricted atmosphere of cinematic dread. 
5.1 The Silence of the Lambs 
The application of embodiment is endless; it can be used in film, or 
architecture, or Virtual reality and in many different fields. This research used one 
case study only to be consistent and continuous in the whole experience faced in 
encountering one dread atmosphere and to have a phenomenology from within. 
The atmospheric corporeal quasi-things that can be grasped from this case study 
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only are proportionate to the length of the thesis and can open possibilities for 
applying findings to other films and grasping further corporeal quasi-things. 
5.1.1 Film Synopsis 
A psychopath known as Buffalo Bill (Ted Levine) is kidnapping and 
murdering young women. The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
sends the agent Clarice Starling (Jodie Foster) to interview a prisoner who may 
provide psychological insight into, and clues to, the killer's actions. Dr. Hannibal 
Lecter (Antony Hopkins) is a brilliant murderous psychiatrist prisoner who will only 
help Clarice if she feeds his curiosity with details about her own complicated life. 
This twisted relationship forces Clarice to face Buffalo Bill, who is also named 
James Gumb, alone in his own place. 
Main cast: Jodie Foster as Clarice Starling, Anthony Hopkins as Dr. Hannibal 
Lecter, and Ted Levine as Buffalo Bill. 
The film was directed by Jonathan Demme, and written by Thomas Harris for the 
novel, and by Ted Tally  for the screenplay. 
Duration of the film is 118 minutes, aspect ratio is 1.85 : 1, filmed by Panaflex 
Camera and Lenses by Panavision in color, Dolby SR for audio, and printed on 
film 35 mm. 
The Film had harvested my film awards; Best Picture, Best Actor in a Leading 
Role, Best Actress in a Leading Role, Best Director, Best Writing, Screenplay 
Based on Material Previously Produced or Published, Best Sound, and Best Film 
Editing in the Oscar 1992, in addition to many other awards at Golden Globe, 
BAFTA Awards, Academy of Science Fiction, Fantasy & Horror Films, best 
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motion picture at Awards Circuit Community Awards, and many others 
(IMDB,2018). 
5.1.2 Why this Film?  
The Silence of the Lambs is one of the most recognizable thriller films because 
of its broad overlapping with horror. However, Jancovich notes that arguments 
about classifying the genre of film are a little ambiguous owing to the fact that 
many audiences and theorists use the term genre to connote user groups on the 
basis of similarities in the subjects (Jancovich 2000). Based on these differences, 
some people have considered The Silence of the Lambs as a serial killer movie 
(Jancovich 2000); as a psychological horror movie (Hanich 2010; Blair and 
Mitchell 2005); and as a horror film (Tharp 1991). However, what unifies them all 
is the required construction of an atmosphere of dread.   
Hanich highlights that after 1990, concepts of killing without motivation were 
interpreted with in the story of the Silence of the Lambs. He considers it to be the 
film that most sparked the cycle of this overlapping with horror, a hybrid form, 
equalizing it with other films: What Lies beneath (Zemeckis 2000), The Sixth 
Sense (Shyamalan 1999), Seven (Fincher 1995), The Blair witch Project (Daniel 
Myrick 1999), Sleeping with the Enemy (Ruben 1991), and The Da Vinci Code 
(Howard 2006), which were all enormous successes (Hanich 2010).  
Many books and articles have mentioned this film in particular. As an example, 
Boyd and Palmer (2006) wrote about the influence of Hitchcock films on 
contemporary directors and films and made a comparison between The Silence 
of the Lambs and Psycho (Hitchcock 1960) because the two films employed 
similar cinematic elements such as photos, mirrors, camera angles, 
cinematography, colors, and the use of a basement, which was another major 
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issue discussed and tied to death, secrets and to the site for prformance and 
transformation (Scott 2015). 
Hanich (2010) states that The Silence of the Lambs is dominated by dread 
divided into many sequences in addition to some direct horror and frightening 
scenes. He regarded the selected scene as a cinematic dread and a prototype, 
where a vulnerable character slowly and quietly enters a dark place harboring a 
threat in which stillness and slowness dominate. An intense, but quiet, 
atmosphere is made that can lead to anticipation of an ending with horror or shock 
(Hanich 2010 p.154). He experienced the six-minute scene as longer because it 
was a protracted time experience due to the isolated and contracted atmosphere. 
He considered the descent as a major character of the basement in which the 
character goes down and where the walls are buried to isolate her/him from the 
sound of the external world, the day light, the weather, and season (Hanich 2010). 
However, his description was very broad and based on a phenomenal 
perspective with common experiences in different films, and he did not interpret 
the embodiment as a mean to define more the atmosphere of that dread scene.  
Laine (2006), in her article Cinema as Second Skin, discussed the importance of 
touch in corporeality and the haptic experience for seeing as a mode of 
corporeality, where consciousness arises when one touches another. She 
considers the camera movement as a method for generating proximity and 
developing the sensation of touch (Laine 2006). She took the last scene in the 
selected sequence only in which Clarice is seen from Buffalo Bill’s side and 
focused on sharing skin where the viewer was being drawn under the skin of 
Buffalo Bill to recognize and perceive his feelings. The movement of the camera 
is sensed on the spectator’s skin as proximity and the fear is made more intense 
as a consequence (Laine 2006). Her research did not discuss the atmosphere of 
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dread or how that feeling of touch elaborates on creating the dread atmosphere. 
However her findings built a very good base for this research to read the scene 
and to combine her findings with other ones to develop the spatial understanding 
of dread atmosphere. On this account, this film, taken as a case study for this 
kind of research, opens up the possibilities for extending the concept of 
atmosphere of dread. 
5.1.3 Scene Description 
The selected scene from The Silence of the Lambs (Demme Jonathan 
1991) extends from 1:42:36 to 1:49:20 when the FBI agent Clarice Starling enters 
the house of the serial killer Jame Gumb (Buffalo Bill). The actual dread scene 
starts from the moment she discovered that he is the wanted person and that she 
has to arrest him and rescue the kidnapped girl, Catherine (Brooke Smith). 
This scene is regarded as a dread scene in Hanich’s (2010) book. In terms of 
narrative, it represents a “vulnerable character slowly and quietly entering a dark 
forsaken place harboring a threat” (Hanich 2010 p.156). According to his 
definition of Cinematic Dread, the general stillness and slowness, the little camera 
movement, the movement within the mise-en-scène, the temporal structure, and 
the spatial and emotional immersions qualify it to be regarded as an example of 
cinematic dread. 
5.2 Phenomenological Concerns and Characteristics 
The following characteristics are necessary to turn the reader into a viewer 
and move her/him into the lived experience of the dread scene in the selected 
thriller film. All these characteristics are built on the literature review in part one 
of this thesis. However, in this sub-section, these characteristics interact in a 
comprehensive way to clarify and support the phenomenology of embodiment to 
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describe how the viewer’s body was extended in the atmosphere of dread and 
made able to become embodied. 
The researcher brings to notice that she used her filmmaking and architectural 
background in the analysis because they, to a great extent, contribute to her 
perception of the scene. Moreover, since this research looks on the dread 
atmosphere phenomenally, it is very important for it to look for the essence of the 
experience and to make it lived for the reader. Hence, the researcher uses the 
pronoun I to describe her own experience and the pronoun We to indicate the 
experience shared with the character.  
 While watching a dread scene in a thriller film, I prepare myself and my 
body to live a difficult experience with a character for two hours. I am a 
lived body that perceives the world of the film and moves and acts to 
encounter it. I experience the scene in spatial and spatio-temporal 
relations with my felt-body; Leib, and my Physical body; Korper. 
 Perception is shared between me as a viewer and the character in some 
scenes when there is a subjective treatment shot, e.g., when the viewer 
and character face a threat for the first time together. 
 As a filmmaker, I understand the film language and the sizes and 
meanings of the shots. Furthermore, since this part cannot be separated 
from my identity, then my perception is a wholeness of what I am. Thus, 
my perception will be affected by the director’s and cinematographer’s 
decisions, and this will be reflected on the description and analysis of the 
perception of perception.  
 The structure of perception is the structure of the seen and the structure 
of the subject’s consciousness. Accordingly, perception describes a space 
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that may be a mere space or a place, and which has physical and tangible 
characteristics, architecture, furniture, texture, etc., that are mediated in 
the context of camera by the screen frame. 
 Perception occurs via the senses. Drawing upon the thoughts of Merleau-
Ponty and other phenomenologists, the experience is defined as Gestalt. 
In other words, the senses work synthetically together. Vision and hearing 
may be the most privileged senses in cinema but they are not isolated from 
other senses which enrich and feed the vision to have a haptic experience 
to touch, smell, and taste as well, which, according to Sobchack (1992), is 
defined as a cross-modal activity that results from the cooperation of the 
senses. In addition to that, the preference of one sense over the other is 
related to the significance core. 
 I will describe what I see, hear, and touch, not what my eyes see, or my 
ears hear, or my skin touches. This means that I will describe what is 
attracting my eyes and stimulating my feelings in the felt-body, which is 
something that usually follows the character in dread according to the 
haptic perception. 
 My skin is a medium of intersubjective connection and it gives the shape 
of my affective engagement. 
 Perception includes perceiving the phenomenal factors that violate familiar 
events and turn the experience into the sort of experience that will increase 
corporeality and consciousness such as surprise, conflict, and shock. 
 Perception concerns things rather than objects, where everything is 
situated in its position for a reason and is manifesting the space to be 
perceived in a certain way. The thing combines all of my senses, my body, 
  Part Two: Case Study 
181 
 
and mind to experience the atmosphere and establish the place instead of 
a space. 
 Phenomenal zones, motifs, or encapsulated objects are all definitions of 
the thing. Stairs, corridors, and doors are only some of the things in thrillers 
that are continuously used to dramatize the plot.  
 Affordances are things in the scene that stimulate and motivate the 
character to look, to move, to choose, to make a decision and to act. 
 Motivation is the emotions and the feeling that concern me, which will be 
described as action-reaction. 
 Movement is the way in which we allocate and experience the space to be 
perceived and lived. The movement inside the screen is achieved through 
the character who transfers me virtually from a space into another, and 
because of my empathy and sympathy as an engagement with the 
character, the movement of the character produces contraction and 
expansion, tension and relaxation for me to create inner movements that 
affect my absolute space. 
 The character experiences the antagonist’s space spatially and moves, 
de-distances, and directs herself/himself to the right, to the left, up, or 
down, thus composing the here and now, and there and then. 
 The flow and pause of the character reflect her/his engagement with space 
and the habitual body. The flow means that she/he recognizes the space 
or starts to recognize it. The pause or freeze means that she/he is not 
engaged, hesitant, or about to do something. It expresses preparation for 
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movement, stands as a sign for affect or affordance, and expresses a time 
extended experience.  
 Each flow and pause for the character is a trigger for me to feel and act, 
and because of my empathy and sympathy with her/him, it will be seen as 
if I am the one who flows or pauses. Sometimes, this will make me wish 
or desire to choose, walk, run, or stop. Her movement is what increases 
my spatiality in the world of the film, which, in turn, has the ability to 
produce places instead of spaces. 
 The moment I am transformed from I can into I am is the moment of 
corporeality and consciousness. 
 Movement has temporal and spatial qualities; tensional, projectional, 
linear, and amplitudinal qualities. It is not necessary for me to change my 
position so as to have a kinesthetic experience and consciousness. Only 
through watching a thriller with all my body, and the movement of the 
character, I have kinesthesia and proprioception because I will be aware 
of my body.  
 The tensional quality has to do with the sense of effort that I am producing 
to follow the character’s flow and pause, especially since I am following 
her/him with empathy and I expect to face the threat of which I know its 
nature but I do not know when it appears, which increases this effort. My 
whole body is engaged, even in stillness. 
 The produced effort awakens my kinetic energy and stimulates it to move, 
physically, as in holding my breath, or visually, to move my eye to 
somewhere else in the frame. 
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 The projectional quality is a metaphoric quality, and corporeal affection 
that can only be compared with language. This quality is an 
intersubjectivity effective that expresses an emotional and corporeal 
involvement referring to the synaesthetic experience. For example, to 
describe how heavy and smooth the action is. 
 The linear aspect of movement is directional and spatial, and the most 
recognizable, aspect that is shaped according to the directionality of the 
character and which describes the movement itself as straight, curvilinear, 
twisted, etc. The linear aspect of movement can be achieved on one axis, 
two axes, and perhaps three axes. The more axes in the frame, the more 
the energy space heightens the senses.  
 The spatial configuration of the scene, even if it is produced by the shapes 
and lines of the mise-en-scene, or if it is produced according to the 
character’s movement. 
 The directional space aligns the character’s movement and is responsible 
for creating felt properties such as narrowness and vastness of the 
atmosphere to create a vector atmosphere. 
 I will consider the gravity pull as the center that attracts my senses, which 
can be most of the time attached to the movement of the character. 
Consequently, the gravity pull can shape the movement of the character, 
namely, where to go, where to stand, and where to pause. As a result, it 
is the pull of gravity of myself. 
 The Amplitudinal quality is the one that concerns the felt-body (Leib) in 
contraction and expansion, and spatial contration and expansion. It can 
  Part Two: Case Study 
184 
 
sometimes be reflected in my physical body (Korper) by tension and 
relaxed body reactions.  
 Proprioception or kinesthesia are described by the narrowness or 
vastness of the space; kinesthesia occurs in motion of the character and 
proprioception occurs in stillness. 
 I will discuss the cognition state according to sub-cognition because in 
many films I may lose details that make me understand the plot completely 
because of the spoken language or because I am focusing on some 
representations in the frame. So, with sub-cognition, I will try to relate what 
I have seen, without necessarily understanding why. 
 Ambiguity, indeterminacy and transcendence are the notions for existence 
according to Merleau-Ponty (2002). The sub-cognition understanding is 
created accordingly. 
 I use action verbs with adjectives to describe the action such as entering 
through the door… hesitant entering through the door. This, in turn, will 
reflect cardinal time and action. 
 Action is connected to the character’s action, where each decision and 
action she/he makes creates transcendence according to Merleau-Ponty 
(2002) and transfers me into a situation turning me into a conscious state, 
where I am. This will increase my sense of existence and of embodiment. 
 Action is mimicry, it may create overt acts, such as breathing or holding 
the breath, and it can be an imagined act expressed in the narrowness of 
the felt-body.  
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 In some cases, the action can be attached to me, not to the character, like 
moving my head away from the screen, or getting down from the chair. 
However, these are exaggerated re-actions that are reflecting the inside, 
felt-body contraction and expansion. These reactions to the action happen 
in the frame and turn into a feeling such as tension because I cannot 
escape my skin! 
 I will in no way live the dread scene unconsciously. However, the level of 
consciousness varies from high to low, depending on the stimuli in a 
specific scene and moment, which may increase the level of 
consciousness or reduce it. If, after a while, the body and mind cope with 
the situation, then a new trigger can awaken the body and increase its 
consciousness. 
 The scene will be divided into segments where each segment is given a 
set name in order to avoid confusion between the scene numbers. 
 The description will follow the character’s experience chronologically, from 
one set into the other, until the end of the dread scene. To visualize the 
characteristics, please see the table below  
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Table 1: The characteristics used in the phenomenal reading 
 Characteristics The 
Researcher 
Clarice 
P
e
rc
e
p
ti
o
n
 
Space √ √ 
Senses to communicate with atmosphere √  
Phenomenal factors 
Surprise, shock, conflict 
√  
Phenomenal zones √  
Affordances  √ 
Consciousness 
H     M     L 
√  
M
o
v
e
m
e
n
t 
Flow pause speed weight  √ 
Tensional Qu. √  
Projectional √  
Linear  √ 
Amplitudinal  (Leib) 
Expanded/Contracted 
√  
Gravity pull  
that forms the movement of the character 
 √ 
Kinesthesia/Proprioception √  
Corporeality 
H     M     L 
√  
A
c
ti
o
n
 
 
Action 
√ √ 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics that help in reading the scene as 
discussed in the phenomenological concerns and characteristics. It indicates the 
particulra characteristics that belong to the researcher and those that belong to 
the character in the scene. Some of the listed characteristics apply to both the 
researcher and the character. 
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5.3 A phenomenal Phenomenology in The Silence of the Lambs2 
To facilitate it for the reader, a sketch of my perception of the scene is displayed 
in figure 5-1 and figure 5-2. It shows the set names and numbers to engage the 
reader with the whole experience. This sketch may not comply with what was 
designed for the film but is the way that I have seen and experienced the 
sequence. 
 
Figure 5-1: 2D plan drawing; Clarice’s experience in Buffalo Bill’s basement 
Source: The author 
                                            
2 The source of all the frames inside this section is : DVD (Demme Jonathan 1991)   
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Figure 5-2: Isometric drawing; Clarice’s experience in Buffalo Bill’s basement 
Source: The author 
 
I looked at each scene many times to formulate a comprehensive phenomenal 
description. This is what Griffero (2014) means by the second, third, and fourth 
impressions that give rise to less intense atmospheres. The following is a careful 
reading of the scene based on the preceding characteristics. 
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     Once Clarice Starling, the FBI agent, had 
stepped over the threshold of the house of 
Buffalo Bill and the door was closed behind 
her, she entered Buffalo Bill’s world, 
experiencing being-in-his-world. The door, 
as a threshold, created a boundary which 
does not stop a place but extends it to invite 
me to be-in-his world as well and to feel 
sympathy for her at that moment; I know that 
she is in the wrong place, facing the wanted 
criminal alone. The difference between my 
knowledge as a viewer and her knowledge 
create a feeling of sympathy for her. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Clarice enters Buffalo Bill’s house  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #1  
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     An external, long-establishing shot 
appears for the first time immediately after 
the door has shut behind her and shows the 
location of the house. The music of the 
previous scene is still on, full of tension and 
worry. It is autumn. The leaves on the trees 
have fallen. The sky is a little foggy and the 
colors are dull. The atmosphere looks sad 
and it is very calm outside. The tweets of the 
birds and the breeze of the air can be heard 
although the non-diegetic music which is still 
on. The camera pans slowly from the right to 
show part of a forest, where an old caravan 
is set, interrupted by a vacant train track line 
heading into an unknown empty forest. The 
camera pans to the left to show four 
separated houses of wood and brick and 
Clarice’s car. This endless space of forest is 
just a constricted isolated space, enabling 
me to dwell and inhabit the character in 
isolation from the outside world. I know now, 
as Clarice knows, that she is isolated and 
alone, but I know more than her that the 
quiet, peaceful look of the house hides the 
power of deception, as in the houses used in 
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David Lynch films in which he translates a 
safe situation into its opposite through using 
the look of a peaceful skin (Martin 2014). 
This, in turn, increases my worry about 
Clarice because she is not ready to confront 
Buffalo Bill. 
 
Figure 5-4: Camera pan, establishing-shot of the location of the house 
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I am entering the living room with Clarice, 
with the non-diegetic music still on, and 
walking with her while she asks Buffalo Bill 
about the previous inhabitant of the house. 
A tracking shot is used to de-distance 
herself and me, to create the Da-sein’s 
spatiality. She is getting closer and closer to 
Buffalo Bill. At this moment, as I am facing 
her, it looks as if she pushes away the 
boundary in order to be closer. I wish I could 
stop her from moving forward. Then, she 
stops looking in, and checking his place 
more closely. I see a photo of a butterfly 
framed on the wall behind her. We see a 
very messy, dusty, and dirty desk full with 
old papers and files, and a cling film wrap. 
Meanwhile, Buffalo Bill is checking the 
cards while asking her if the police have 
found any clues as to the identity of the 
criminal. We see a butterfly landing on 
strings of different colors. This is when 
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Clarice realizes that this man is the wanted 
criminal. An extreme close-up is showing 
her sparkly eyes. The sense of fear is 
increasing. Buffalo Bill is asking if they have 
any fingerprints. Clarice looks as if she is up 
to the challenge. She prepares her gun and 
prepares herself to fight. Her ambiguity and 
initiation to determine his identity is 
absolutely over. Now, she is in the third 
aspect of the notion of existence, i.e., the 
transcendence stage, where she is 
transferring herself from a volunteer I can to 
the position of confronting him alone; I am 
in a situation. 
 
Figure 5-5: Doubt in the living room  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #2  
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     I see a gun in the kitchen, the room next 
to the living room. This informs me that he 
has a gun. This gun inhabits my body and 
mind as the music becomes louder in 
sympathy for Clarice. Going back to the 
living room, Clarice, in an extreme close-up 
shot, asks Buffalo Bill to use his phone. He 
smiles, and that is the moment when Clarice 
takes out her gun and asks him to freeze. 
We see him escaping through the kitchen. 
Clarice follows him quickly. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6: The moment of revealing his identity 
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #2   
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     I see into the kitchen through a stage 
frame shot where Clarice is framed within 
three doors, two opened and one closed. The 
flat composition informs me that she is 
trapped in herself. I also smell old food and 
leftovers which stimulate an argue to vomit. 
Although there are three doors through which 
to anticipate which way to choose, since 
Buffalo Bill may be hiding behind one of these 
doors there is anxiety, however the light 
outside and being at the level of the main 
street, make me feel safe. Additionally, the 
spatial aspect of the kitchen is simple; a 
simple space facing towards the door. 
Therefore, at this point, I still feel that I am 
extended and that I can breathe. Clarice 
stops in the middle of the frame, taking off her 
coat and preparing herself for the next 
movement. The doors in this scene are things 
that let me guess for a moment which door is 
best to go through, and the openness and 
closeness of the doors make me anticipate 
the threat of invasion at any moment. That 
pause provided me with a kinetic energy 
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preparing me for the next situation; it is a 
tensional temporal aspect of movement. 
Figure 5-7: The kitchen 
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #3  
Filmmakers use flat frames when they want to show that the character feels 
trapped. She was trapped in the kitchen. The dirty dishes and pots on the stove 
and the fast food and ready meals on the table are what Paul Elliott (2011) calls 
an abjection and rejection. They provoked the bad smell to serving the narrative 
and function of killing and associated disgust. 
 By opening the door, which goes down, Clarice transferred me at this moment 
into a new situation. My consciousness, empathy, and existence are all 
increasing. For me, that was the moment of transcendence which Merleau-Ponty 
(2002) describes. It increased my consciousness and corporeality and prepared 
my body and mind to move to the new situation. This change occurred because 
of two reasons. The first is that she is following him alone, and by choosing the 
door behind her, there will be no return unless she kills him first. The second 
reason is subtle and depends on the recollection of an earlier moment in the film 
when Clarice failed a training task by not considering doors as important. 
Therefore, choosing doors will be the transitional moment that will snitch our 
silence, for a more corporeal experience, and make her closer to the moment of 
confrontation. 
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A transitional thing bridging between the 
upper world and the underworld is 
transferring Clarice into an entirely private 
and forbidden realm that reflects Buffalo 
Bill’s true identity. While the music is still on, 
but dropping gradually as if it is about to 
finish, Clarice is enclosed within a corner of 
the frame where she is checking the space. 
We see two closed doors with an old 
washing machine and dirty old metal. The 
tight frame traps Clarice from her face to her 
feet while she is descending the old wooden 
staircase with a creaking sound. The close-
up shot of her feet while descending gives 
me details of the material and her weight; it 
is a haptic shot that increases my kinesthetic 
corporeality, I feel how heavy her feet are 
and I am producing the same effort as her to 
be quiet while descending. This shot ends by 
enclosing Clarice within the wall where she 
stands and looks carefully. The one flight of 
old wooden stairs ends with a small landing 
and two closed doors. We together are 
confused as to which door to choose until 
Clarice is tracking me with her movement; 
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de-distancing to the right door, while her 
breathing is becoming audible. At that 
moment the music is very low and the 
intensity of her breath is increasing very 
clearly. 
Figure 5-8: Descending the staircase 
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #4  
The tight and close-up frames enclosing Clarice while descending and the 
vertical movement downwards affect the linear spatial aspect, where the pull of 
gravity increases and the axes of walking increase to become three axes; the 
horizontal exes and the vertical axis. These axes push together as disorientation 
forces, challenging the sense of order and orientation, to energize the spatial 
configuration and heighten the body senses and responses. Accordingly, the 
heaviness in her feet and the sound of her breath are mirrored as a contraction 
in my body through holding my breath. 
Her spatiality in that scene; leaning down, descending, freezing, and moving 
towards the right door, created high kinesthetic consciousness for me. This 
spatiality achieved kinesthesia as I felt my limbs and muscles and because it 
achieved a sense of proprioception; of being frozen, framed, and confused 
between two closed doors which increased my sense of my position and my 
balance in space. Actually, I was her in that moment because I was in the middle; 
between those doors, until she took me out by moving forward. In addition, the 
sense of decay and neglect from earlier moments becomes heightened through 
having to choose between two doors, which appear to be the beginning of a 
labyrinth, a return!  
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I am now inside a dark space facing a closed 
door. I thought for a moment that I am the 
eyes of Buffalo Bill waiting for Clarice to 
open the door. Then, I see Clarice opening 
the door. The eerie sound of the door is high 
and it is calm, but a sound of diegetic rock 
music is playing and Clarice’s breath is high. 
We see a partially lit corridor of brick ending 
with a window. As we get closer down the 
corridor, the sound of the music gets louder 
and we can hear the sound of Catherine with 
her dog barking from the other side of the 
corridor. We are moving towards the left 
door that has a map. Clarice stops to decide, 
then she opens the door. The linear, simple, 
straight spatiality of this corridor of one-axis 
movement decreased the corporeality of my 
body, which was then awakened when 
Clarice stopped to open the door. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Walking in the first corridor  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #5   
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I am inside a lit room with photos of Buffalo 
Bill on the frame of the door and music is 
played in this room. Clarice opens the door 
framed in a medium shot. She is in full shock 
and surprise because she has discovered 
something. We see a mannequin with real 
skin standing in front of an opened wardrobe 
where some pieces of newspapers about 
killings are hanging. It looks like an actors’ 
preparation room, with many models, wigs, 
lights, colors, and a camera. She did not 
move an inch and the voice of Catherine 
steals Clarice out of her shock and out of the 
room. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: The exhibition, his work place 
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #6  
This space gives us extra information as to what Buffalo Bill is doing with the 
skins of the kidnapped girls and remains as a space not a place for me at this 
moment. Once Clarice decides not to go in, and because of her standing still, 
just passively observing without participating or interacting with the space, she 
does not create Da-sein in Heidegger’s definition, because only by directionality 
and de-distancing she could bring the viewer in-the-world. As a consequence, I 
do not experience any kinesthetic experience, hence, my corporeal presence 
remains down here. This space remains as a space that does not matter for now. 
It does not make me feel any kind of sympathy or empathy towards Clarice 
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because Buffalo Bill is not there and because Catherine takes our attention away 
by shouting. 
 
Going back to the corridor, Clarice is walking 
towards the other door while the music is still 
playing and Catherine’s sound is getting 
louder. We become closer together to 
opening the last door in this corridor, which 
means that the threat is very close and about 
to appear. The corporeal presence is 
becoming higher, and I am living again in-the-
world of Buffalo Bill. Clarice’s breathing is 
more audible again and I am back in a state 
of contraction. We are about to get into a 
confrontation situation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Going back to the corridor  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #5  
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I am facing the door which Clarice is about 
to open. Her action of holding the gun makes 
me understand that the killer is not here 
(yet). The music in his room is still playing. 
We see this room, which is called the 
Oubliette Chamber in the original script. It is 
a circular space with three doors, brick walls, 
and natural stones and rocks. It looks like a 
cave; rough rocks and a space that echoes. 
I have been in a real cave, and I know that it 
is a very cold space. In the middle, there is 
a pit, a circular well, where Catherine is. 
Clarice for the first time now speaks aloud: 
“Catherine Martin, Its FBI…” She is closing 
the door on the left by an axe she has found. 
The music in his room has disappeared now. 
An opening in the wall enables Clarice to 
look through and discover that there is a 
fourth open door. The room is not 
completely circular. It has been cut by a wall, 
and a door. Clarice closes the door. Once 
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she has closed all the doors, she feels safer 
and starts speaking loudly. Speaking aloud 
was a relief for me. I feel more expanded 
and I can breathe now. I am now waiting to 
know which door Clarice will choose. That 
was a kind of respite, a momentary break 
that eases the sense of isolation which 
Clarice experiences. The music is back 
again. And because of this technique I know 
that we are in the head of Clarice who is 
ignoring the sound of Catherine and 
focusing on Buffalo Bill. The track-shot 
heads in the direction of the fourth door 
which she had closed before, which is 
located beside the wall that has an opening. 
We are getting closer to it, de-distancing 
again and about to open it. She reminds 
Catherine to be quiet again, her screaming 
adds extra tension from another 
perspective. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-12: The oubliette chamber and the pit 
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #7   
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Clarice’s spatiality in this room, moving back and forth between the doors, 
shutting them or standing behind them, complicates the linear aspect and 
increases the complexity of the spatial configuration, and her movement makes 
me disoriented in the space. But because of the wideness, the cold environment, 
and control of the space by Clarice, I felt as if I was expanded, especially since 
Clarice had talked, which means that she communicated with the space, which 
made me breathe. That can refer to the directional space defined by Schmitz that 
is responsible for creating the vector atmosphere, in which, a space can be 
described as centrifugal; moving away from the center, and that can explain the 
expansion of my felt-body here and now.  
The situational constraint or the atmospheric constraints (Catherine’s shouting, 
dogs barking, the killer being missing, etc.) are all corporeal suggestions that 
push Clarice to speak loudly in reaction and to move in circles. These corporeal 
suggestions, as Schmitz states, are demonstrated by the motor reactions but can 
be traced back to, or suggested by, the situation itself (Schmitz 1990: 67 as cited 
in (Griffero 2014 p.35). 
The doors shape the movement of Clarice as she moves according to her 
intention in shutting them and then talks to Catherine. There was an opening in 
the wall that made Clarice look through it and choose that door as the extent of 
basement has not apparently ended. This basement is not a chamber but is a 
labyrinth of corridors and doors. This constitutes a shock for me because time is 
passing and the possibility of finding the right door to arrest Buffalo Bill is seeming 
very limited. 
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By opening the door from the Oubliette 
chamber we see a partially-dark corridor. The 
music is louder and moths are flying. The 
walls are made from wood and the other 
façade is made from brick. The partially-dark 
corridor is a small, straight corridor ending 
with one room. Clarice’s breathing is heard 
and is fast.  
Figure 5-13: The second corridor 
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #8  
I have been before in a place where butterflies and moths are raised. Such places 
are very hot and so humid in order that they are good environments for moths. 
Further, earlier in the film, it was mentioned by the scientists in the museum that 
this kind of moth lives in Asia and that their habitat has to be kept warm. The 
wood color (reddish) can also reflect the temperature. This temperature shock 
from the cold oubliette chamber to the hot humid corridor amplifies the sense of 
touch and smell for me. Thus, this has increased my corporeality and 
consciousness. The kinesthetic experience referring to the spatial aspect is low 
because of the simplicity of the corridor’s axiality. Hence, I refer my corporeal 
presence here to the temperature shock and the color contrast that awakened 
my senses and let me feel my subjectivity. Now I am contracted again.  
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Clarice is moving hesitantly and slowly, 
standing behind the opened door (the first 
door in the scene that is already opened), in 
a room that is lit with daylight (blue and 
green). The moths are everywhere and their 
flying sound is very loud. The music is also 
getting louder. Very weird pieces of 
furniture are scattered in the space. 
Watching Clarice in a long shot makes me 
expanded a little bit, knowing that she is 
safe as I do not see Buffalo Bill. But a 
sudden cut to medium shot from her behind 
with a shocking sound contracts me 
immediately. It was a moth. We see a sign 
on the door saying: “America: Open your 
eyes” with a Nazi symbol beside the fridge. 
This sign affected me very much as an 
Affection-Image whereby a reverse shot of 
Clarice tracking her face shows that she 
has been caught with this text. The 
statement “Open your eyes” amplified my 
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sense of vision, in addition to the other 
senses, and eventually increased the 
weight of my eyes and that of my body. 
Clarice moves away backwards towards 
another open door.  
 
 
Figure 5-14: The skinning room  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #9  
 
Although the space is wide, its colors, the moths, and the text increase my sense 
of consciousness and corporeal presence. I feel that my senses are all open to 
live the space which is turning into a place. My understanding of the text, and with 
the help of the camera movement towards Clarice standing still in her position, 
make me feel my own proprioception in this moment and increase my kinesthetic 
experience and the weight of my body. It seems that this sign and the text were 
an affect that pulled me towards the gravity of Clarice’s situation and, as a 
consequence, mine also. 
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The gravity’s affect reflected in the next scene 
where we see Clarice from a Dutch angle 
(tilted view) walking away from that room into 
another corridor where a moth is flying 
around the naked bulb and the music is 
getting louder and closer. Then, we see in 
front of us the same room in which there is a 
mannequin and to our left there is a closed 
door towards which Clarice is taking me.  
 
 
 
Figure 5-15: The third corridor  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #10  
The Dutch angle is used commonly in thrillers to show a lack of balance, which 
can be increased in the present case by the command to “Open your eyes.” This 
angle will make me feel unbalanced as well. Another surprise for me is seeing 
Buffalo Bill’s room (the exhibition) from this new angle, which reveals to me that 
the whole basement is a labyrinth of doors and corridors, leading eventually to 
his workplace; it is a trap. This unintentional return has been acknowledged by 
Freud (2003) as the definition of the uncanny. He states that unintended 
repetition increases the presence and existence of the body. In effect, this 
moment can change my point of view on Buffalo Bill’s room as space into a place 
at that moment, which, by effect of its role, heightens my consciousness and 
corporeality; I am definitely contracted. 
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“The spaces are not only different by culture, gender, […] but the moments of 
interiorization of the spatial manifestation through which the house takes shape” 
(Klages 2005, p.24 as cited in (Griffero 2014, p.38). 
 
Clarice enters the bathroom, where I see her 
in a position of pure shock, frozen. We see a 
corpse in the bathtub. We are getting closer 
until we see nothing but darkness. Buffalo Bill 
has cut the power in his basement. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-16: The bathroom and the corpse 
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #11    
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I feel disgust when I see the corpse. But this 
feeling soon switches to fear and contraction 
once everything turns black, while I still hear 
the breath of Clarice. Then, a sound of 
Buffalo Bill’s goggles is heard, followed by 
watching Clarice through the eyes of Buffalo 
Bill who had switched into his night detective 
goggles. By this time, I have become part of 
Buffalo Bill’s body and, hence, I only hear and 
see Clarice through the night vision getting 
out of the bathroom touching the walls. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17: Getting out of the bathroom  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #11    
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I know to what extent Buffalo Bill is close to 
Clarice, but Clarice does not. In a medium-
long shot, I see her touching and feeling the 
walls to walk. Then, I see Buffalo Bill coming 
closer to her, and the frame is becoming 
tighter to see her in medium shot. She is 
turning around herself, feeling the space. She 
is very calm. I hear her loud breath, the 
moths, and the hum of the fridge. This can be 
understood as what she is hearing as well. 
Clarice falls down at the threshold of his 
room. She walks inside the room, not seeing 
anything. But I know how close Buffalo Bill is 
and that he is getting closer now! He is about 
to touch her!  Once he stretched his arm to 
touch Clarice, non-diegetic music starts and I 
see Clarice in close-up because Buffalo Bill is 
very close. She is totally vulnerable. It seems 
as she is fainting; revolving around herself 
with heightened breath. Once Buffalo Bill 
clicks the gun, she spots the source of sound 
and shoots him immediately. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-18: Proximity, trying to touch  
Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #12   
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This scene in particular has been described and analyzed by Laine (2006), who 
built her study upon Sobchack and Marks to understand the role of skin in 
Cinema. Her analysis was targeting only the sense of touch and its role in 
increasing the corporeality. However, she did not discuss its affect on the felt-
body.  According to her, we, as viewers, are distorted because we are in the skin 
of Buffalo Bill, but hearing the heavy breathing of Clarice from the inside, invites 
us to join her perceptual subjectivity as well. The proximity of the camera (as 
Buffalo Bill’s point of view becomes closer to Clarice) is experienced as a touch, 
and his arm interrupting the frame confirms that, i.e., to touch and be touched via 
a skin shared by the viewer, Buffalo Bill, and Clarice (Laine 2006). 
In view of this, the senses in this scene, as an experience shared by me, Clarice, 
and Buffalo Bill, were beyond vision. Not only touch was the only sense, however, 
the hearing sense also was essential to embody me through hearing her breath 
and for her to focus on all the details that were transferred to me such as the 
sound of the moths and the hum of the fridge. The risk of touch was the 
motivation behind fear; I am afraid that he will touch her! That fear is the moving 
force that is experienced as touch as well from which my skin starts to crawl. The 
touch transferred the whole experience into a haptic one for me. Here, the skin 
and the sense of touch work as an Affect that raise my consciousness and 
corporeality to the maximum as I am in the position of encountering; I was 
experiencing an expansive Away!-tendency that I want to get out of my skin, and 
Buffalo Bill’s skin as well, but I could not, and that introduced the maximum 
contraction of my body of the whole sequence, and tension eventually. 
I also refer my corporeality to the imaginative empathy for Clarice’s 
proprioception where in darkness one senses the balance and position in the 
space to the maximum. Further, and based on my proximity to her, I have felt 
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this proprioception and kinesthetic experience as transferring into my corporeal 
consciousness that which was reflected in my extreme contraction. 
The proximity of me to Clarice through Buffalo Bill, by touching her, made me 
very conscious of being-in–his-world. That space definitely has changed from a 
space into a place.
  Part Two: Case Study 
5.4 Conclusion 
Merleau-Ponty states that “I can understand the function of the living body 
only by enacting it myself, and only in so far as I am a body” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 
p.75). In light of this, this research set out from a personal reading of the 
researcher who is using the first-person phenomenology to grasp the concept of 
atmosphere and to create a relevant framework for it through her own lived 
experience in encountering dread atmospheres on screen. This means that the 
framework presented here is not a universal perspective, but a subjective point 
of view that followed characteristics and guidelines that were drawn from the 
critical literature review in part one, and is supported by a horizontal reading of 
different theories of phenomenology and various examples of thriller films to 
make it more objective.  
By conducting phenomenological research and developing a phenomenal 
reading of the viewer’s lived experience, the aim is not to create a technical tool 
or model that informs people how to create the atmosphere of fear and dread. 
Rather, according to Van Manen, “it opens up possibilities for creating formative 
relations” (van Manen 2007) between the things in order to explain, interpret, and 
highlight phenomenal zones and quasi-things to help in building suspense in the 
dread atmospheres. 
The sequence in The Silence of the Lambs was motivated in general by an urge 
to formulate cinematic dread according to Julian Hanich’s (2010) definition of an; 
alone in the dark scenario. However, it was overlapped with moments of 
cinematic terror and suggested horror. Hence, that did not affect the spatial, 
temporal, and emotional immersion that are related to dread, which in turn 
elaborated on Hanich’s definition of the ‘Atmosphere of Dread’. 
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As to spatial immersion, the arrangement of the house, especially in the cellar, is 
made in such a way appear to be a labyrinth. Corridors and (closed/open) doors 
create dizziness and disorientation for the viewer, which results in restricted 
visual access for the viewer and restricted movement for the character. 
Regarding temporal immersion, the time was real and dense; it was extended in 
order that the viewer can live second by second with Clarice. With respect to 
emotional immersion, the viewer expects the threat at any moment, and this fear 
feeds the sense of dread and keeps the viewers on the edge of their seats.  
The whole atmosphere fed the uncertainty contribute to the suspense; the sound, 
silence, lighting, darkness, textures, texts and phenomenal zones have all served 
to create a restricted atmosphere.  
Applying the thoughts of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists made it 
possible to realize the role of common spatial things such as stairs, corridors, and 
doors in affecting the embodiment of the viewers, their existence, and their 
corporeality. In addition, the phenomenal reading opened up possibilities for 
establishing relations and explaining, interpreting, and highlighting some of the 
atmospheric corporeal situations that have the ability to make the atmosphere be 
well perceived and felt and that have the ability to enhance the atmosphere of 
dread; these are the quasi-things. Those corporeal atmospheric affections were 
produced for the viewer kinesthetically and synaesthetically; kinesthetically by 
muscles and skin, synaesthetically by the continuous expansion and contraction 
felt by the felt-body, accordingly, the continuous opening and closing of the 
absolute space increased the tension of the viewer and increased its embodiment 
in that atmosphere. 
According to the phenomenological reading of the present case study, one may 
choose many corporeal quasi-things to discuss their affect on corporeality. For 
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this thesis, only three quasi-things will be discussed; the text, transparency and 
surveillance. The following part discusses those quasi-things in deep and 
supports the argument through borrowing examples from other thriller film. 
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Part Three: Analysis and Discussion, In Relation to the Atmospheric 
Corporeal Quasi-things 
Previewing approaches to the phenomenology of embodiment in part one, helped 
this thesis to establish the essence of the reciprocal relationship between the 
subject and the object and their interaction in film. Body, its senses, and its 
corporeality are at the center of this situated relationship and the overall relational 
encounter. This attempt has drawn on the conceptions of many 
phenomenologists, mainly Merleau-Ponty and those who built their theories upon 
his. This understanding has created a framework that helped the researcher to 
interpret the lived experience of the viewer with the character in describing a 
dread scene from the Silence of the Lambs in part two, in order to describe the 
atmosphere of dread in that particular scene.  
The description demonstrates that every single detail in the atmosphere of the 
selected sequence in film the Silence of the Lambs was used as a key for the 
viewer and Clarice, as well as for any effort aiming at understanding the killer’s 
world. Only a few significant details and phenomenal zones worked more 
effectively than the others in increasing the corporeality and consciousness of the 
viewer, such as the use of stairs and of some doors. It is necessary to underline 
that having those phenomenal zones, or quasi-things in Griffero’s terms, is not a 
prerequisite for the atmosphere to change into dread. However, they enhance the 
potential for this atmosphere, together with all other factors, to create the dread 
experience since the experience is a holistic one.  
Griffero (2014) considers phenomenal zones as anchor points. He claims that 
anchor points are responsible to generate a field of condensation which in turn 
elaborates to create an atmosphere.  As a result, he defined the whole 
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atmosphere as a quasi-thing, namely, a situation or an orientation “whose 
ecstasies are expressive characters or qualities and those qualities belong where 
they are found” (Griffero 2014 p.109). However, it is important to stress that these 
anchor points cannot always create the same affect, and what is grasped is the 
totality of the atmosphere. For example, the doors in some locations in the scene 
segments discussed in the previous chapter were anchor points as was the case 
in the basement. However, the two doors that were framing Clarice in the kitchen 
are not anchor points, yet they helped the viewer to understand Clarice’s 
emotions; flat and confused. 
Griffero confirms that the first impression is always atmospheric. In other words, 
it is an affective corporeal involvement; “interrupting the habitual observational 
and pragmatic flux to give the subject an identity” (Griffero 2014 p.29). According 
to the style of shooting in dread scenes, and the mimicry relationship, the viewer 
shares the character the first look and the first impression. They both live in an 
affective and corporeal perception that undergoes immediate evaluation and has 
consequences for its expression (Hanich 2010). This can be the reason behind 
the exaggeration of the forms or the experience that offer an affective, corporeal, 
first impression. But, as has been mentioned before, the second, third, and fourth 
impressions help in looking more, understanding more, and exploring more than 
the first impression because perceiving is not simply the elementary sensing of 
data that is performed after the state of things, but is a process of being involved 
in the things themselves. 
In order to elaborate on the atmosphere of dread that has been discussed by 
Hanich (2010), the phenomenal reading of the dread scene in the Silence of the 
Lambs helped this research to define and develop some quasi-things that were 
behind the constricted atmosphere in that scene. Some of them are not common, 
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and are rarely talked about in the context of film, such as the ‘phenomenology of 
text’ and ‘the phenomenology of transparency’, and some of them could be 
common at the first impression, but they suggest a new phenomenal perspective 
in order to reveal their influence on embodiment to affect the atmosphere of 
dread, such as ‘the phenomenology of surveillance’. Having these situations as 
part of the definition of an atmosphere transfers space into place that is 
approached, corporeal, and memorable.  
This part of the thesis discusses these situations and highlights how they are 
used to increase the sense of embodiment in dread atmosphere; chapter six 
discusses the phenomenology of text, chapter seven discusses the 
phenomenology of transparency, and chapter eight discusses the 
phenomenology of surveillance. 
 
  
  Part Three 
221 
 
  
 PART THREE:  
Chapter Six:  The Phenomenology of Text in Film 
Chapter Seven:  The Phenomenology of Transparency  
    In Film 
Chapter Eight:  The Phenomenology of Surveillance  
    In Film 
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Chapter Six: The Phenomenology of Text in Film 
This chapter presents the first quasi-thing that has been concluded from 
the phenomenal reading in part two of this thesis. 
The use of Nazi logo was obvious in the scene of the Silence of the Lambs, but 
it was accompanied by a statement “America, Open your eyes.” Images in 
general have specific messages to communicate with the viewer. Sometimes, 
physical and direct language is used to support a concept or deliver a meaning. 
Maryvillegov argues that language is divided into semiotics, semantics, syntax, 
and pragmatics. Semantics focuses on what words mean while semiotics is 
concerned with signs. On the other hand, Syntactics is related to the structural 
relations between signs and pragmatics is the relation of signs to interpreters 
(Maryvillegov 2009). 
In this research, signs and codes are not discussed for two reasons. The first 
reason is that many studies have tackled the signs and their meanings and 
representations in film and architecture such as (Danesi 2004; Leeds-Hurwitz 
1993; Trifonas 2003; Walsh 1993; Tilghman 1980; Hurford 2007). The second 
reason is that having codes and signs requires a previous experience of the 
viewer. Therefore, interpretations of codes and signs will be different between the 
viewer who knows the sign and its meaning and the viewer who does not. 
Meanwhile, the aim of this phenomenal reading and discussion is to guarantee 
an approximately equal experience for most of the viewers. Accordingly, this 
study concentrated on reading representations, namely, texts, which are divided 
in this study into words and numbers. 
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6.1 Words 
From an embodiment perspective, it has been documented in different 
fields of social science, psychology, and neuroscience that observing an action 
can create a mirroring in motor movements. As noted in chapter three some call 
the mirrored behaviors as representations as Preston (2007). 
Some experiments (e.g., Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi (1996), Rizzolatti 
& Arbib (1998), Gallese & Lakoff (2005), and Fischer & Zwaan (2008)) have 
demonstrated that the verbal stimuli related to emotional expressions should be 
regarded as embodied elements. Additionally, language has a role in 
embodiment and its understanding points to a mental process driven by the 
mirror-neuron system (Foroni and Semin 2009). Furthermore, some researchers 
(Spadacenta et al. 2014; Oosterwijk et al. 2010; Portch et al. 2015; Foroni and 
Semin 2013; Foroni and Semin 2009) suggest that, as a way of communication, 
written language is not merely symbolic, but also somatic. The different 
dimensions of psychology, social psychology, and neurophysiology of the 
aforementioned studies are beyond the scope of this study, but their findings and 
experiments support the argument of the somatic response of the viewer and 
some of their experiments will be referenced in order to prove the arguments of 
the current study. The following discussion addresses the power of words in 
preparing the body and transferring it into a new situation under the 
phenomenology of the perception of words according to Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
and the art of using paratexts in media studies according to Gray (2010). 
For Merleau-Ponty, the word is not a geometrical structure in a segment of visual 
space, but is a presentation of a form of behavior and a linguistic act in its dynamic 
fullness, which can prepare the body for an action or transfer it into a situation 
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that eventually creates the corporeal experience. He explains that because of the 
nature of words, which induce a kind of experience that produces physical 
tensions on the muscles of the body (Merleau-Ponty 2002). He believes that 
words have a motor physiognomy because one adopts with regard to them and 
with regard to each person a form of behavior to make the complete appearance 
the moment each word is given. For example, if someone is able to read the word 
hard in a short time, it “produces a stiffening of the back and the neck, and only 
in a secondary way does it project itself into the visual or auditory field and 
assume the appearance of a sign or a word” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.273). He 
considered it as an event that “grips the body, and this grip circumscribes the 
area of significance to which it has reference.” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.273). Thus, 
encountering a word, as part of the atmopshere, fuels special kind of experience 
in perception, movement, and action.  
Merleau-Ponty states that in preparation, there is a certain bodily attitude, a 
specific kind of tension to give structure to the image for it to be recognized as a 
pattern. As an example, when one reads the word warm the body prepares itself 
for heat and when one reads the word damp a feeling of dampness and coldness 
invades the body and, at the same time, imparts to one’s mouth (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). In this respect, what is brought by the behavior of the word is an identity. 
Hence, for Merleau-Ponty the body can be said to have a behavioral pattern. 
In his book Show Sold Separately, Gray (2010) talks about paratexts that are 
used for promotional films and other media contexts, in which for example, an 
introduction can be told verbally or orally for preparation, in order to tell the 
audience what to expect and establish the faith in the subsequent 
transubstantiation. He states that these paratexts create worries, hopes, and 
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expectations and offer a chance to be experienced but do not ultimately 
guarantee the experience. 
In The Poetics of Space, Bachelard defines a special quality of language in 
poems that brings the reader closer to the sense of being, which he called 
phenomenological reverberation (1964 xxiii, as cited in (van Manen 2007). In this, 
Van Manen notes that the power of a text understanding feeds the reader with a 
pre-discursive and pre-cognitive mode of being, which may give rise to evocative 
images that can move the reader. They “inform us by forming us and thus leave 
an affect on us” to bring a change of being (van Manen 2007). 
Before starting to make claims and provide examples, it is important to stress the 
significance of understanding words as a process to guarantee the experience, 
supporting grounded cognition theories which predict that processing conceptual 
or linguistic cognition of emotion may be accompanied by bodily reactions. So, 
recognizing words of fear and retrieving their meaning is a basic reenactment of 
fear (Spadacenta et al. 2014; Oosterwijk et al. 2010; Fino et al. 2016; Portch et 
al. 2015).  
As Hanich suggests, dread is built upon spatial, temporal and emotional 
immersion. The phenomenology of text as observed in this thesis is mostly 
attached to emotional immersion, because it prepares the viewer for 
anticipations, hopes and worries, which in turn increase their being and 
consequently their corporeality and embodiment. The discussion below will divide 
the phenomenology of words upon their use in three parts; ‘preparation’, a way 
‘into-a-situation’ and for ‘being-in-situation’. 
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6.1.1 Preparation: One Word Signals Different Uses 
There are some words that, once perceived, may have the same meaning 
and indications for specific anticipation, but only using them in different contexts 
can change the meaning. For example, the word “Exit”’ always has the meaning 
of getting out. In a terror scene, a chase scene, or an escape scene, as found in 
The Italian Job (Gray 2003) and I am Legend (Lawrence 2007), a sign saying 
“Exit” will lead the character to move in a specific direction. In the meantime, it 
induces a breath of air for the viewer. It does not, however, create a moment of 
pause. It produces a flow of motion that relieves both the character and the 
viewer.  
However in a  different example “Exit” sign is shown in the film Se7en (Fincher 
1995), but it provided the entrance for detective Mills (Brad Pitt) from the 
beginning of the film. He did not escape those serial crimes because the last 
murder was the murder of his wife, and then he had to kill the serial killer John 
(Kevin Spacey). This case did not leave him and he could not get out of it. Hence, 
the word “exit” has the same meaning, but in the last example, it was used 
differently. 
In real life, one can see an “exit” sign in any public place but not at home; in the 
garage of any shopping centre, in a museum, or in a library. Therefore, reading 
the sign indicates the opportunity of finishing a temporary experience (that may 
be good or bad) and leaving it to move towards home, which produces an ending 
to that experience. It is important to acknowledge that the meaning of that written 
signs are impacted by their placement in different contexts. 
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6.1.2 Preparation: Emotional Words (Arousals) 
In the beginning of The Silence of the Lambs, Clarice is exercising in the 
woods. In one scene, only the audience see some writing on a tree log, including 
the words “Hurt”, “Agony”, “pain”, and “love it”. This kind of preparation is for the 
viewer, not for the character. The same applies to “exit” and “keep out” signs used 
in Se7en, where the detective does not see these writings, but the viewer does. 
This kind of preparation is, most probably, feeding the viewers’ sympathy from 
the beginning. It is preparing them for the experience which the character will go 
through. 
In a social psychology experiment, Oosterwijk et al. have proven that conceptual 
fear knowledge can invoke a bodily reaction and enhance subsequent bodily 
reactions to fearful stimuli (Oosterwijk et al. 2010). The results of using 
unscrambled sentences relating to fear such as “he bleeds to death” have 
supported the Grounded Cognition Theories which predict that processing 
conceptual or linguistic expressions about emotion may also be accompanied by 
bodily reactions. According to these theories, those words, which have emotional 
content, work as a means to arousal. Research has shown that “simulation 
processes that occur while processing conceptual fear knowledge prepare the 
body for fear signals, resulting in a heightened bodily sensitivity to fearful stimuli” 
(Oosterwijk et al. 2010, 70).   
Some experiments have supported the embodiment hypothesis that processing 
an emotional concept (e.g., sadness, anger, agony, etc.) produces an emotional 
reaction. In the experiment of Niedenthal et al. (2009), those emotional words 
resulted in facial activity, and in other experiments, they produced body posture 
while generating disappointment in words (Oosterwijk et al., 2009) or body 
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movement when reading sad or angry sentences (Mouilso, Glenberg, Havas, & 
Lindeman, 2007) as in (Oosterwijk et al. 2010). In summary, those studies show 
that emotional concepts can serve as contextual cues, or, in other words, 
corporeal atmospheric affections in Griffero’s terms. 
Stanley Fish pointed in his book Affective Stylistics to the idea that literature is 
kinetic, i.e., it moves; “it refuses to stay still and doesn’t let you stay still either”, 
where it has temporal flow. Whenever it is read, the first word takes the reader to 
the second and the third, and so on (Fish 1980, 80 as cited in (Gray 2010 
p.41).Gray argues that considering the role of  texts in this framework, is that they 
may talk to, and revise, other texts, either explicitly or implicitly, in order to connect 
meanings to previous texts, and that they always make sense through the frames 
offered by other texts or frames (Gray 2010 p.31). Merleau-Ponty refers to this as 
the relational image of the words since they may induce behavioral patterns once 
they are spotted (Merleau-Ponty 2002). The kinetic nature of the word and its 
connection with other events can be responsible for transferring the sense of the 
body into a situation, because it awakens the senses and accordingly, its 
transcendental subjectivity. This, in turn, confirms the significance of the use of 
written text in construction of a dread scene, where its position and the timing to 
perceive it offer an opportunity to transfer the viewer into a new situation which 
can be manipulated according to its relational image. 
6.1.3 Into-a-Situation: The Same Words but Different Levels of Affect 
Despite the fact that the word has a relational image, it may not induce the 
same behavioral pattern every time. For instance, the sign “Bates Motel, 
Vacancy” appears twice in the film Psycho (Hitchcock 1960). The first time one 
sees it, it gives the viewer relief because the character (Marion Crane) will be 
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safe from the weather and from any potential car accident. However, it does not 
produce any kind of engagement with the character, neither sympathy nor 
empathy. But the second time the viewer sees it, it works as a motivation for fear 
related to the sympathy that has been developed with the characters. This 
motivation turns into a kinesthetic experience that awakens the senses to be felt 
as a transcendental subjectivity, providing the viewer with recognition of its 
locomotion which then turns into a kinesthetic consciousness. This, as a 
consequence, turns the motel from a space that has a function into a place that 
has a memory. In this way, the repeated word is only one way to transfer the 
viewer into a situation. The other method for transferring the viewer directly is the 
use of ‘sensorimotor verbs’, which are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
6.1.4 Being-in-Situation: Action Verbs vs. Adjectives 
To be more specific in discussing the use of words in film, this research 
focused on action verbs and adjectives. Recent research in neuroscience and 
psychology have shown that those parts of speech have different effects on the 
sense of corporeality and hence, the experience of the body.  
The neuroscientists Francesco Foroni and Gün R. Semin (2009) have 
investigated whether semantic stimuli do, or do not, induce motor resonance in 
facial muscles comparable to that triggered by the facial expressions of emotion. 
Motor resonance regards any movement in the muscles of the body. They have 
also explored the somatic reactions that emerge as a study of embodiment. They 
chose to work on the difference of impact between action verbs such as “smile” 
or “frown”, and adjectives such as “funny” or “annoying”. The results revealed that 
reading both the action verbs and adjectives created corresponding somatic 
responses in the facial muscles of the participants (i.e., zygomatic major and 
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corrugator supercell muscles). However, motor resonance was significantly 
weaker in intensity in the case of adjectives than it was in the case of action verbs 
being interpreted. In their experiments, they have bridged between different fields 
of social cognition and affective processes research (e.g., Strack et al., 1988), 
psychophysiological work on mimicry (e.g., Dimberg et al., 2000), and 
neuroscientific work on language (e.g., Pulvermuler, 2005). Their findings were 
specifically related to the comprehension of language. For example, 
understanding the verb “smile” leads to the physical simulation of the events to 
be comprehended. They have clarified that not all linguistic expressions have the 
same consequences, as some categories induce more resonance than others 
and may contribute to more embodiment (Foroni and Semin 2009). 
Another study in psychology carried out by Fino at al. confirmed that it is 
necessary to understand the word in order to have the motor response (Fino et 
al. 2016). They found that emotional sentences, including descriptive action verbs 
(e.g., to smile, to laugh, to frown, and to scowl) and emotional state verbs (e.g., 
to enjoy, to be excited, to be enthusiastic, to get angry, and to irritate) both have 
effects on the emotional ratings and the corresponding facial muscle activations, 
but that the effect was greater in the emotional state verb sentences than in the 
descriptive action verbs. Portch et al. have compiled a huge list of verbs and 
studied the extent to which they evoke specific emotions such as happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, and fear. For example, the verbs cry, hide, and 
shiver are action verbs that induce fear (Portch et al. 2015).  
6.1.5 Sensorimotor verbs 
In The Silence of the Lambs, the notice “America, Open your eyes” is 
hanging on one of the doors of Buffalo Bill’s basement. Clarice and the viewer 
 Part Three: The Phenomenology of Text in Film 
233 
 
both have read. It serves to literally enlarge the opening of the eyes and to amplify 
the sense of sight for both. Buffalo Bill is seen to have personalized the message 
by adding “America” to add extra political and personal meaning, this may be 
relevant to a semiotic reading of the film, which is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
Some images can affect and stimulate the eyes to look more carefully, but they 
may hook some people and not others. Writing a statement in an imperative form 
works directly on the senses and works more effectively in one way, which is 
through stimulating the opening of the eyes and subsequently focusing on any 
visible details. This can be considered as a both cognitive perception and a 
somatic unconscious reaction that, in reciprocation, can amplify the sense of 
sight. In this research, any action verb that works on the senses is called a 
‘sensorimotor verb’. 
Senses, as discussed by Merleau-Ponty (2002), are significant for perception and 
for their eventual embodiment. So, speaking to a sense (e.g., vision) can work 
directly without any indeterminacy or ambiguity of meaning as, for example, there 
is only one way to open the eyes. With reference to the framework that has been 
drawn previously, one can determine the reasons behind the high corporeality 
found in verbs than in adjectives, in which relate to the act of looking, the 
determinate transcendence, the consciousness of the act, the somatic empathy, 
and the external and internal movements. 
From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty (2002), the act of looking is either 
prospective or retrospective. It is indivisibly prospective because the object is the 
final stage of the process of focusing, and retrospective because it will present 
itself in its own appearance, i.e., as the stimulus, the motive, or the prime mover 
of the process, since the beginning. This is what happens when the stimulus is 
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an action verb that urges one to “open the eyes” and look for Buffalo Bill, who is 
known to be at the final stage of looking (i.e., to find him). The sign “Open your 
eyes” works as both a prospective act, a command to look for Buffalo Bill and as 
a retrospective act, because the act of looking is the stimulus itself. 
The logical structure of existence has been described by Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
contains states of ambiguity, indeterminacy, and transcendence. Ambiguity 
means that everything has several meanings. Indeterminacy means that the 
nature of the situation is uncertain which prompts one to act. The associated act 
in which the body takes up and transforms into a situation is called the 
transcendence stage. Using ‘sensorimotor verbs’ grasps the senses to jump 
directly into the transcendence stage, followed by those of ambiguity and 
indeterminacy. The command to “Open your eyes” lets the body act immediately 
by opening the eyes and looking, but where and how to look creates the ambiguity 
and indeterminacy that, altogether, feed the sense of existence (i.e. of being). 
Merleau-Ponty notes that existence and consciousness are not necessarily 
accompanied by a sense of corporeality. However, when using the ‘sensorimotor 
action verbs’ the body acts in consciousness and corporeality. It is not enough to 
gaze at the objects. In order to be conscious, one has to know that he/she is 
seizing or watching in order to be aware of herself/himself, otherwise it implies 
that it is a third party who looks (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
In the Silence of the Lambs, when the viewer opens the eyes after spotting the 
sign “Open your eyes,” the action of the body is unconscious, but after the 
intensity of opening it will be conscious of the opening itself. Then, it merges in a 
way with the objects Clarice is looking at, but the intensity of keeping the eyes 
open in order to look amplifies the sense and makes the mind work in two ways. 
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This dual thinking may create confusion and may, thus, be the reason behind 
reflecting this confusion in the use of a Dutch angle to shoot the following scene. 
Action verbs are talking to the somatic form of empathy, not the imaginative one. 
The somatic forms, according to Hanich (2010), are divided into motor mimicry, 
sensational, and affective mimicry. The viewer opens the eyes as Clarice does, 
and they do this together at the same time, not as a reflective image.  Once the 
viewer sees the reaction of Clarice in a close-up, this creates motor mimicry; the 
viewer mimics Clarice’s look and her way in opening the eyes, and because of 
the duration of the look, the motor mimicry transforms into a sensational mimicry, 
in which the viewer feels the enlargement and tension of the eye’s muscle. 
Accordingly, the viewer feels with Clarice. The affective mimicry comes from the 
anticipation of fear. Consequently, the facial expressions of Clarice and the 
enlargement of the viewers’ muscles and senses feed the emotional experience 
of dread. 
The final reason behind the intensified effect of the verbs can be the fact that the 
external and internal movements happen within the body. These verbs force one 
to call all the spatial and temporal forces in order to encounter the environment. 
Asking anyone to do something with any part of the body, such as opening the 
eyes, creates physical movement in the muscles. The physical movement 
according to Sheets-Johnstone awakens transcendental subjectivity to increase 
the feeling of the senses in the form of kinesthetic consciousness. If the viewer 
turns the attention to herself/himself (e.g., by looking, hearing, or touching), then 
this will provide the body with kinetic experiences to generate corporeal 
consciousness. In addition to the fear attached to the atmosphere, Griffero and 
Hanich note that the subject experiences inner movement that creates a 
contraction that shuts the absolute space; the space of the felt-body (Griffero 
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2014; Hanich 2010). Accordingly, the ‘sensorimotor verbs’ produce kinesthetic 
and synaesthetic affective corporeal atmosphere. 
An interesting study in neurophysiology researched the effect of using linguistic 
material without any emotional connotation on arm-reaching movements. The 
study used arm/hand related verbs that describe negative connotation (to shoot, 
to strangle, and to whip) that modulate different reaching movements from 
arm/hand or leg/foot neutral connotation action-related verbs (to comb, to color, 
to march, and to hop). The arm reaching movement was shown to be 
corresponding to higher arousal than other movements (Spadacenta et al. 2014). 
This experiment of Spadacenta et al. (2014) provides evidence of the interplay 
between motor responses and action language away from any emotional 
connotations. So, this experiment supports the notion that actions and reactions 
of the ‘sensorimotor verbs’ can be applied to any body action just as illustrated in 
the action triggered by the command “Open your eyes.” 
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The only action and/or reaction the readers might have had just on seeing 
the written command “don’t breathe” is to have held their breath for a second or 
may be more until reading this sentence. These imperative forms of verbs may 
have been repeated even in a film itself or in the title of a film. It controls and 
embodies the body, prepares and guides it to communicate under one condition 
for the whole movie. 
Don’t Breathe is a title of a thriller film (Fede 2016) that traces the action of some 
burglars who are trying to steal money from a blind man who lives alone with his 
dog. Breaking in to the house of the blind man, who was once a soldier, is shown 
as a thrilling scary adventure. Hold your Breath is a horror film (Jared 2012) about 
a group of friends camping for a weekend who find themselves picked one by 
one when one of the group refuses to hold his breath while passing cemeteries 
to abide by a superstition that he might be breathing in evil spirits. Hush (Mike 
2016) is a thriller film about a deaf and mute writer who retreats into the woods 
to live a lonely life. She fights for her life in silence when a masked killer appears 
at her window. 
These three films and many similar ones ask their viewers from the beginning to 
be silent and to hold their breath. The titles serve as a means of ‘preparation’ of 
the viewer from the beginning. Then, they take the viewer into a situation once 
the action in dread requires and acquires a state of silence. Since the body, 
according to Merleau-Ponty (2002), is a work of art and is a negotiation of 
impersonal forces, then it turns through a creative operation to take the past to 
the future or to the action.  The way the body prepares for the moment that can 
be turned into a situation looks like the acquisition of habit; it collects unconnected 
movements into a particular gesture that will remain dormant in the body until a 
situation calls for its powers to unity (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
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According to Oosterwijk et al., whose experiment supports the argument that 
using action verbs that have knowledge of fear intensify the embodiment 
(Oosterwijk et al. 2010), and with reference to Merleau-Ponty (2002), these verbs 
create an event that can grip the body. As a consequence, the body absorbs the 
event and transforms it into a situation; the transcendence stage of existence. 
This imperative action verb of not breathing, in addition to mimicking the actors 
and the silence in the film, embodies the viewer from the beginning of the film. It 
creates a conscious action that is practiced unconsciously over duration of the 
film and which is connected to the body is heart rate and muscles. 
Ackerl, Kerstin, Atzmueller, Michaela and Grammer explain how holding one’s 
breath deprives the body of oxygen and stops carbon dioxide from exiting. This, 
together with tension in the muscles while watching, makes the body produce the 
adrenalin hormone, which, in turn, increases the heart rate. Since the heart needs 
oxygen, which is in short supply under these conditions, then it takes blood from 
the hands and feet to compensate that loss. This, in return, will make the body 
weaker when it releases itself for a breath (Ackerl, Kerstin, Atzmueller, Michaela 
& Grammer 2002). As a consequence, this experience that is intensified by 
holding the breath amplifies the tension and embodies the viewer consciously, 
first as a reaction for not breathing as an overt act that the viewer carries out, 
then unconsciously following empathy with the character to leave the viewer in 
total corporeality.  
With reference to Gray (2010), one can consider the action verbs as universal 
codes that guarantee a universal unified action. On the other hand, adjectives 
cannot guarantee the same reaction of the viewers as they can express a mood 
of an atmosphere or something about the character that can increase sympathy 
but they cannot embody the viewer. For instance, the term ‘Silence’ in the title of 
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the Silence of the Lambs just adds something to the reading of Clarice’s personal 
life and suggests that breaking this silence will set her free. It does not have the 
same effect of the silence that was asked for in the action verbs above (i.e., hush), 
but the silence and stillness of the film is revealed by the actions, the spatial 
arrangement of the basement, and the silent movement of Clarice. 
There are other kinds of writings and texts that embody the viewer, but in a 
different way and to varying levels. “I can see you,” “I still can see you,” and “I 
know what you did last summer,” are titles of horror and/or thriller films. This kind 
of text encourages embodiment because it addresses the vulnerability of the 
character of them being seen by the villain. The current study discusses this part 
of embodiment in detail in chapter eight; the phenomenology of surveillance.  
6.1.6 Numbers 
Like words, numbers are considered in film as a special case of text that 
help in energizing the atmosphere and preparing the body for anticipating, or 
getting into, a situation. Numbers which appear in films as a clock, a bomb clock, 
a thermometer, or any other form are only an indication of measure; time or 
temperature. 
Although numbers may be more common in terror scenes or suggested horror 
scenes than in dread scenes, they can be applied in dread scenes to embody the 
character and the viewer both consciously and corporeally. Untraceable (Hoblit 
2008) is a thriller film about an FBI agent who is tasked with hunting down an 
untraceable serial killer who streams live videos of his victims on the Internet. The 
webpage starts with “Kill with me? ENTER” (The command here is an invitation 
for the participation of the characters, not the viewers. Hence, it is not counted as 
a sensorimotor verb). The criminal involves the characters in the act of killing with 
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him, and the more viewers there are of the webpage, the faster the victim is killed. 
The numbers of viewers appear on the webpage and in front of the victim who is 
tied alone in darkness enclosed by the means of torture. In addition to the editing 
technique that shows the increasing number of participants and, besides the 
reactions of the FBI agents and the victim, the number itself was the stimulus to 
embodiment in that scene since it was the indication of time where the increase 
in the number of participants makes the killing faster. 
Other examples of numbers to serve in counting can be found in thriller films but 
as part of a terror or a suggested horror scene as is the case in the film In Time 
(Niccol 2011), where the number, a clock attached to the skins of the characters, 
is an indication of lengths of their lives. Number is used in a similar way in the 
Brickworks Museum in Germany. The architects Thomas Duncan and Noel 
McCauley created an oval kiln installed with numbers indicative of the 
temperature on the brick walls to create a haptic experience for the visitor. The 
visitors are invited to pick up a glowing white brick, which turns into red whenever 
the heat is up while walking through the tunnel. Actually, the heat does not 
change and does not reach 100 ºC, but the numbers on the walls and the 
changing color of the brick create a haptic experience and increase embodiment 
of the visitor in that atmosphere. 
6.2 Names 
As noted in Chapter Two, Tim Creswell suggests two ways to turn space 
into place; in addition to movement that is responsible to create spatiality, naming 
is the other way by which space can be given meaning and transferred to a place 
(Cresswell 2004). But names are different in that they may sound, mean, and 
serve different purposes according to the context in which they are delivered. 
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However, they all share in common their role in ‘preparation’ of a base for the 
reader or viewer only under one condition; that the name is recognized and its 
meaning is retrieved for the viewer. So, one can consider the name as a special 
case in ‘preparation’. 
6.2.1 Names and Meaning 
Braiman argues that naming characters or places can be considered as 
one form of foreshadowing, it is a literary technique that prepares the reader for 
an ending (Braiman 2007). The author chooses to name her/his characters and 
places for a literal, abstract, or figurative purpose. The names may have a 
denotative meaning (the literal meaning of a word) or a connotative meaning 
(suggestions and associations resulting from a word or group of words). In 
addition, Maryvillegov  argues that several words may have the same denotation 
while differing significantly in their connotations (Maryvillegov 2009). The practice 
of naming has been used by many filmmakers, writers, and architects such as 
with great deliberation.  
Alfred Hitchcock, took care in naming his characters. In Psycho, he named the 
female character Marion Crane, and the male character Norman Bates. Cileone 
highlights that Crane is a type of bird and Norman has an interest in stuffing birds 
because, according to him, they are passive creatures. He comments on her, 
saying that she “eats like a bird.” Marion’s last name foreshadows that she will 
become one of these dead creatures (Cileone 2015). The name Norman also 
suggests the word normal since the character looks very normal and peaceful on 
the surface to make the viewer sympathize with him. It may also suggest nor man, 
according to his psychological state due to that he is neither woman nor man. 
Cileone goes on to suggest that Bates and baits as homophones may be meant 
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by the writer because Bates has an innocent appearance that is trapping 
someone behind it (Cileone 2015). 
In architecture, museums are the most common relevant type of buildings that 
names can be applied for their spaces to induce a dimension of special and 
spatial experience. This is reinforced by a process of what Thrift calls imitative 
contagion, “which is an infectious, though often unconscious, response to 
atmosphere that primes us to act in certain ways” (Thrift 2008, 231) as cited by 
(Waterton and Dittmer 2014). Waterton and Dittmer suggest that names are 
augmented by the behavior of the user specific through somatic routine that 
eventually enables certain assemblages to emerge and to create place (Waterton 
and Dittmer 2014).  
6.2.2 Names and Sound 
Griffero notes that the heavy first syllable of the town Parma in Italy made 
Proust imagine that it was compact, glossy, violet, and tinted because in 
pronouncing the word, no breath of air is stirred (Proust 2010, 467) as in (Griffero 
2014 p.117). Names for Proust expressed an atmospheric-synaesthetic halo from 
their pictures, the brightness or darkness of their sounds, and their colors. It is as 
if he is visualizing the sound in colors and pictures. Thereupon, sounds create a 
sensible quality accompanied by the motor physiognomy that may produce action 
or movement. To some extent, this accords with Merleau-Ponty (2002) who thinks 
of colors as a sensation or a sensible quality. So, this philosophy can be applied 
to sounds of names because they may affect the subject’s reaction, depending 
on the heaviness or lightness of the syllables that create a sensation which has 
a motor accompaniment such as in colors.  
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The movement when one sees blue and green, according to Merleau-Ponty, is 
inwards towards the stimulus, but it is in the opposite direction when seeing red 
or yellow; “The significance of abduction is that the organism turns towards the 
stimulus and is attracted by the world (green and blue)--- of abduction that it turns 
away from the stimulus and withdraws towards its center (red and yellow)” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.243). He states that colors present more than sensible 
qualities, they “present themselves with a motor physiognomy, and are enveloped 
in a living significance. It has long been known that sensations have a ‘motor 
accompaniment’, that stimuli set in motion ‘incipient movements’ which are 
associated with the sensation of the quality and create a halo round it” (Merleau-
Ponty 2002 p.243). 
Merleau-Ponty also suggests that colors have motor significance only if they 
suggest a new manner of evaluating that affect consciousness and movement. 
Consequently, not every word or syllable can create this reaction and response 
and what is most important is that sensation is intentional “because I find in the 
sensible a certain rhythm of existence is put forward (abduction or adduction) 
[…], and stealing into the form of existence which is thus suggested to me, I am 
brought into relation with an external being” whether to open myself into it or to 
shut myself from it” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.248). From Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) 
point of view, the sensible element is a vague thing before the body synchronizes 
itself to experience it. Thus, one can conclude that sensation is a reconstitution 
that prepares the body to get into the experience which embodies it 
unconsciously. 
These observations rise questions as to whether the syllables of Gumb and 
Buffalo Bill are heavy or dark. Do they have colors? 
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6.3 Conclusion 
It has been argued that words, once recognized in film, have the motor 
physiognomy that is capable of preparing or transferring their reader/viewer into 
a new situation. This conception has created a platform for this study to consider 
text as a powerful approach to corporeal experience in viewing dread scenes. 
Observation of different thriller films led to the researcher to conclusion that text 
is used for ‘preparation’, a way ‘into-a-situation’ and for ‘being-in-situation’, as a 
way for emotional immersion in cinematic dread. 
Texts that are meant for the ‘preparation’ of the viewer only, not the character, 
can be considered as tools that enrich sympathy with the character. They are 
usually very common words that have one meaning only. However, their function 
can be manipulated to have the opposite meaning when using them differently 
like the case of entering from an “Exit” point. 
‘Into-a-Situation’ is regarded as a reflection of the sympathy for the character, 
which happens when experiencing discovery of the same text but with different 
timing. It feeds the anticipation of dread. ‘Being-in-Situation’ is a direct 
engagement with the body of the viewer, and the character, such as the use of 
action verbs that have a direct relationship with the body and senses, which the 
researcher calls ‘sensorimotor verbs’ in this thesis. These verbs have the highest 
cognitive perception among the texts, such as “Open your eyes.” The researcher 
discussed these verbs on the basis of their causing the act of looking, the 
determinate transcendence, consciousness of the act, somatic empathy, and 
internal movement. They serve to intensify the somatic resonance and can be 
seen to create direct intensified effects on the viewer who is experiencing this 
with the character the whole time. 
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When the ‘sensorimotor verbs’ are used as a title of the film, e.g., Hold your 
Breath, they serve in both ‘preparing’ and ‘transferring into a situation’ to the 
viewer. They start to embody the viewer from the beginning to create a conscious 
action that is practiced unconsciously over duration of the film as a reflection of 
the empathy with the character. 
Numbers or the act or counting are regarded as a special case of text that can 
energize the atmosphere because of their relationship with time. Their use is very 
common in terror scenes and suggested horror scenes. Moreover, they can be 
applied in the formulation of dread. 
Use of the naming strategy to turn space into place can be regarded as offering 
subtle clues, especially in the case of names of characters because of the 
different cultural backgrounds between the viewers. In addition, the sound of a 
name can create an unconscious sensible quality that, in return, creates a certain 
rhythm of existence that prepares the body to open itself to it, or to shut itself out 
of it. 
In conclusion, text has characteristics for preparation which start consciously and 
increase intentionality and anxious anticipation to force the viewer to interact with 
the screen and sympathize with the character. Once the text transfers the viewer 
into a situation, which happens unconsciously, it physically embodies the body 
and intensifies the experience of the dread atmosphere while the viewer 
experiences empathy with the character. 
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Chapter Seven: The Phenomenology of Transparency in 
Film 
7.1 Phenomenology of Transparency 
This chapter presents and extends the second quasi-thing that has been 
concluded from the phenomenal reading in part two of this thesis. 
Buffalo Bill was walking towards Clarice, by using night vision goggles, he was 
given confidence as if he, by blinding her, had deleted all the spatial barriers; 
everything was transparent for him to spot Clarice, and space was under his 
control. On the other hand, it looks as if the total darkness surrounding Clarice 
created walls enclosing her and stopping her from moving forward. This 
observation provokes the concept of transparency to be understood 
phenomenologically as another quasi-thing that has enhanced the dread 
atmosphere in that scene. 
This chapter discusses the phenomenology of personal, spatial and sensorial 
transparency in film and its role in increasing the corporeality of the viewer. In the 
beginning, this section defines transparency as a state and condition with rich 
interpretations in art and contemporary architecture, then it uses its 
characteristics to develop a new situation for film. 
7.1.1 Literal and Phenomenal Transparency 
 Many theorists have observed in architecture that since the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the notion of sight, its technologies and its relation to power 
and control have affected the form of the built environment and its progress. 
Buildings for prisons, factories, and many institutions used transparent 
architecture for the administration of power and control; where prisoners, 
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employees, and workers were to be seen and heard very clearly (Foucault 1995; 
Hancock and Jewkes 2011; Fiddler 2011). Issues of power, control, 
Superimposition, communication and interaction became signals for the modern 
era  that have concerned philosophers such as Guy Debord commenting on The 
Society of Spectacle (1967), and Foucault in his striking contrast with modern 
forms of power in his famous analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon (Foucault 1995; 
Leach 2005). Bentham’s designated transparency through the design of the 
Panopticon as discussed by Foucault is just a matter of a network of power 
relations retaining control through anxiety based upon the surveillance of 
individuals; the prisoners. This has been identified repeatedly as being reflected 
in other modalities in modern architecture such as in some factories (Gerbino 
2012; Lamming et al. 2004; Foucault 1995; Hancock and Jewkes 2011) 
In research, transparency has been used and described as a means for 
experiencing something through something else, which allows for all the layers 
to be detected, by vision, audibly, by touch, by smell and even by taste (Gerbino 
2012; Leach 2005). The concept of transparency has been used by vision 
theorists, such as Kepes (1944), and Gibson (1954), to express the double 
experience. In his Language of Vision, Kepes (1944) interpreted transparency as 
a condition to be discovered in art; when two or more figures are overlapping 
each other, and each one of them claims for itself the common overlapped part, 
the figures are endowed with transparency, which means they are interpenetrated 
without causing the optical destruction of one another. This condition implies 
more than an optical characteristic. It implies a broader spatial order, the 
perception of different locations, and equivalence in the position for the 
overlapped figures; the close one has the same meaning of the further one 
(Kepes 1944) as cited in (Gibson 1954). Beside visual arts, the emphasis on 
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perceiving sounds through other sounds has been shown to have heightened the 
audible transparency such as in the work of the neurobiologist Bergman (1996). 
In terms of touch, transparency has been analyzed by Katz (1925, 1935), where 
it is seen as the means to resolve any conflict that occurs from the visual 
perception of double layers (Krueger 1970).  
The artist Moholy-Nagy in his Vision in Motion points to issues of time and space, 
highlighting the idea that transparency leads subjects to travel though different 
layers of space in a fixed time. Those layers transfer “insignificant singularities 
into meaningful complexities”  (Moholy-Nagy 1947 p.210) because the 
transparent quality of the superimpositions suggests a transparency in the whole 
context that is able to reveal the unnoticed structural qualities in the object 
(Moholy-Nagy 1947). 
Shonfield has argued that the classical notion of depth of field in photography has 
been revitalized by the depth of time enabled by advanced technologies 
(Shonfield 2003), whereby the transparency of technology, and consequently the 
mediation of the natural world through the built environment can be directly linked 
to the occupant’s ability for physical engagement with architecture (Patterson 
2010).  
In the literature of contemporary architecture, transparency has been discussed 
by Rowe and Slutzky (1963) in Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal. They 
argue that transparency is loaded with many possibilities of meaning and 
misunderstanding. Accordingly, they have distinguished between two forms of 
transparency; (i) literal transparency, which is an inherent quality of substance, 
that of being penetrable to air and light, as in a glass curtain wall, and (ii) 
phenomenal transparency, which is an inherent quality of organization; a “result 
of an intellectual imperative, of our inherent demand for that which should be 
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easily detected, perfectly evident, and free of dissimulation” (Rowe and Slutzky 
1963).  
They derived those distinctions from the theories behind cubist paintings and the 
rules whereby literal transparency was defined in cubist representations. 
Whenever transparency applies to the literal rules of cubism (i.e., frontality, 
suppression of depth, contraction of space, definition of light sources, tipping 
forward of objects, restricted palette, and oblique and rectilinear grids), it 
corresponds to the existence of literal transparency. On the other hand, when the 
transparency applies to the intersections, overlapping, interlocking, and building 
up of the composition in  cubist paintings and larger and fluctuating 
configurations, they demonstrate that the rules allow for the creation of the 
typically ambiguous cubist motif which generates the state of transparency (Rowe 
and Slutzky 1963). 
The architectural analogy of material qualities of glass produces literal 
transparency. Rowe and Slutzky  notes that glass is able to create compositions 
of superimposed layers that are produced by the reflctions and accidents of light 
playing upon a surface (Rowe and Slutzky 1963). Spuybroek confirms that such 
a consistency of material generally leads what modernists call transparency, 
since the internal structure is exposed at the exterior, in addition to that, the 
internal structure transforms while being exposed (Spuybroek 2016). 
Rowe and Slutzky illustrate the workshop wing of the Bahaus as an example of 
literal transparency. The visitor can see all the interior while standing outside the 
building because of the glass façade. However, they confirm that Glass does not 
always guarantee transparency. For instance, Le Corbusier’s Villa Stein-de 
Monzie at Garches is an example of phenomenal transparency although it has 
wide windows that permit visual access. Rowe and Slutzky describe, its 
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transparency is not brought about by the windows, but rather by “our being made 
conscious of primary concepts which interpenetrate without optical destruction of 
each other” (Rowe and Slutzky 1963). The villa is divided by five vertical layers 
and four horizontal layers. The researchers define phenomenal transparency in 
this villa according to the fact that the “deep space is constantly oppsosed by the 
inference of shallow space”, the whole experience of the house, after reading all 
those layers according to experience, claim attention “and this gridding of space 
will then result in continuous fluctuations of interpretation” (Rowe and Slutzky 
1963). In short, the user feels the transparency of the layers by experience and 
movement not only by the penetration of their eyes. 
According to the above definitions, the transparent material or object tends to be 
that which is perfectly clear, and becomes ambiguous because of the optical 
destruction and re-composition of space and meaning. Under this reading, this 
research claims that literal transparency can create a surprise for the viewer for 
the first time encountered that lasts for minutes. However, phenomenal 
transparency causes attention that lasts longer than for literal transparency since 
it regards the lived experience that is contributed by movement.  
In film theories, transparency is known as a key concept about the truth and myth 
of what the spectators are watching (Hayward 2013). This chapter contributes to 
film studies by accumulating other definitions and forms of transparency, related 
to phenomenology and the lived body experience. 
Understanding how the body encounters transparent atmospheres becomes a 
critical issue in this research. Accordingly, the question arises as to how 
transparency is reflected in film? How can the viewer grasp the affect of 
transparency both corporeally and consciously? The following section in this 
chapter will seek to understand the phenomenology of transparency; its essence. 
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It will address its affect on the viewer and it will seek to provide a new reading of 
the use of spatial transparency in film.  
7.1.2 Proximity, Accessibility, Touch, and the Kinesthetic Experience 
To understand the phenomenology of transparency; i.e. its essence, it is 
important to focus on what Kepes (1944) stressed in his Language of Vision 
regarding the spatial arrangements and the equivalence of the close and the 
further; whereby the close has the same meaning as the one that is further away 
(Gibson 1954). He focusses on a very significant point, namely, proximity to 
objects behind a transparent surface and the concept of visual accessibility. The 
definitions and applications of transparency discussed above may look different, 
but they are all based on the fact that all the objects, once they are seen, then 
open the opportunity to be accessible, and to be close enough to be reached 
eventually.  
Proximity leads to accessibility; the short distance to the character opens the 
accessibility to him/her. In the context of film it can be argued that proximity works 
at two levels; the level of distance between the characters, which can be tangible 
and intangible, and at the level of filming and framing the characters. 
In film, the tangible distance between the characters is assessed based on 
nearness of the characters and if there is a barrier between them or not. 
Meanwhile, the intangible distance is described in terms of the strengths of the 
relationships amongst the characters. For example, a close relationship, e.g., the 
case of a husband and wife, a boyfriend and girlfriend, cousins, etc., adopts 
accessibility and allows the character to reach to the other. 
In relating proximity, as a motivation for movement, to Heidegger’s (1996) Da-
sein, it has been discussed earlier that movement increases spatiality and 
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increases corporeality which in turn increases the sense of embodiment to be-in-
the-world. According to that, proximity between characters and proximity with the 
viewer foster the presence of the viewer and increase her/his corporeality. 
Consequently, the shooting style and the framing size is highly important so as 
to reflect the relevant distances for the viewer, because, as Metz and Laine argue, 
they have the power to position the viewers by providing them with an imaginary 
vision at the center of the visual field of the photographic image (Metz 1974; Laine 
2006). The various techniques that have been used will be underlined during the 
following discussion of different forms of transparency.  
The short distance between the protagonist and the antagonist raises the 
possibility of touch, and all that matters for the viewer is to keep the two 
characters apart.  
It has been discussed earlier that Laine (2006) considers the fear of touch as the 
main factor that awakens the skin of the spectator, in which she considers skin 
as a medium of intersubjective connection that is able to create the affective 
engagement with the screen because it forms the structure of haptic perception 
that represents a mode of bodily consciousness (Laine 2006). But how can this 
proximity and its possible touch improve the corporeal consciousness? 
7.1.3 Transparency as a Kinesthetic Experience 
Proximity and accessibility are aspects of transparency, they both lead 
ultimately to touch. This section will clarify how proximity, leading to touch, can 
be a kinesthetic experience that ends with a corporeal consciousness 
experience. 
The viewer experiences the kinesthetic experience of movement in dread 
through two main ways, the first one is the actual movement of the antagonist, 
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especially when he de-distances and directions himself towards the protagonist. 
The second movement is created by fear, the fear of the atmosphere, or the fear 
for the characters. However, both experiences are able to create a kinesthetic 
and corporeal experience to increase the embodiment of the viewer. To 
understand both means’ relation to the kinesthetic experience and corporeality, it 
is important to recall the phenomenology of movement that concerned Sheets-
Johnstone (2011) who has drawn upon the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, 
and relate it to the expansive Away!-tendency of Schmitz discussed by Hanich 
(2010).  
Movement itself, according to Sheets-Johnstone (2011), is the source of the 
senses in space and time. When the antagonist physically moves towards the 
protagonist, the viewer produces a tensional quality of movement because of the 
effort produced internally to stop, or delay, the antagonist from touching the 
protagonist, especially when the proximity is shot from a first-point perspective as 
in the Silence of the Lambs. Here, the desire to stop Gumb/Buffalo Bill triggers 
the body to add force and an intellectual effort to push, stop, or remove that touch. 
Not only his movement, but also his pause, expresses an effort for the viewer in 
stillness building the anticipation to move. This tensional quality can be better 
described as a heavy movement produced by the synaesthetic experience of the 
subject. The effort produced awakens kinetic energy and stimuli to move, 
physically, as in holding a breath or in stillness, or visually, by focusing on the 
screen. The effort then provokes the senses and heightens them in a way that 
extends time and makes that moment count to produce transcendental 
subjectivity. The subject then turns its attention to the body itself to feel its 
locomotion, and accordingly, the experience becomes corporeal and conscious.  
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Laine argues that touch is the motivation behind fear and that fear is the 
moving force of the dreadful, which is experienced as touch to which “our skin 
responds and starts to crawl” (Laine 2006). Fear, as has been discussed earlier 
by Hanich and Schmitz, is characterized by expansive Away!-tendency; it enters 
the felt-body, which is the absolute phenomenological location, to experience 
constriction in the moments of fear, the body tries then to escape the skin, but it 
cannot, accordingly tension is produced (Hanich 2010; Schmitz et al. 2011). This 
in turn, will create an amplitudinal aspect of the kinesthetic experience, a felt 
contractiveness, and a spatial contractiveness of the body of the subject. 
According to that, the fear of touch, and the experience of touch that starts to 
crawl in addition to the expansive Away!-tendency to escape the skin, is a very 
affective engagement that increases the corporeality and the consciousness, 
which in turn increases the embodiment.  
According to that, transparency that is fed by proximity and touch can create a 
corporeal atmospheric affection produced kinesthetically by the muscles and 
skin, and synaesthetically by the contraction of the felt-body according to closing 
the absolute space. 
The engagement of the spectator with the character is necessary to build the 
kinesthetic experience above which leads eventually to a corporeal experience. 
In order to be embodied, the spectator has to feel for or feel with the characters; 
sympathy and empathy are two forms of engagement that have been discussed 
in part one.  
By understanding the concept of transparency spatially in art and architecture, 
the concept of proximity and its relation to the roles of accessibility and touch in 
developing the kinesthetic experience, and then relating to Hanich and Smiths 
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understanding the relationship between the spectator and the character from the 
perspectives of sympathy and empathy helps this research to distinguish three 
forms of transparency for the purposes of this study that can be found altogether 
or separately in thrillers in general or in dread in specific, these are; ‘personal 
transparency’, ‘substance transparency’, and ‘sensorial transparency’. These 
three concepts will be set out here and illustrated in the context of the case study 
of the Silence of the Lambs and similar thriller films. 
7.2 Personal Transparency  
‘Personal transparency’ is an intangible form of transparency that stems 
from the close relationship between the protagonist and the antagonist, e.g., a 
husband as in Sleeping with the Enemy (Ruben 1991), a boyfriend as in Hush 
(Mike 2016), or a family friend as in The Glass House (Sackheim 2001), and Wait 
until Dark (Young 1967). The close relationship leads to physical proximity in the 
body and mind, which makes the antagonist capable of identifying the weak 
points in the protagonist. 
An unexpected and unanticipated disruptive outcome of a scene, such as through 
‘personal transparency’, is responsible for creating surprise for the viewer. 
Although the study of emotional impact is not within the scope of this study, it is 
worth briefly touching upon the notion of aesthetic strategies, because they will 
affect the creation of a dread atmosphere.  
According to Hanich (2010), the aesthetic strategies such as surprise, shock, and 
attention,  aim to produce emotions of the same name, as a decision made at the 
film level, to affect the viewer and evoke her/his emotions. Mølbak (2012) 
considers those aesthetics in increasing the relationship between the subject and 
the object in creating the event by creating the experience that the subject 
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undergoes not has (Mølbak 2012). In addition to that, those aesthetics have the 
ability to produce productive ambiguity and uncertainty to energize the 
atmosphere, as Labelle (2011) notes, and accordingly, relating to Merleau-Ponty, 
the uncertainty and ambiguity  increase the sense of existence since they lead to 
the final stage of existence; the transcendence stage. 
Surprise, according to Hanich (2010), is not a type of fear since the viewer does 
not in every case of surprise respond to something threatening by comparing it 
with the shock and attention. Accordingly, this form of transparency; ‘personal 
transparency’, can enrich the suggested horror prototype of fear, discussed by 
Hanich (2010), more than dread.   
The nature of ‘personal transparency’ and its relation to the characters, demands 
that one can consider it more in terms of  psychoanalysis than of phenomenology. 
Accordingly, this area of research is outside the scope of this thesis, but, as Van 
Manen argues, phenomenology opens up a new possibility for creative relations 
between subjects and objects in other fields (van Manen 2007). Therefore, this 
finding opens the opportunity for further research concerning ‘personal 
transparency’ in psychoanalysis. 
7.3 Substance Transparency 
‘Substance transparency’ in film is probably the closest form of 
transparency to the  concept of literal transparency, as discussed by Rowe and 
Slutzky (1963), where the protagonist and antagonist exist in the same space but 
are separated by a transparent obstacle that allows them to see, hear, smell, and, 
sometimes, touch each other. The material condition is what controls this form of 
transparency, such as a glass wall, window, door, or any partition that is 
penetrable by air and light such as a jail’s bars. ‘Substance transparency’ can 
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also be attached to objects, not only to transparent walls. The key point in this 
form of transparency is that both of the characters realize sensing each other and 
communicate. Therefore, its engagement with the viewer may create more 
sympathy than empathy, depending on the way that the film is shot.  
In The Silence of the Lambs (Jonathan 1991), there were two special scenes that 
express ‘substance transparency’, both associated with the meeting of Clarice 
with Dr. Lecter. The first scene is the one showing Clarice passing through five 
gates to reach the cell of Dr. Lecter, (Figure 7-1). All the way down, the FBI agents 
and the officers warn Clarice against being touched by Dr. Lecter; “don’t go near 
the glass!” All the cells have literal transparency where sight, sound, touch, and 
smell are possible. Clarice walks closer to the wall to avoid being touched by the 
prisoners. Dr. Lecter’s cell is made of clear glass with small holes at the head 
level and the glass wall serves to superimpose all the layers behind to let Clarice 
see him and see his paintings, bed, sink, etc.  
 
  
  
Figure 7-1: Dr. Lecture’s Cell, ‘Substance transparency’  
Source: DVD  (Demme Jonathan 1991) 
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The first shots are filmed as medium shots with the over the shoulder technique 
for both of the characters until Dr. Lecter asks Clarice to show her ID, and asks 
her to come closer to be seen, in a first point of view in close-up as if they are 
close to each other. Even after she had sat down, she could still see him in close 
up, but he was only able to see her in medium close up shot. The more he talks 
to her, the tighter they are placed in the frame as if he is reaching her body by 
knowing more about her; Clarice says: “You see a lot Dr.” and that comes after 
both of them are in close-up shots while he talks about her father. The shots are 
reflections of their proximity, not spatially, but in terms of how he sees her; once 
he knows everything about her, she becomes closer, touchable, and vulnerable, 
but the glass wall she is kept behind reassures the viewer and the character. 
Drawing upon Murray (1994) in sympathy, the close-up shots with clear glass 
separation place the viewer in a close relation with Clarice that embraces both 
spatial attachment and subjective access to feel for her; sympathy is what the 
viewer relates in this scene, specifically, fear for Clarice that she should be 
touched by Dr. Lecter or by the other prisoners. 
The other scene that applies ‘substance transparency’ is when Clarice visits Dr. 
Lecter in the hall, where he sits inside a cubical cage (Figure 7-2). Although 
Clarice was not physically close to him, she was shot in close-ups and extreme 
close-up as if there were no bars separating them; the more he talks to her, the 
tighter she appears in the frame. Close-up shots in film give the proximity of body, 
mind, and thought; Dr. Lecter broke her aura and became closer. This penetrated 
the barrier between them and opened the opportunity for Clarice to be touched 
by him, and that actually happened later when she took her case file and Dr. 
Lecter touches her finger.  
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Figure 7-2: Touching Clarice via the cubical cage, ‘Substance transparency’ 
Source: DVD  (Demme Jonathan 1991) 
The phenomenal proximity which is produced by the close-up shots and which 
breaks the aura of the character is a very successful way to approach greater 
spatial alignment and the subjective access which serve to increase alignment 
and allegiance sympathy.  
‘Substance transparency’ is not only attached to architectural decisions such as  
the placement of partitions and walls, but also to other elements that are 
connected to characters as in the case of the Sleeping with the Enemy (Ruben 
1991) where the husband’s attendance (Martin Burney) is connected to objects 
such as the well-organized towels in the bathroom and cans in the kitchen. As 
has been discussed above, the critical issue in this form of transparency is that 
both characters recognize that they are set within in the same space.  
Hush (Mike 2016) is about Maddie, a deaf writer who lives alone in the woods. 
She is the girlfriend of the killer and she faces him from behind a glass door all 
the time. This film is another dense film that applies transparency at three levels: 
(i) the level of ‘personal transparency’ because the antagonist (the man) is the 
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protagonist’s (Maddie’s) boyfriend; (ii) the level of ‘substance transparency’ 
because of the separation of the characters by, and their communication through, 
a glass door; (iii) and the level of ‘sensorial transparency’, which is the third form 
of transparency that will be discussed soon. Most of the events happen beyond 
the glass door; meeting him, seeing him killing people, cutting the phone and 
network cables, and creating a hole in the tires of her car. She sees him 
disconnecting her from the world. From its beginning, the scene behind the glass 
door increases the sympathy for the viewer, especially because Maddie is a deaf 
woman; the viewer feels for her, but there is a kind of perceived assurance once 
he cannot touch her thanks to the glass door and wall which will keep him away. 
Everything is transparent to him. He could see, smell, hear, and touch.  
The first time Maddie meets the masked-man, she runs to the doors and windows 
to shut them; the first moment they meet behind the glass was shocking for the 
viewers, reflecting and mimicking the shock of Maddie, that was built upon their 
sympathy and worrying about her. 
Considering Hanich’s (2010) perspective on terror, ‘substance transparency’ can 
best be used to connote terror rather than dread. The nature of terror is hectic, 
loud, and fast and it demands running, escaping from danger since the threat’s 
nature is known (Hanich 2010). The nature of terror and the time spent in that 
event can be described as shock. As an aesthetic strategy, the psychological 
shock bursts into the scene suddenly and lasts only briefly, and the moment of 
shock is rooted in the present. It does not include any thoughts or anticipations 
of the future as in the formulation of a dread atmosphere (Hanich 2010). In this 
regard, Hanich (2010) considers shock produces more of fear than of surprise 
although both aesthetics share “unexpectedness as a characteristic of their 
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intentional object”, because not every type of surprise is fearful, but a moment of 
shock makes the viewer frightened, even if only briefly.  
An interesting study testing the role of transparent walls in their capacity to 
increase feelings of shock, anxiety, and fear has been conducted by Hagenbuch, 
Feldon, and Yee (2006) and Albrechet-Souza et al. (2005) using the elevated 
plus maze test. The Elevated Plus Maze (EPM) is one of the most widely 
employed tools for the behavioral screening of anxiety. In this test, a rat or a 
mouse is placed in a transparent elevated maze consisting of two opposing open 
arms and two opposing enclosed arms. Then, behavior of the rat or mouse is 
compared to its behavior in another elevated plus maze assembly equipped with 
opaque walls made from black foil. In general, the mice tended to stay longer in 
the open arms of the transparent EPM than in those of the opaque EPM, and the 
test showed that they were less active. Accordingly, the researchers concluded 
that transparent walls will be more suited to assess manipulations expected to be 
anxious, while an EPM with opaque walls will be suitable for manipulations with 
potential anxiety (Albrechet-Souza et al. 2005; Hagenbuch, Feldon, and Yee 
2006). In these experiments, both groups of researchers described the induced 
anxiety which the mice felt, but they didn’t define a reason behind it. Here it is 
suggested that one can apply what happens in the scenes of terror, where shock 
is induced first, followed by anxiety and sympathy for the viewer.  
‘Substance transparency’ can be calm but therefore also full of anxiety as in The 
Silence of the Lambs which fits with the suggested horror category defined by 
Hanich (2010). In addition, it can be fast and hectic as in Hush for a terror scene. 
In both examples, the aligned and allegiance sympathy are the form of 
engagement between the viewer and the screen after being shocked. Shock is 
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the aesthetic strategy that is used in this form of transparency to feed the 
sympathy of the viewer. 
7.4 Sensorial Transparency  
This form of transparency can be seen as the closest to the notion of 
phenomenal transparency discussed by Rowe and Slutzky (1963), whereby 
intersections of layers are responsible for creating transparency. In film, it 
corresponds to a temporary or permanent loss of a sense, which makes the 
character reachable and touchable because of that missing sense. This form of 
transparency can be the more intense form of transparency since the character 
does not realize the threat. This raises attention and it takes longer to make it 
suitable for creating an atmosphere of dread. It is related to losing all senses but 
that of touch, where touch is understood to be the reason behind fear and the 
reason for a sense of corporeality.  
7.4.1 The Sense of Touch and Corporeality 
“Sense experience is the vital communication with the world which makes 
it present as a familiar setting of our life” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.61).  
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty investigates the existence 
of a person’s body that refers to the sense experience. Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
considers ears and eyes as instruments of bodily excitation only and not of 
perception because they cannot ensure any cognitive power for the notion of 
perception. So, one’s eyes see and her/his hand touches but those senses alone 
do not put the subject into the world of experience. He argues that what matters 
in understanding the nature of perception is reading its structure; both the 
structure of the object and the consciousness of the subject (Merleau-Ponty 
2002).  
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The sensory experience can be described as both synthetic and haptic in that it 
creates the required perception in terms of dread. As a synthetic experience it 
speaks directly to all senses at the same time at primary level, a sense experience 
that precedes its division among other senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Afterwards, 
and as another stage, Merleau-Ponty argues that the subject can distinguish 
which sense it talks to. The cooperation among the senses is necessary for 
perception. Many recent studies (e.g., Marks (2000)) emphasize that one sense 
modality may respond to information normally used for another sense modality. 
This is called Synesthesia, that is, “the perception of one sensation by another 
modality, such as the ability to distinguish colors by feel,” the yellow color, for 
example, is associated with male procreative power and with the merry melody 
of the flute (Marks 2000 p.213). 
Synesthesia alters to deliver a corporeal knowledge and contributes to the 
development of a corporeal experience because the senses intercommunicate 
by opening to the structure of the thing itself to capture the sensible significance, 
e.g., to see the hardness of the glass or the softness of the wool (Merleau-Ponty 
2002 p.267). According to Laine, this creates a haptic perception, which is a mode 
of seeing through all modes located on skin, and a mode of bodily consciousness 
and corporeality where the body perceives and feels (Laine 2006). 
Merleau-Ponty argued that the body can be seen as a ready-made system of 
equivalents offering transposition from one sense to another. The senses 
translate each other without an interpreter and are comprehensible without the 
intervention of an idea (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Accordingly, one understands that 
her/his eyes see, her/his ears hear, and her/his hands touch, but that she/he as 
a subject perceives. The senses are not separable but they transform the 
perception from a form to another. They may transfer it visually or audibly, or in 
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the form of odor or a tactile signal or message. Since touch is the last thing that 
can be lost, it is the sense that extends the area of synaesthetic perception and 
feeds the corporeal experience and consciousness. In terms of ‘sensorial 
transparency’, the antagonist encounters the protagonist in the same space 
without physical barriers and the possibility of touch is high, because of losing 
one sense or more. 
7.4.2 Examples 
In the selected scene, in part two, in the Silence of the Lambs (Demme Jonathan 
1991), Buffalo Bill cuts the power off to blind Clarice when she reaches the corpse 
in the bathroom. She loses her sight in an unknown world, and he controls both 
darkness and power to navigate the space physically by wearing night detective 
goggles, and psychically because he owns that place. This scene is shot from the 
killer’s point of view where the viewer sees Clarice and recognizes what is 
happening to her and how close to her Buffalo Bill is. The shots become tighter 
moving from medium shots, to medium close-up, to close-up in order to reflect 
the proximity of Buffalo Bill. As a result of shooting this scene from a first point 
perspective, Laine (2006) describes it as the viewer stepping into Buffalo Bill’s 
skin to experience his spatiality and proximity to Clarice. 
   
  
 
Figure 7-3: Sight transparency. Source: DVD  (Demme Jonathan 1991) 
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In this scene, Buffalo Bill is physically with Clarice, but losing her sight prevents 
her from spotting him in order to run or to escape. All the space becomes 
transparent for Buffalo Bill enabling him to spot her first and then to touch her. 
Sight for Clarice is transformed into sound and touch. All the other senses but 
sight are employed to break the transparency and to build a barrier between her 
and Buffalo Bill such as the click of the gun that breaks the transparency enabling 
her to spot him. 
The viewer knows more than Clarice of how close Buffalo Bill is. This produces 
aligned and allegiance sympathy, but because of the way it is shot, inside his 
skin, and being saturated with her breathing, the viewer experiences both 
imaginative and somatic empathy. The viewer experiences imaginative empathy 
because she/he realizes the proximity of Buffalo Bill to Clarice and because he is 
about to touch her, especially when Buffalo Bill puts his arm in front of the frame, 
trying to touch her shoulders and face. Meanwhile, the viewer experiences 
somatic empathy because she/he is saturated with her breathing covered by the 
silence of the atmosphere, where the viewer mimics the muscular actions of 
Clarice. It was a very corporeal and very intense scene to live with because of 
the proximity of Buffalo Bill, whom the viewer lives inside, and for Clarice, where 
there is an intellectual effort from the viewer to stop Buffalo Bill from touching her. 
According to Schmitz’s New-Phenomenology, the fear of the current situation 
works on creating constriction in addition to the expansive Away!-Tendency. The 
viewer, as Hanich explains, cannot escape the absolute location i.e. “the lived-
body’s phenomenological Here”, and what s/he is trying to do is to escape its 
skin, “by expanding Away somewhere, but cannot flee the lived-body’s 
constriction”, and this produces a tension between constriction and attempted 
expansion that feeds the experience of the viewer (Hanich 2010 p.103). 
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Two other key examples of ‘sight transparency’ are found in the films Don’t 
Breathe (Fede 2016) and Wait until Dark (Young 1967). Don’t Breathe is a film 
about some burglars who are trying to steal money from a blind soldier who lives 
alone with his dog. In the beginning of the film, all the barriers are transparent to 
the burglars since the soldier is blind. The only action required from the blind man 
was an audible click to break this transparency, and the only action required from 
the burglars was not to breathe so as to maintain the transparency for them. Once 
the blind soldier cuts the power off, the burglars become blind and he regains full 
sight because he knows the place. The burglars need touch and sound signals 
from him to help guide them to survive, but for him, only a sound was enough. In 
darkness, once the silence is broken, touch is the only way to get out. The 
shooting style in this scene was very different from that in The Silence of the 
Lambs. In Don’t Breathe, there is no optical point of view, and it is shot from a 
third person perspective which results into more sympathy than empathy. One 
can assume that more sympathy is intended because the viewer knows more 
than the characters do about where the blind soldier is standing. Meanwhile, 
empathy is clearly also intended, this can be seen in the mimicry of the characters 
in holding their breath, which forms a somatic empathy and increases the sense 
of corporeality for the viewers in that moment. 
In Wait until Dark, the protagonist (Susy Hendrix), who is a blind woman, faces 
an interpreter in her house. She removes all the light bulbs from the house to 
black it out, forgetting to remove the bulb in the fridge. In that scene, she threatens 
the antagonist who is fully-covered with gasoline by holding a lit match. She asks 
him to keep tapping threatening to throw the match at him if he stops. The whole 
screen is dark and the viewer lives in darkness too as Susy only hears the tapping 
from the intruder. The tap in the scene, with the darkness used in a haptic way, 
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reflects what Marks (2000) calls a haptic sound. A term used to refer to the sound 
which is experienced and internalized (Marks 2000), suggesting closeness of the 
intruder for the viewer. Once the tapping has stopped and it is still dark, silence 
increases the sense of fear. Then, the door of the fridge is opened and 
transparency is created again! Now Suzy can be located and she can be touched 
easily. Sympathy and empathy are both experienced in this scene; in light, 
sympathy prevails since the viewer knows more than her, and in darkness, 
empathy is induced, and probably the imaginative empathy only dominates where 
the viewer goes through the same experience as Suzy. 
In Hush (Mike 2016), Maddie is a deaf, not blind, woman, and she is the girlfriend 
of the killer and she faces him from behind a glass door all the time. The film is 
dense in terms of the use of transparency due to the fact that it applies modes of 
‘personal transparency’, ‘substance transparency’, and ‘sensorial transparency’ 
because of Maddie’s loss of the sense of hearing. In the dread scene at 1:21:44, 
she is alone in the bathroom sitting and waiting for her boyfriend to come through 
the door and fight. Silence covers the atmosphere making the viewer as deaf as 
her. Then, the viewer sees her boyfriend coming from the ceiling; he breaks the 
ceiling and reaches towards her. Now the viewer is sitting behind her, through the 
boyfriend’s optical point of view, the viewer sees her closer as he is about to touch 
her. She does not feel him, but once he laughs and sighs (in sarcasm) his 
exhalation breaks the transparency and enables her to locate him. In this scene, 
the duality of sympathy and empathy increase the corporeality of the viewer; 
sympathy occurs when the sound breaks and when the viewer realizes the 
proximity of the killer to the protagonist. Meanwhile, empathy occurs when the 
viewer experiences the deafness of Suzy; it was a sensation empathy (feeling 
with her exhalation) and an example of affective mimicry (anticipating that the 
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worst is coming). In another scene, she works on robbing him of the sense of 
hearing by starting the fire alarm, which is so loud that he could not tolerate it. In 
that moment, she reaches to him through his hearing as a form of transparency. 
The use of ‘sensorial transparency’ feeds the fear of the viewer because the 
barrier between the heroine and the antagonist is removed and the possibility of 
physical touch is very high, which will increase the sense of corporeality for the 
viewer. This, in turn, feeds the sense of sympathy, especially when the character 
does not know that she is in the same space as the antagonist. It also feeds the 
sense of somatic and imaginative empathy according to the way in which it is shot 
because of the realisation of proximity and the high potential for her to be 
touched. ‘sensorial transparency’ is the transparency that fits with the formulation 
of dread the most. It emerges gradually and can go on for a considerable period 
of time. In addition, it creates both sympathy and empathy and, above all, it raises 
attention. 
7.4.3 Attention 
We may say that whatever attracts our attention… surely becomes more 
vivid and more clear in our consciousness. This doesn’t mean that it becomes 
more intense. A faint light to which we turn our attention does not become the 
strong light of an incandescent lamp. No, it remains the faint, just perceptible 
streak of lightness, but it has more impressive, more distinct, more clear in its 
details, more vivid… it has come to our consciousness. 
(Sobchack 1990 p.28) 
Attention is described as a lived body movement that does not involve movement 
through space (Sobchack 1990). For Merleau-Ponty, it is a “consciousness in the 
act of learning”, that is, a creative act in terms of the subject’s relationship to the 
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world. He argues that “attention […] as a general and formal activity, does not 
exist. There is in each case a certain liberty to be acquired, and a certain mental 
space to make the most of. There is literally a question of creation” (Merleau-
Ponty 2002 p.28). According to that notion, ‘sensorial transparency’ can be 
viewed as a creative and transformational activity of consciousness because it 
articulates the senses that were otherwise absent and presents them as new 
formed objects. Furthermore, it creates a distinct experience because it is lived 
in silence with the character, mixing between empathy and sympathy. Sobchack 
(1990) has drawn upon Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) concept of attention and found 
that the optical movement in cinema such as the zoom, track-in, and track-out, is 
what brings this active and constitutive function of attention into focus; it 
transforms the visual field and the objects within it to create a new figure-ground 
relation between the subject and the object. Originally, this has been noted by 
Munsterberg (1970) who pointed out how the close-up functions to make these 
features of perception visible. 
Munsterberd (1970) considers the optical active movements for attention such as 
close-up, zoom, and rack focus, which all are used to intensify the object and 
make it more vivid and center it in the spectator’s consciousness of the film 
(Münsterberg 1970). A missing sense provokes the optical movement to use 
special optical point of view to intensify it and make it more vivid, and the fear of 
touch is the motivation behind this.  
What is interesting in shooting the transparent shots of scenes using close-ups, 
medium close-ups, and a first person perspective, or what Hitchcock calls 
subjective treatment, is that it leads to mimesis, which, as Marks describes it, 
shifts the hierarchal relationship between the subject and the object in such a way 
as to dissolve between the two and by which “the subject comes into being, not 
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through abstraction from the world, but through compassionate involvement in it” 
(Marks 2000 p.141). Accordingly, this action feeds the somatic empathy. 
Comparing the concept of attention to that of surprise or shock, neither of which 
can be viewed creative acts in that they stop the subject from thinking, it can be 
argued that attention is, by contrast, a creative act because it transforms the 
mental field, and when it comes to senses and the prospect of losing a sense, it 
motivates the mimesis and then penetrates the skin and the sense itself to be 
considered and felt, that is, to be more corporeal and conscious. 
7.5 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, the concept of transparency is presented as a state that 
allows close visual accessibility to an object. In film, transparency has been 
demonstrated to act as an element that allows for accessibility of the body and/or 
mind to reach the characters eventually by touch. 
The key for increasing the sense of the viewer’s embodiment here is to create a 
corporeal lived experience with the character, full of empathy in its forms; somatic 
and/or imaginative, and sympathy in the form of alignment with its interlocking 
functions, i.e., spatial attachment and subjective access and the allegiance 
sympathy. This has been demonstrated through a series of illustrated examples. 
Proximity is shown to be both a consequence of transparency and its motivation. 
Heidegger’s Da-sein explains the way the subject can be seen to be in-the-world; 
that movement by the characters and movement of the camera are capable to 
pull or push the viewer to be also in-the-world. In addition, according to the 
phenomenology of movement discussed by Sheets-Johnstone (2011), the 
movement of the characters and the style of shooting can also create tensional, 
projectional, and amplitudinal qualities of movement for the viewer to induce an 
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internal movement that is responsible for stimulating senses of corporeality and 
embodiment. According to that, one considers transparency as a corporeal 
atmospheric affection produced kinesthetically by the muscles and skin, and 
synaesthetically by the contraction of the felt-body. 
Reading the concept of transparency through Rowe and Slutzky’s definitions 
(1963) in terms of art and architecture helped this research describe the use of 
transparency in film from different perspectives. This research then identified 
three forms of transparency; ‘personal transparency’, ‘substance transparency’, 
and ‘sensorial transparency’. Whereas one or all of these transparency forms can 
be found in thrillers in general, this chapter concludes that ‘sensorial 
transparency’ is the form of transparency used the most in the creation of dread 
scenes.  
‘Personal transparency’ is defined here as a phenomenal transparency which 
stems from the close relationship that is established between the protagonist and 
the antagonist, where the latter can reach to the former because of knowing her 
or his weak points. This form of transparency can be best found in the suggested 
horror prototype of Hanich (2010). The aesthetic strategy of this transparency is 
to create surprise for the viewer that develops sympathy with the character. This 
form of transparency does not follow the concept of phenomenology as a process 
for creating embodiment. In view of this, the current research does not discuss 
the issue in detail but the observation highlights the opportunity for future 
research in the field of psychoanalysis. 
Here, the concept of ‘substance transparency’, which is been seen to fit terror 
and horror scenes more than dread scenes, is shown to be very close to the 
architectural notion of literal transparency, whereby a penetrable barrier (e.g., a 
glass wall) separates the characters, thus allowing for penetration of all the 
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senses except touch. This form of transparency is characterized by the fact that 
it allows both characters to perceive and recognize each other. Accordingly, the 
viewer, much like the characters, knows the positions and actions of each one of 
them. Shock is the aesthetic strategy that can be experienced in this form, and, 
as a type of fear, psychological shock bursts into the scene suddenly and lasts 
only briefly. However, the feeling turns into anxiety after the shock is experienced 
putting the viewer in the state of pure sympathy with the character. 
It has been demonstrated here that ‘sensorial transparency’ is the form of 
transparency fitting the emulation of dread the most. It is based on the concept 
that one character only controls the space and that the space for her/him is 
transparent, which in turn enables her/him to locate the other character(s) easily 
because of missing one sense or more. In such a case, the most thrilling 
experience for one of the characters is that both characters exist in the same 
space without separating barriers. This form of transparency can be very intense 
according to its style of shooting, which, most of the time, using the first point 
view perspective and close-up shots, which, as a consequence, raises the 
attention of the viewer. The possibility of touch in this form of transparency is 
high, and it is shot in a way when puts the viewer in the position of the antagonist 
most of the time. In addition to sympathy, somatic and imaginative empathy are 
shown to be the engagement form that can be created in this form, and this will 
feed the cultivation of a sense of fear, internal body movement, kinesthetic 
experience, consciousness, and, accordingly, a corporeal consciousness. 
According to Hanich (2010), dread provides the quality of spatial immersion, 
temporal immersion, and emotional immersion. This form of transparency is 
shown here to feed the three forms of immersion, which it is argued makes it the 
optimal form of transparency to be used in the creation of dread scenes. The 
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collaboration of senses is shown to be significant in this form of transparency 
because the perception that is needed from the viewer is a haptic perception, one 
where the viewer perceives and feels himself or herself to be under the aura of 
consciousness at the same time.   
As Marks has noted, the “sensorium is formed by the culture” it is grown in (Marks 
2000 p.203), therefore, it is not possible to guarantee an equivocal response from 
the viewer, especially for the senses of smell and taste. This leaves sight, sound, 
and touch to be the universal senses that the film experience can build on. 
Besides sight as the main sense of engagement, sound is shown here to have 
an intermodal influence. Synesthesia is shown to others the possibility of a 
corporeal knowledge and, eventually, to make a corporeal experience. Moreover, 
silence, much like sound, is shown to be used to elaborate on the filmic 
experience in order to reveal greater tension. Touch is shown to be the 
destination in any scene in thriller films as it increases the haptic experience of 
anticipation. The increased potential for touch is demonstrated to relate to an 
increase in kinesthetic consciousness, which eventually also increases the 
potential for a sense of corporeality.  
Finally, through reading these three forms of transparency, it is shown to 
be possible to combine them to create an ‘Intensified Transparency’ which is 
shown in the case of the dread scene in Hush. This is formed to demonstrate all 
three forms of transparency and as a result to create the ability to embody the 
viewer corporeally.
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Chapter Eight: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film 
 This Chapter describes and explores another quasi-thing extracted from 
the phenomenal reading in part two; Surveillance. 
Surveillance was observed in the selected scene of the Silence of the Lambs in 
various forms. First, it appeared when Buffalo Bill blinded Clarice by cutting the 
power off and then used his night vision goggles to watch her and try to touch 
her. Second, the concept of surveillance was induced by the spatial configuration 
of the basement; a labyrinth-like arrangement controlled by Buffalo Bill to entrap 
Clarice. This reading of the scenes helps the research in developing an 
understanding of the phenomenon of surveillance and examining its effect on 
corporeality of the viewer.  
This section starts with tracing the theoretical framework around surveillance to 
track its development as a concept in different fields, then it opens possibilities 
for an understanding of different notions of seeing and looking according to a 
range of theorists in different fields including film. After that, the chapter describes 
the essence of surveillance in order to relate it to the logic of body existence that 
has been discussed by Merleau-Ponty (2002), to create ‘docile-body-viewers’. 
Following this, the chapter explores new panoptical forms of surveillance in dread 
spaces through a horizontal reading of relevant scenes drawn from different 
thriller films. 
8.1 Theorizing Surveillance 
 The concept of surveillance was developed in the late eighteenth century 
but it was not a key theoretical focus until 1970s when many theorists proposed 
and suggested new modes of surveillance as a means to explore concepts of 
power and control. Early social scientists mapped the field of surveillance drawing 
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attention for modernist disciplines and their preoccupation with watching; the 
necessity to watch others in factories and cities. Examples include Marx (1867) 
who addressed the modern disciplines of capitalist supervision, Simmel (1903) 
for the eye in the urban metropolis, Durkheim (1916) for the disciplinary response 
to growing social inequality , and Weber (1947) for bureaucratic record keeping 
(Lyon 2006). In the post-modern era, the work of Michel Foucault and his 
discussions of Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon in the 19th were the 
most prominent related developments. They stimulated new approaches to 
understanding surveillance and explored and defined new modes of its practice. 
His book, Discipline and Punish- The Birth of the Prison, which was originally 
published in French (1975), was essential to the new debates on surveillance and 
other notions of looking.  
The Panopticon prison architecture plan, produced by Jeremy Bentham, became 
a set piece for Foucault’s work on surveillance despite all the critiques it faced 
(e.g., Bauman 1992; Bogard 1996; Lyon 1993; Mathiesen 1997) as cited in (Lyon 
2006). Evans, Hancock and Jewkes state that Bentham’s influence on the design 
of prisons of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries was noted to have 
extended to other public buildings such as schools and libraries, where 
surveillance was the main strategy placed at the heart of those institutional 
architecture  (Evans 1982; Hancock and Jewkes 2011).  
Foucault maintains that the Panopticon relies entirely on its “investment in its 
visual aspect” (Foucault 1995 p.204). Accordingly, the Panopticon concept still 
appears in surveillance discourse and plays the role of an arbiter in surveillance 
studies. The Panopticon consists of a circular arrangement of cells, all of which 
open onto a central watchtower where it is possible to observe all the prisoners 
all the time. The cells are lit in a way that prevents the occurrence of blind spots 
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in order for them to be seen only through the watchtower. The sidewalls of the 
cells make the prisoners invisible to one another to increase their alienation and 
isolation, the prisoner is “the object of information, never subject to 
communication” (Foucault 1995 p.203; Evans 1982).  
From the viewpoint of Foucault, power was revealed in the Panopticon through 
the architecture which obstructs communication, enhances fragmentation and the 
art of distribution by creating enclosures that are heterogeneous to all others 
whilst being closed in upon themselves to separate them from the others 
(Foucault 1995 p.141). 
Lyon highlights how Foucault understands the Panopticon as an ideal model of 
the surveillance relations involved in modern technologies of penal power (Lyon 
2006). Thus, the function of power that is revealed through visibility aspect 
because a critical of the consideration of spatial arrangement in the modern era. 
The Panopticon creates a rich and complex concept according to the 
interpretation of emphasis; it encapsulates an emphasis on the self-discipline of 
the prisoner and a focus for the different treatment of the sovereign power of 
prisoners. Moreover, it highlights the enlightenment of vision, especially in the 
modern era, as a way to order and control under the complex dialogues of 
watching and being seen. This has been identified behind many schemes from 
urban planning to military intelligence that took different shapes from the 
centralized tower. With the emergence of new vision technologies, and their use 
for security, the concept of surveillance grew into a critical political issue to take 
a different form from the panoptic tower, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
cameras and the phone call center (Lyon 2006). 
 Hancock and Jewkes have revealed ways in which these Victorian concepts can 
be observed as driving later modern buildings such as Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
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Larkin building in 1905 in New York. It was distinguished by its vast enclosed 
space that restricts movement by means of fixed furniture. The space 
represented a medium of discipline and authoritative symbolism because the 
arrangement of the desks, which were also designed by Wright, restricted 
movement as they were attached chairs in a way that has been described to 
ensure a non-sociable, controlled, and bureaucratic labor process (Hancock and 
Jewkes 2011). 
Architects began using new materials in the modern era such as glass, iron, 
concrete, and steel, which enabled translucency and framing and were used in 
clean and neat designs to suit the aesthetics of modernity and to guarantee the 
silent system environment for labor such as the factories of Albert Khan (1869-
1942). The Ford car Glass Factory in Dearborn Michigan, which was designed 
according to the rational principles of standardization and enabled uninterrupted 
mass production through the integration of human and non-human technologies, 
where the order and regulation, in addition to the silent system, were enforced 
(Hancock and Jewkes 2011).  
In the post-Panopticon regime, Webster, Robins and Zuboff highlight that new 
technologies and new political regimes went beyond Foucault to understand the 
contemporary electronic technology under which the arrival of data-surveillance 
creates another form of surveillance (Webster and Robins 1986; Zuboff 1988) as 
cited in (Lyon 2006)3.  
                                            
3 An example of data surveillance is the ‘Permit Book’ which recorded details of each purchase of alcohol 
in Toronto, where a copy was held by the permit holder, another by the vendor, and a third by the Permit 
Department in Toronto, to allow for double control and surveillance for both the vendor and the individual 
(Cartwright 2005). 
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8.1.1 New Notions of Seeing 
 In 1975, the same year that Foucault’s Discipline and Punish was 
published and afterwards, other modes of surveillance were explored with 
different dimensions under the umbrella of psychoanalysis. Notions such as the 
gaze and voyeurism which hold different meanings and have different goals for 
the concept of the look. These definitions carried moral, psychiatric, and political 
connotations in different studies that could include sexual dimension in addition 
to gender roles in looking (Laura Mulvey 1975; Axberg 2011; King 2014; Lindqvist 
and Tishelman 2015). 
The gaze is the exchange of looks that takes place in cinema. It is used in 
psychoanalytic theories when discussing the relationship between the spectator 
and the screen, justified by the concept of the mirror stage. An idea drawn from 
the theories of Freud and Lacan about image mimicry that works at the level of 
the unconscious mind (Hayward 2013). Some theorists such as Christian Metz 
(1975) and Raymond Bellour (1975) discussed this mirroring, but both of them 
focused on the identification of the self with sexual interest and acquisition of 
sexual differences. This debate was taken further by the British feminist Laura 
Mulvey (1975), who wrote an essay Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema 
(1975). Mulvey discussed the gaze between the male and female, drawing upon 
Freud’s (1905) notion of looking and touching. She was one of the first to link the 
look in narrative cinema with the psychoanalytical needs of the spectator, such 
as voyeurism and exhibitionism where the woman is the object and the man is 
the active bearer of the look (Laura Mulvey 1975). In this context, King states that 
the gaze turns the subject into an object which regulate the social behavior (King 
2014). 
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Voyeurism is known as “the act of viewing the activities of other people 
unbeknown to them” (Hayward 2013 p.446). It refers usually to the behavior of 
repeated interest in viewing or observing unsuspecting people with fantasies that 
may or may not include sexual activities (Sadock and Sadock 2007 p.677). It can 
be one of the suitable terms used to describe the way of incorporating the 
spectator in Hitchcock’s films Rear Window (1954) and Psycho (1960). Mulvey 
(1975) considered his gazing across the courtyard in Rear Window as an instance 
of voyeurism. She related his behavior psychoanalytically to sexual motivations 
(Laura Mulvey 1975). However, other theorists conceptualize the voyeurism a 
pure mechanism of filmmaking that aims at serving the natural process of looking. 
For example,  Sharff notes that using long shots to represent the ordinary eyes, 
then using binoculars and photo lenses to make closer shots so as to create a 
shared narrative and distance for the spectator as the actor (Sharff 2000), and 
Shaw confirms that Hitchcock’s interest in the act of looking was a means of 
discovering its capacities and producing a cinematic technique that effectively 
engages the spectator with the character who looks out. His use of purely 
technical methods is his way of exploring this; “Hal Jeffries is everyman, while the 
cinematic screen operates as the panorama of the world stage, and the audience 
members are the role of curious onlookers” (Shaw 2014).  
The gaze and voyeurism theories are only two example theories of 
psychoanalytic background that are relevant to the pleasure and displeasure of 
some narrative films. There are more theories than these two theories, e.g., the 
scopophilic instinct and the ego libido as can be seen in The Surveillance of 
Desire (Henelly Jr. 1998), but the scope of this thesis does not include the 
investigation of the motivations behind the watching, or, as Freud (1905) 
expresses it, aim of looking. The aim of this part of the thesis is rather to 
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understand the phenomenology of surveillance, to open possibilities for different 
panoptical forms that have been used to create dread spaces in thrillers, and to 
find out how these forms increase the embodiment of the viewer. Therefore, the 
other issues which this research sought to examine under Foucault’s panoptical 
concept are how surveillance affects the prisoners and how they experience it. 
Addressing these issues will help in relating surveillance to the viewer since the 
lived body experience is what matters in phenomenology and embodiment. 
8.1.2 Docile Bodies 
 The emerging discourse of Freudian psychoanalysis can be thought of as 
embodying the importance of seeing and being seen in the modern period. 
Foucault (1995) has theorized the relationships among the subject (prisoner), the 
viewer (watch tower), and the panoptic power of spatial relationships in creating 
a situation wherein the subject surrenders herself/himself to the power effect only 
through being conscious of the possibility of being seen (Foucault 1995). The 
panoptic power is the “effect achieved through the realization that one is 
subjected to the gaze.” (Foucault 1995 p.203). Foucault (1995) adds that the 
prisoner experiences a feeling of constant surveillance and, in this sense, 
produces docile subjects:  
 He who is subjected to the field of visibility, and knows it, assumes responsibility 
for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he 
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both 
roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. 
(Foucault 1995 pp.202–203). 
From Foucault’s (1995) point of view, this kind of power and control creates docile 
bodies, i.e., “calculated manipulation” of the body (Foucault 1995 p.202) where  
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[D]iscipline increases the forces of the body and diminishes these forces; it 
dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a 
‘capacity’, which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of 
the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict 
subjection 
 (Foucault 1995 p.138).  
The effect of the look is described by the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1992) in 
terms of alienation. He states that to experience the look is to experience oneself 
as “no longer belonging to oneself but as belonging, as an object, in the project 
of the other” (J-P 1992 p.112). Therefore, it does not matter who watches and 
what is the motivation behind watching. Rather, what matters is the “anxious 
awareness of being observed.” (Foucault 1995 p.117). In her empirical study of  
the Washington State Supermax prison (2004), Lorna Rhodes observed that this 
kind of surveillance creates more than a docile body. She clarifies that the 
disciplinary spaces invite and magnify disorder to create disturbances, not as a 
docile body, but a destructive body that becomes a spectacle, a new self for the 
observer to see a “vision that undermines vision” (Rhodes 2004; Rhodes 1998 
p.287). 
In short, the surveillance, or the panoptic power in this context, manipulates the 
body of the prisoner by dissociating her/his power from her/his body, alienating 
her/his body, or producing disturbed and destructive body. The question is now: 
Can watching someone in a dread scene under surveillance create a ‘docile-
body-viewer’? It is expected that there will be no discipline that concerns the 
viewer, but there will be a mind manipulation of the body of the viewer that can 
affect it, depending on the setting and the mimicry of the image. Consequently, 
this study addresses the three aesthetic strategies that have been discussed 
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previously; namely, shock, surprise, and attention. Each affect the engagement 
of the viewer with the character. Furthermore, this study explores the 
phenomenology of surveillance in an effort to determine how the filmmakers can 
use it to entrap and control the viewer. 
8.2 Phenomenology of Surveillance 
 The previous section sought to provide an overview of theories of 
surveillance and how different philosophers look at it, and to consider how 
prisoners experience being seen the whole time. This part of the research goes 
beyond Foucault’s discussion of the Panopticon and extends it through analyzing 
the phenomenology and essence of surveillance. It is anticipated this process will 
help to find different panoptical forms in film and to determine how they can create 
a panoptic power effect on the viewer. First, a discussion of atmosphere should 
be made in order to discover the nature of surveillance in term of phenomenology.  
Griffero notes that in order to feel atmosphere, the subject has to co-perceive the 
affective corporeal situation pre-categorically according to the setting and 
previous experience, synaesthetically by stimulating the senses, and 
kinesthetically by being positioned internally and externally he/she realizes that 
feeling is here and now (Griffero 2014). The perception of an atmosphere does 
not require recognition of the object in its entirety, but simply to recognize and 
assess the important aspects and the corporeal affections such as perceiving 
how heavy, light, hard, or soft the atmosphere is (Griffero 2014). Hence, the 
constricted atmosphere which Hanich (Hanich 2010) discussed in the context of 
film does not create a dread atmosphere but facilitates and enhances the 
apprehension of dread to make it be perceived here and now. Usually, the 
unfamiliarity of space stimulates the body to make it “reactive to the effusion of 
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sensory affordances” and “actively engages with the things it beholds” (Edensor 
2007 p.229). Therefore, a constricted atmosphere can be a cave, a tunnel, a 
labyrinth, or an endless space (Hanich 2010), or it can be constricted according 
to its properties and characteristics that constricts the felt-body. Benson-Allott 
argues that the space that restricts the power of perception and reveals its limited 
agency gives the feeling of entrapment and claustrophobia accompanied by 
perceptual uncertainty (Benson-Allott 2015). 
In the light of all the previous readings, the atmosphere of surveillance is the then 
seen as combination of the atmospheres of power, control, entrapment, 
claustrophobia, isolation, and alienation. Thus, the phenomenology of 
surveillance will be discussed based on the experiences of ‘power and control’ 
and ‘isolation’.  
8.3 Experience of Power and Control 
 The power and control experience intended by the design of the 
Panopticon is “entrapping rather than liberating” the prisoners (Urrichio 2002, 112 
as cited in (King 2014). In this respect, Merleau-Ponty states that power is 
affected and stabilized in the panopticon because the surveyor is inaccessible 
(as cited in King 2014) and the surveyed person, according to Foucault, is an 
“object of information, never the subject of communication” (Foucault 1995 
p.200).  
Hancock and Jewkes assert that the hyper-organizational institutional  spaces of 
the 19th century have been identified as sharing one common feature: a strictly 
designed and regulated physical environment oriented towards the production of 
appropriate employee behaviors, bodies, and identities  to express their power 
(Hancock and Jewkes 2011). Moreover, the architecture of bureaucracy 
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associated with Weber’s (1947) metaphor of the iron cage counted on a reading 
of hierarchy in human relationships based on particular principles. As a 
consequence, the power and control experience is manifested through ‘Sensorial 
Control’ and ‘spatial Control’. 
8.3.1 Sensorial Control 
 Power partly functions by making people visible. In this regard, Foucault 
states that “visibility is a trap;” it involves a “complex ensemble of practices which 
individualize persons and which constitute those individuals within a field of 
visibility, such that they can be observed and kept under surveillance” (Foucault 
1995 p.117).   
The notion of ‘sensorial control’ focuses on the power of making the subjects 
always accessible by entrapping and interpreting the senses of the surveyed 
personnel in watching and hearing, and sometimes through touching them. This 
can be revealed even through use of some special objects, such as binoculars or 
other tools, or architecturally through the arrangement of space. 
Power that is revealed through both visibility and watching was an issue that has 
been observed in many signs and forms in the modern era. In order to watch the 
prisoners well, architecture supported fragmentation against communication 
between the prisoners by creating individual enclosures to separate them, as in 
the example of the Panopticon (Foucault 1995). The silent system environment 
is the other shape of power and verbal control over the labor in spaces that echo, 
such as in Ford Glass Factory in Dearborn Michigan (Hancock and Jewkes 2011). 
In addition to that, transparent and clear materials (e.g., glass) supported both 
visibility and hearing in these projects and similar ones in the modern era. 
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Dale and Burrell note that certain characteristics such as protection and 
enclosure, positioning, and codification are other architectural actions that make 
surveyed people always accessible to the surveyor (Dale and Burrell 2008), 
which in turn increase the proximity of the surveyor and supports the possibility 
of touching the prisoner as a result of the vulnerable situation he/she is 
experiencing. 
‘Sensorial Control’ is initiated by the surveyor to make the surveyed person 
accessible and vulnerable as the surveyor can see but cannot be seen, can hear 
but cannot be heard, and can touch but cannot be touched, which is enough to 
create a docile body of the prisoner or the labourer under this surveillance 
because she/he is conscious and aware of her/his weakness and vulnerability. 
Although the surveyor may not always be watching or hearing, the occupancy of 
the “watchtower” and the “apparition of a surveyor” are sufficient to secure the 
panoptic effect (Foucault 1995 p.117).  
8.3.2 Spatial Control  
Creating boundaries in space is what guides the movement of the users and 
restrict them as well. As an example of that, Hancock and Jewkes describe the 
fixed furniture in Wright’s Larkin Building as a medium of discipline and 
authoritative symbolism because of the arrangement of the attached desks, which 
restricted movement to ensure a non-sociable, controlled, and bureaucratic labor 
process (Hancock and Jewkes 2011). 
The continuous watching, and hearing, and the potential for touching by the 
surveyor, in addition to the limitations of the movement in space by effect of its 
spatial design, function as a form of power and control. The question emerges as 
how to explore the experience of the surveyed person? 
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8.4 Experience of Isolation 
 The above discussion addressed the phenomenology of surveillance on 
the basis of the power and control of the surveyor. According to Foucault, the 
excessive pressure of control in both of its forms, i.e., the ‘sensorial’ and ‘spatial 
Control’, will create a docile body subject that turns it into a subject of isolation 
and alienation (Foucault 1995 p.203; Evans 1982). Hence, this part of this study 
attempts to develop further insight into the essence of isolation, since ‘isolation’ 
is the situation that usually faces the character in dread atmosphere. 
8.4.1 Sensual Disengagement and Sensual Deprivation 
Hankock and Jewkes have asserted that in the 21st century, the sensual 
disengagement that was completed through the modernist aesthetics of 
grandeur, were achieved by the brutal scale of high-rise architecture that affected 
the skyline (Hancock and Jewkes 2011). Dale and Burell state that these “great 
phantasmagoria in the sky” both asserted power and created a highly-productive 
workforce (Dale and Burrell 2003 p.169). As a consequence, they argue that 
sensual disengagement is produced as a result of the non-synched senses 
and/or the not-fit body in the space that should be in somewhere else. These 
appear similar notions to Jonathan Hill’s sensual gap concept in which there is 
no synchronization between senses or there is a missing sense to engage with 
the object (Hill 2003). Some prisons built in the 19th century featured corridors 
that echo, naked gas light bulbs, and eventually decaying walls as means of 
psychological compression to keep the prisoners away from spatial circulation 
(Fiddler 2009; Hancock and Jewkes 2011). Solomos and Koumparoulis note that 
these compressions work psychologically on the not-fit body and/or the non-
synched senses to increase the pain and deprivation and sense to exhaust the 
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prisoners psychologically and emotionally (Solomos and Koumparoulis 2011). In 
many cases, Hancock and Jewkes argue that the sensual disengagement and 
the power of incarceration depress the senses (e.g., space light and color) so as 
to create a psychological compression to be turned into sensual deprivation 
(Hancock and Jewkes 2011).  
Bowker argues that the physical assaults which occur in these environments are 
themselves an assault on the senses (Bowker 1980). As a torture method, 
sensual deprivation causes the loss of critical capacity, disorientation, 
enfeeblement of resistance, and makes thinking to be less clear. This is what the 
social activist Naomi Klein calls a state of shock, in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise 
of Disaster Capitalism, in which the prisoners cannot think rationally or protect 
themselves. Therefore, they may become vulnerable and eager to make 
confessions and give information (Klein 2010). According to the unfamiliarity of 
dread spaces for the subject and its spatial immersion, one can relate the not-fit 
body and/or the non-synched senses as a characteristic of dread atmosphere 
that can be grasped. This should be recalled when relating to the scene 
description in the Silence of the Lambs. 
8.4.2 Spatial Deprivation 
 Hollier presents the work of George Bataille, who in his writings (1971-
1988) considered the prison as a project, and describing it as a labyrinth because 
of its psychological depression since if the prisoner wants to get out of it, then 
she/he has to close it and close herself/himself inside it. This metaphor came 
from the spatial structure of the labyrinth; “one never knows whether one is being 
expelled or enclosed, a space composed uniquely of openings, where one never 
knows whether they open to the inside or the outside, whether they are for leaving 
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or entering” (Hollier 1993 p.61). Hollier adds that in such a space the categories 
of subjectivity and objectivity do not exist. Thus, the distance looks like proximity 
and the separation looks like the adhesion. Prison, like the labyrinth, is a space 
in which the future is a threatening and un-representable guise of the unknown, 
a state that will induce anxiety (Hollier 1993). The prisoners are then experiencing 
psychological compression that produces sensual deprivation which may lead 
them to a state of shock. They are also experiencing continous anxiety based on 
spatial deprivation. How does this lead to a sense of isolation and alienation? 
8.4.3 Fear  
 Fear is the means that feeds the experience of dread, and it is the reason 
for isolation. Hanich defines fear as an emotion that carries a sense of personal 
phenomenological detachment of feeling, which becomes separated because it 
centripetally constricts the lived body. As previously discussed in chapter two, 
Hanich considers fear as a form of resistance, and that tension is produced 
according to the expansive Away!-tendency (Hanich 2010). As a consequence, 
the body feels enclosed and separated (Hanich 2010 p.196; Schmitz et al. 2011).  
Julian Hanich, like Hermann Schmitz, considers the experience of personal 
isolation as an aspect of fear, and argues that a movie may support the emotion 
of fear by evoking an atmosphere of isolation through use of tight frames (Hanich 
2010). Relating to the literature in part one, the isolation of the character is 
mirrored by the viewer because of the somatic empathy through mimicry and the 
alignment and allegiance sympathy, together with the haptic perception that is 
felt as an internal contraction movement, inducing a kinesthetic experience, and 
a corporeal consciousness.  
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Since in film the physical assaults which take place in the staged environments 
are themselves an assault on the senses (Bowker 1980), the power and control 
of the antagonist, in addition to the vulnerability, weakness, and isolation of the 
protagonist, can be felt and experienced by the viewer under the aesthetics of 
empathy and sympathy. 
If one is to describe Buffalo Bill’s basement in The Silence of the Lambs 
objectively and in light of the previous reading, then the spectator will find that 
this basement was spatially controlled due to its labyrinth-like arrangement. This 
is, hence, responsible for creating a spatial deprivation, both for Clarice and for 
the viewer. That basement became sensorially controlled when Buffalo Bill cut 
the power off and blinded Clarice. By so doing, she became totally accessible for 
Buffalo Bill without being able to access him. She was seen, heard, and 
touchable. The dark-echoing corridors, the naked bulbs, and old walls, as in the 
19th century prisons, depressed the senses and produced a sensual deprivation. 
Thus, the basement of Buffalo Bill provides a clear example of the use of 
surveillance in film that is experienced by the viewer. 
As Benson-Allott states, the setting, space, and decoration precede the narration 
and characters and also provide information (Benson-Allott 2015). However, in 
dread scenes, most of the time there is no establishing shot; the character 
experiences it moment by moment (here and now). Voids are used to operate as 
a spatial and architectural effect through which some techniques in filming allow 
the viewer to occupy a space there. 
8.5 Panoptical Forms in Thriller Films 
 After discussing the phenomenology of surveillance in terms of power, 
control, and isolation, this section explores further panoptical forms in dread 
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scenes and thriller films. It categorizes the panoptical forms and discusses them 
according to ‘sensorial’ and ‘spatial’ forms. 
8.5.1 Sensorial Panoptical Forms 
 The sensorial form of the Panopticon counts on the senses. As it has been 
discussed before, for Merleau-Ponty (2002), eyes and ears are only instruments 
for bodily excitation, not for perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002), and the 
phenomenology of perception involves the existence of the subject’s body that 
refers to the sensory experience. One that can be a synthetic or a haptic 
experience. 
Sobchack (1990) describes the film viewer as a cinesthetic subject whose body 
is affected by the film in order to be involved in understanding it and its meaning. 
This takes place through the effect of Sobchack’s cross-modality activity, one 
which triggers the cooperation of all senses, and in return creates the haptic 
perception to make the body feel through the skin before the eye does. 
The key point to understand with regards to surveillance, even if it is visual or 
audio-visual surveillance, is that it makes the subject accessible and 
approachable, hence raising the possibility of touch, as Laine argues, is always 
the reason behind the fear and the reason for corporeality (Laine 2006). Since 
touch is the last thing that can be lost, then it is the sense that extends the area 
of synaesthetic perception and feeds the corporeal experience and 
consciousness. The fear of touch awakens the skin while watching a horror or 
thriller film, and the only way that the viewer defends herself/himself is by 
multiplication, which transforms the skin into a kind of resonating membrane to 
think and feel at the same time. As Steven Conor puts it: 
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Sensing the crawling taking place over it, the skin itself begins to crawl: it squirms 
into the shape of an insect or the worm—or rather, the multiple form of the insect 
or worm—in order to escape the touch of insect or worm. 
 (Connor 2004 p.247) 
This type of surveillance takes two forms: ‘textual surveillance’ and ‘sensorial 
transparency’. 
Textual Surveillance 
 In chapter six, the concept of written notes was described as a quasi-thing, 
where both the character and the viewer may read notes simultaneously at 
certain moments in thrillers, which increases the sense of embodiment. They 
were used for (i) ‘preparation’ such as agony, pain, danger, and exit; (ii) 
preparation ‘into-a–situation’ (e.g., Bates Motel Vacancy); and (iii) ‘being-in-
situation’ such as the ‘sensorimotor verbs’ that place the viewer in a situation 
such as in the films ‘Open your eyes’ and ‘Don’t breathe’. With respect to the 
concept of surveillance, a very special type of expression and particular 
sentences inform the protagonist that she/he is being monitored, for example, 
“get out” in The Boy (2006), and “I know what you did last summer,” and “I know” 
in I Know what you did Last Summer (1997) and I still Know what you did Last 
Summer (1998). All these are sentences that the protagonist spots in certain 
moments, however she/he cannot spot their sender or writer. In this thesis, they 
are called ‘Someone-is-Watching-notes’. This kind of communication reflects the 
proximity and nearness of the antagonist (the watcher) and the vulnerability of 
the character, and gives an idea that the moment of touch may be very close. 
This ‘note’ is experienced and perceived, although sometimes it cannot be literally 
seen or read. This is what Merleau-Ponty identifies as the perceptual field, which 
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is always in the middle of something else and forms part of a field that develops 
between things and spaces between things (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.18). This 
perceptual field means that it is an integrated, lived body experience where the 
senses mutually resonate in their synaesthetic perception. This, by its nature, 
evokes and engages meaning from the world. Thereupon, the ‘note’ that is 
perceived with the character and which shows that someone is watching enters 
the perceptual field of the scene first, followed by the synaesthetic perception 
according to the mimicry of the character and the fear of touch. 
 In most of the examples above, which in many cases contain the title of the film 
itself, the characters, like the viewers, do not see the watcher. This means that 
after the moment of surprise of knowing that someone is watching, the viewer 
enters into a stage of mimicry with the character. In this, the viewer may enter the 
logic of existence as defined by Merleau-Ponty (2002). This event starts with a 
sense of ambiguity followed by one of uncertainty of ‘who wrote this note’ and 
‘where is he/ she now’. Thereafter, the viewer enters the last stage of existence; 
the transcendence stage, where the body has become in a situation, where it 
should stand up and act; to look somewhere else on the screen, and to guess 
who sent it, in addition to induce certain feelings. This process will increase the 
consciousness of the viewer and her/his corporeality based on its role in 
anticipation. 
Usually, these written notes are shot even before or after a reverse shot of the 
characters, followed by a subjective point perspective looking around or a reverse 
shot on the face of the character again such as in “get out” in The Boy (Bell 2016). 
The surprise in reading the written note and the ambiguity of its source engage 
the viewer through both empathy and sympathy with the character. It forms an 
imaginative empathy, which, according to Murray (1994), is an emotional 
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simulation that occurs when the viewer takes over the perspective of the 
character to imagine the character from inside and feel what it feels at the moment 
(Smith 1994). Furthermore, surprise is experienced as a somatic empathy on the 
basis of the mimetic relationship with the character. The closeness of the watcher 
and the fear of touch can be experienced in the viewer’s skin which responds and 
starts to crawl. Based on the subjective access to the character, the viewer can 
have an aligned sympathy that gives access to the character’s actions and to 
what they know and feel. This kind of surprise clarifies how surprise energizes 
the atmosphere to produce a productive ambiguity (Carter 2000 as cited in 
(Labelle 2011); it produces the ambiguity and uncertainty for acting and getting 
into a new situation. In addition to empathy and sympathy, this contributes to 
increasing the corporeality and consciousness of the viewer. 
The Sensorial Transparency 
 This form of transparency has been discussed in chapter seven as a very 
intense form that corresponds to a temporary or permanent loss of a sense, which 
makes the character vulnerable and reachable from the missing sense. In 
‘sensorial transparency’, the antagonist encounters the protagonist in the same 
space without physical barriers and, hence, the possibility of touch is very high.  
In an example of sight transparency, Buffalo Bill (Gumb) was watching Clarice 
through his night vision goggles. He was one meter and less far from her, and 
she was blinded by effect of the power being cut off. With reference to the 
experience of isolation that was discussed earlier in this chapter, this power cut 
can be seen as the power of incarceration. The senses are depressed to create 
sensual deprivation, which, in turn, causes a loss of critical capacity, 
disorientation, enfeeblement of resistances. This less clear thinking, is in effect 
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what Klein (2010) calls a state of shock, as could be experienced as synthetic 
and haptic shocks. The viewer has an aligned as well as an allegiance sympathy 
and both imaginative empathy and somatic empathy with Clarice. As a result of 
the way that the scene was shot, from inside the skin of Buffalo Bill, the viewer is 
saturated with Clarice’s breathing, the subject experiences imaginative empathy 
because she/he realizes the proximity of Buffalo Bill to Clarice and that he is about 
to touch her, especially when Buffalo Bill puts his arm in front of the frame, trying 
to touch her shoulders and face. Meanwhile, the viewer experiences somatic 
empathy because the scene is fueled by the sound of her breathing covered by 
the silence of the atmosphere, where the viewer mimics the muscular actions of 
Clarice.  
The very corporeal and very intense scene is challenging because of the 
proximity of Buffalo Bill, whom the viewer lives inside. There is an intellectual 
effort on behalf of Clarice from the viewer to stop one or other from touching her. 
In this scene and a similar scene in Hush (2016), which was based on ‘hearing 
transparency’, the viewer was watching the heroine as the antagonist. The 
somatic empathy and the aligned and allegiance sympathy boost the corporeality 
and consciousness of the viewer on the basis of the fear of touch and 
accessibility, and in view of the spatial attachment and subjective access of the 
antagonist. Worse yet is that the antagonist is inaccessible, at least for few 
moments.  
It has been argued in the previous chapter that this kind of transparency produces 
attention as an aesthetic strategy. In fact, it produces an activity of consciousness 
because it articulates the senses that were absent and presents them as a new 
object. The viewer feels the character and lives in the body or eyes of the 
antagonist, and all that the viewer is trying to do is a tense internal (Leib) effort to 
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stop the antagonist. However, she/he cannot. The state of shock experienced by 
the viewer can be described as a docile body experience. This is similar to 
Foucault’s panoptic power in dissociating the power of the viewer from its body 
to stop the antagonist. It establishes a disturbing and destructive body experience 
because the viewer experiences it through the body of the antagonist saturated 
with the protagonist’s body reactions (breathing or shaking) to create a ‘docile-
body-viewer’. 
8.5.2 Spatial Panoptical Forms 
 The previous section discussed the ‘sensorial panoptical forms’ that can 
increase the empathy and sympathy with the characters and increase 
embodiment of the viewer seeking to explore the ‘docile-body-viewer’. This 
section discusses different panoptical forms that are based on the spatial 
arrangement of the setting that is intended to create a constricted atmosphere for 
both the character and the viewer. The constricted atmosphere encourages 
isolation and supports fear and as Hanich argues, also increases the viewer’s 
empathy (Hanich 2010). 
Substance Transparency 
 This form of transparency was discussed in chapter seven, where the 
antagonist and the protagonist exist in the same space and realize presence of 
each other but are separated by a transparent obstacle. Most of this is a material 
that controls the level of transparency that is penetrable to allow the characters 
to communicate.  
One of the examples of ‘substance transparency’ that fits with the surveillance 
concept is the scene in the film Hush (2016). Maddie was separated from the 
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man in her house by glass doors and windows, watching him killing her friends, 
and disconnecting her from the world. The Glass House (Sackheim 2001) is 
another example of ‘substance transparency’ that also serves the concept of 
surveillance. The house is made of glass walls, glass railings, glass stairs, and 
glass doors with vast and wide spaces that penetrate sight and sound to make it 
almost impossible to hide in that space. Mr. Glass was able to monitor the kids’ 
behaviors by seeing and/or hearing them. In one scene he states: “everything is 
heard in the Glass house,” including the whispers. In addition to the house 
materials, Mr. Glass’s room overlooks the whole space, therefore enabling him 
to watch everybody in the house.  
These two examples represent spatial settings that allow the antagonist and the 
protagonist to watch one another. They are argued much like in the Panopticon 
in terms of its capacity to exert power and control over the characters, not the 
viewers, entrapping them and shaping their future actions. It induces shock at the 
beginning for the viewer as a physiological response and an aesthetic strategy 
that lasts only briefly because of the setting. This is followed by a sense of anxiety 
and aligned and allegiance sympathy with the characters in view of spatial 
attachment and subjective access to the character. This form of transparency can 
be close to the spatial deprivation that has already been discussed in this chapter 
because of the limitation of movement for the character. The character is 
enclosed and all her/his behaviors are monitored. The space looks as Hollier 
describes it where the future is threatening and offers an un-representable guise 
of the unknown, one which will develop anxiety (Hollier 1993). Thereupon, this 
form of transparency does not create a ‘docile-body-viewer’ but an anxious 
viewer, one who sympathizes with the character because of the antagonist’s 
control. 
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Labyrinth-like Spaces 
 The power and control effect that is produced in labyrinths naturally makes 
them a good setting for entrapment of the victim and the viewer. Pallasmaa notes 
that most of the time, as a setting, the labyrinth or the maze is used as a metaphor 
for a disturbed mind because of its spatial complexity (Pallasmaa 2001), and 
Hanich concludes that, because of the sense that there is no way out, labyrinths 
are  disorienting and disturbing supporting the feeling of isolation (Hanich 2010). 
In horror films and thrillers, the labyrinth may be shown either literally or 
figuratively. The Shinning (1980), The Maze (2018), and The Maze Runner 
(2014); and the maze in the garden of the castle in Perfume: The Story of a 
Murderer (2006) are examples where literal labyrinths are used. Generally these 
are used to express the disturbed mind of the antagonist as affected by factors 
ranging from being trapped in a real maze to kidnap, or to games of hide and 
seek. They serve to disturb the protagonist who needs to get out.  
Pallasmaa notes that Kubrick (1980) in the Shining used the physical maze 
outside the lobby of a hotel and a miniature model inside of it to give mythical 
depth and significance to the protagonist. This was used to demonstrate how he 
changed from a father to a state of  psychosis through his creative sterility, 
dissatisfaction, and sense of detachment (Pallasmaa 2001 p.99). The entire 
spatial configuration of the hotel: its corridors, mirrors and things seen twice, 
doubles. It is a maze that is seen figuratively. The figurative labyrinth can be found 
in many films, Hanich (2010) lists numerous examples of this figurative labyrinth; 
such as the bewildering arrangement of rooms (The Relic, 1997), the long  and 
endless corridors (The Haunting) the dark, constricted tunnels (The Third Man, 
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1949), and the narrow rooms (A Nightmare On Elm Street, 1984) (Hanich 2010 
p.173).  
In the Silence of the Lambs, the bewildered arrangement of Buffalo Bill’s 
basement acts as a figurative labyrinth that helped in entrapping Clarice. It was 
provided with only one entrance from the kitchen side and it then expanded 
through a series of corridors and doors to give Clarice the illusion of choice and 
to entrap her in his work place. The spatial experience which Clarice goes through 
opens other perspectives of interpretation for what purpose of the labyrinth 
purpose is. It isolates, controls, and embodies the character and the viewer in 
order to open up possibilities for other forms of surveillance to co-exist. Next, two 
major themes that can contribute to the constricted atmosphere of control and 
isolation will be discussed. These are instances of unintended repetition and the 
concept of double experience. 
The Unintended Repetition and the Double Experience Concepts 
 The role of phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty (1983) articulates it in his 
Preface to Hesnard's L'Oeuvre de Freud (1983), is to “reformulate certain 
Freudian concepts in the framework of a better philosophy,” in order to help 
psychoanalysis “to be completely itself.” (Merleau-Ponty 1983 pp.67–69). 
Additionally, Seamon argues, a key aspect of phenomenology is the capacity for 
the phenomenon to reveal itself in the ways it needs to (Seamon 2017). As a 
consequence, phenomenology in this thesis has used some Freudian concepts 
in the lived body experience; unintended repetition and double experience are 
used as means to explain the uncanny. Understanding and embedding their 
essence could be a means to express how they increase the sense of 
corporeality. 
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Unintended repetition was defined by Freud when he described walking through 
a small Italian town whilst avoiding moving in circles. Even though he avoided 
walking in circles, he spotted the same women who had been seen in the 
windows of the little houses. Freud has an interpretation for his confusion and 
loss of bearings: “it is only the factor of unintended repetition that transforms what 
would otherwise seem quite harmless into something uncanny and forces us to 
entertain the idea of fatal and the inescapable, when we should normally speak 
of ‘chance’” (Freud 2003 [1919]). 
Freud states that unintended repetition increases the presence and the existence 
of the body (Freud 2003). The most important objects in this repetition are the 
women, they are the reference point which made Freud aware of the repetition. 
It increased his consciousness that had come back to the same place even 
though he was trying to avoid it. His consciousness increased the existence both 
of his body and of its corporeality. 
The town which Freud walked through and the basement which Clarice walked 
through have something in common; the issue of doubling. That is, a doubling up 
of things; doubling up of situations, double experiences, and double spaces. In 
the Silence of the Lambs Clarice experiences the doubling of doors and corridors 
because in each scene in the basement she is in a position to choose between 
two doors. Then, in the oubliette chamber she is presented with four doors and, 
again, has to choose between doors until she reaches his work place. As 
Pallasmaa states, the excessive use of corridors and doors creates a confusing, 
endless labyrinth that generates a feeling of disorientation and dizziness 
(Pallasmaa 2001 p.107). That is made obvious in the film. When Clarice reaches 
the last point she is viewed from a Dutch-angle that is used to reflect her 
imbalance and disorientation. 
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The concept of doubling also belongs within the Gothic literary tradition of  
narratives and novels (Cartwright 2005). Linda Dryden, in her study of literary 
doubles in Gothic literature, claims that double was a new Gothic mode that 
appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. Its narratives focus on the urban 
present and use it to refract the contemporary concerns through the lens of a 
literature of imagined terror (Dryden 2003 p.19). In his essay The Uncanny, Freud 
offers explanation, not only of what is uncanny, but also of the function of doubles, 
which he defines as  
[T]hose unfulfilled, but possible futures to which we still like to cling in phantasy, 
all those strivings of the ego which adverse external circumstances have crushed, 
and all our suppressed acts of volition which nourish in us the illusion of Free Will. 
 (Freud 2003 p.236). 
Dryden argues that protagonists in Gothic novels revisit events and each time 
they believe that they can affect the outcome to their advantage. While the 
doubling of characters and exploration of alter egos is an integral part of the 
Dystopian novel, such novels of future possibility are also strongly shaped by the 
recurrence of situations where the characters appear trapped, being doomed to 
revisit situations again and again (Dryden 2003). 
Visually, mirrors and shadows can also be used as a form of doubling in films. 
For instance, in The Shining (1980), Kubrick used mirrors to create in the form of 
a double, both literally and figuratively as a theme in the film. One instance of 
literal doubling was the appearance of the word “MURDER” as “REDRUM” in the 
mirror image on the bathroom door. Meanwhile, an example of figurative doubling 
was the case of using twins, Pallasmaa describes how “Kubrick deliberately 
confuses the categories of reality, myth, hallucination, dream and memory, in 
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order to make a maze like-narrative that leads any attempt to trace a string of 
logic into a cul-de-sac” (Pallasmaa 2001 p.100).  
 Hanich (2017) suggests referring to the shots which have mirrors as complex 
mirror shots because they actively raise the viewer’s attention to the reflected 
objects or events. He justifies the spectator’s attention by the fact that the mirror 
shots function as a magnetizing frame-within-the-frame that “channels the 
viewer’s look into the anterior depth of the mirror” and refer the viewer to look off-
screen beyond the image (Hanich 2017a p.133). The layered experience of 
perception and imagination challenges and complicates the effort to read the 
image. He argues that the spatial complication of those shots leads to a sense of 
disorientation which in return transforms the way in which the viewers look at and 
perceive the filmic image (Hanich 2017a). 
Many films were based on the concept of the double as a device to reveal certain 
personalities such as Black Swan (Aronofsky 2010) and Shutter Island (Scorsese 
2010). From Freud’s perspective, the meaning of the double is related to the 
concept of  alienation, namely, the self and the other, that one requires one’s ego 
and perceives oneself as an autonomous and compact self, that is, the I (Freud 
2003). Cartwright confirms that the doubling is confusing and is experienced as 
a loss of the self, where the person creates a double image to dilute and dissolve 
the essence of her/his individuality (Cartwright 2005).  
Hanich (2017) supports the argument that the double shot (the complex mirror 
shots, for example) puts the viewer in an ambiguous and fluctuating position 
because the image is stimulated by a range of affordances in terms of what they 
can do. He argues that affordances invite or force the viewers to oscillate between 
the modes which affect their attitudes. The ambiguity and fluctuation of the double 
induces an attention for it to be perceived and spotted in pure consciousness. 
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Merleau-Ponty (2002) considers that the double has potential as a new 
articulation of repetition. He outlines how it makes a crucial shift for drawing 
attention to a phenomenon:  
To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring 
about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. [. . .] The miracle of 
consciousness consists in its bringing to light, through attention, phenomena 
which re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment 
when they destroy it 
 (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.35). 
In view of the foregoing arguments, one can consider the double as one salient 
characteristic of repetition that can be used to represent ambiguity, duality, and 
opposition. At the same time, the double and repetition can be used to cause the 
disorientation, dizziness, confusion, and loss of bearing which are characteristics 
of the navigation of a labyrinth. In the same way doubling and repetition work in 
real life, they have been used to work on spectators. That is confirmed in a recent 
study by Hanich (2017) who states that mirror shots have the potential to unsettle 
the ways spectators look at the image by making them insecure about the status 
of the image or the spatial construction in a mise-en-scène (Hanich 2017a). 
Based on the previous literature, one can recognize that the double concept 
works for both Clarice and Buffalo Bill in the Silence of the Lambs. The doubles 
of doors and corridors that helped in creating a labyrinth in the basement of 
Buffalo Bill’s house were used as a reflection of his double personality. In addition 
that the psychopath Buffalo Bill has been denied a sex change operation 
reiterates this notion. So, he is killing the young female victims and using their 
back skin to sew himself a female skin, where he has used the caterpillar as a 
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symbol to indicate the transforming. This kind of mirroring is substituted for the 
imaginary and the symbolic conception to reflect the invisible parts of the image.  
The double experience was lived by Clarice in the situations she had faced and 
revisited again and again in the cellar; walking through a spatial disorientation 
stimulated by complex systems of doors and corridors she finds herself walking 
in a labyrinth with a dead end. The constricted setting (labyrinth-like setting) and 
the way this scene was shot, which mixed between first-point perspective and 
reverse close-up shots on Clarice, put the viewer in a shared lived experience 
with Clarice to leave her/him in pure somatic empathy; the sensation of fear, the 
motor mimicry in copying her breath and her face reactions, and affective mimicry 
in the anticipation of realizing Buffalo’s appearance. Above all, by realizing the 
power and control of Buffalo Bill and recognizing the isolation of Clarice from the 
world, the sympathy of the viewer with her is also created.  
Attention is the aesthetic strategy used in this scene as has been discussed in 
chapter seven, and according to the logical structure of existence that has been 
described by Merleau-Ponty (2002), each time Clarice faces a choice of doors, 
the viewer faces his or her ambiguous and fluctuating position to live in the 
indeterminacy that Clarice lives through. The first-point perspective of the 
shooting enables the viewer to share her thinking and anticipation; in particular 
Clarice’s pause before selecting the door and the over-shoulder shot bring the 
viewer and Clarice together under the confusion of choice until Clarice moves 
and pulls the viewer with her through a track-in shot. The viewer is thereby moved 
with her into the transcendence stage at which the body switches to address a 
new situation.  
On the basis of the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the double as they were 
described in the preceding paragraphs, employment of the double plays 
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excessively and directly on the concept of the first two stages of existence. The 
double moved into the third stage of existence, which offers transcendence at two 
scales; the first was based on Clarice’s decision which moved the viewer to a 
new situation, and the second took place due to the repetition of the situation. 
Hence, the viewer enters this stage indirectly and consciously again and again. 
Eventually dizziness, disorientation, confusion, and alienation are stimulated in 
the body of the viewer serving to trap her/him in Clarice’s body and mind.  
As was illustrated by Hollier in the foregoing paragraphs, the device of a labyrinth 
enables a form of a spatial deprivation that creates psychological depression as 
a result of its unknown and threatening future which constitutes anxiety (Hollier 
1993). In the way that it was shot, experienced, and shared with Clarice, this 
scene created a dissociating power from the viewer’s body because it gave the 
viewer the chance to choose as Clarice in some shots. In addition, it created a 
disturbed body due to the repetition of the situation and the anxiety concomitant 
with its spatial deprivation. Accordingly, in this scene, a ‘docile-body-viewer’ is 
created. 
Through-Wall Surveillance and Through-Floor Surveillance 
Cartwright outlines how a special case of repetition and doubling has been used 
in Gothic novels as a framing device in narration to find a story within a story 
(Cartwright 2005). Even plays, used this concept of repetition; the play within a 
play, such as in act three in scene two in Hamlet attempting to “catch the 
consciousness of the king”, to create a psychological state of guilt for the king 
(Musolf 2009). Building upon the understanding of the essence of the labyrinth 
from doubling and repetition, this thesis has identified a new form of surveillance 
delivered through constricted atmospheres that are used in many thrillers and 
horror films. ‘Embedded structures’; such as walls within walls and floors within 
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floors. Most of the films that use this form of surveillance relate to psychopaths 
who live behind a wall such as The Resident (2011) and The Boy (2016), or as 
ghosts under the floor as in The Conjuring (2013). The double structures of walls 
and doors express also the double personalities of the character. 
The Boy (Bell 2016) is a horror, mystery, and thriller film that describes a boy who 
is actually a life-sized doll that should needs a nanny (Gretta) during his parents’ 
absence. During this film, the nanny and the characters start to believe that the 
doll is really alive. When the doll’s head was broken, all the walls shook and the 
real boy revealed himself to show that he was living behind the walls all the time 
because he had a burned face.  
The discovery moment for the character and audience is when the boy comes 
out through the mirror on the wall. Gretta and Malcom (Lauren Cohan and Rupert 
Evans) run away until they see a passage to escape. 
Afterwards, they walk through series of internal walls and passages till they reach 
a room that has all his belongings. While Gretta runs inside the passages, she 
and the viewer gradually realize how he used to communicate with her; mainly 
through a form of surveillance through walls. The moment she discovers these 
details is shot from her first-point perspective, followed by reverse close-up shots 
showing her shock. She comments to Malcom: “he was living in the wall the whole 
time watching me!” 
The perception of this scene is shared by the characters and the viewers because 
it uncovers all the mysteries inside that house. By crossing through the walls until 
they reach the boy’s room, all the place looks like they were running in a labyrinth. 
Anxiety is created for the viewers because of the constricted space they walk 
through and also because of its spatial deprivation which, in turn, feeds the 
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viewers’ empathy. In addition, sympathy for the characters is increased because 
they believe that the boy knows the walls and the way out and that he can catch 
them very easily. As a result, after revealing this truth, a sense of shock, followed 
by attention through a perception is shared by the character and the viewer.  
The unexpected disruptive outcome of the scene is responsible for creating shock 
for the viewer. Shock, as has been discussed in chapter seven, according to 
Hanich (2010), is a type of fear that supports dread that bursts into the scene 
suddenly and lasts only briefly, and it does not include any future anticipations 
(Hanich 2010). But based on the above-mentioned scene, this shock is followed 
by attention; an activity of consciousness that combines past events with 
anticipated future events. This kind of setting and atmosphere has the power to 
jump the subject to the third stage in existence according to Merleau-Ponty; 
transcendence, as a result of the shock. Then, the subject returns back to the 
ambiguity and indeterminacy stages. Therefore, this kind of surveillance 
increases the corporeality and consciousness of the viewer. 
The Resident (Jokinen 2011) is another example of ‘through-wall surveillance’. 
Dr. Juliet (Hilary Swank) rents an apartment in New York City and later starts to 
suspect that something is unusual in the apartment. In this film, the viewer can 
see hints of Max (Jeffrey Dean Morgan), her landlord, walking through tight 
corridors, lined with water pipes and unfinished paintwork. However, it is not 
revealed until the very end that these corridors are only walls behind Juliet’s 
apartment. And that he used to live behind them the whole time to watch her. 
Juliet discovers through video tapes that her landlord, Max, rapes her while she 
is sleeping. However, she could not figure out how he always managed to stay 
close. When she faces him, he locks her in the apartment from the outside, then 
suddenly he appears inside it. When she hides in the bathroom, she looks at the 
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mirror to check her eyes until suddenly the mirror breaks and Max pulls her 
towards the ‘embedded walls’ in which he hides. She could run away from him 
but she walks in an unknown world to see her living room from one small hole 
and the rest of her apartment from other positions. In this moment, the viewer, as 
the character, relates all the past events to the present and understands that Max 
was watching her the whole time from those walls. Then, Max shouts and says: 
“there is no way to get out!” Finally, after many trials, Juliet goes back to her 
apartment. The walls behind the walls were used to make a labyrinth where the 
entry and exit are only possible to and from her apartment. When she realizes 
that she is locked in and disconnected from the world, she takes the pin drill as a 
weapon to fight Max. For a moment, he catches her and tells her: “Juliet, I saw 
you. You could pull me out of these walls…. I am sorry… But you betrayed me!” 
The use of some first-point perspective shots in the eyes of Juliet show the scale 
of the walls or the pipes that she crawled inside enabling the viewer feel the 
space, and, thus, increase the level of her/his empathy. But most of the shots 
were taken through a moving camera following or proceeding Juliet as if it was 
Max’s eye that is about to catch her. Sobchack (1990) has drawn upon Merleau-
Ponty’s (2002) concept of attention and found that the optical movement in 
cinema such as the zoom, track-in, and track-out, is what brings this active and 
constitutive function of attention into focus; it transforms the visual field and the 
objects within it to create a new figure-ground relation between the subject and 
the object. 
The track-in the shots in this scene was very effective in creating sympathy for 
Juliet; increasing the anticipation of the viewer and the anxiety that Juliet is almost 
caught. In this example too, the shock was followed by attention that is 
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responsible for moving the viewer to a state of transcendence first, followed by 
one of ambiguity and indeterminacy in Merleau-Ponty’s terms. 
In The Silence of the Lambs, Clarice walks through a labyrinth in a place that did 
not belong to her, which explains why the body’s existence of the viewer followed 
the logic of existence described by Merleau-Ponty. That is a sequence starting 
with ambiguity, followed by indeterminacy and transcendence. On the other hand, 
Gretta and Dr. Juliet in The Boy and the Resident lived in places they used to 
know very well. However, discovering that there is another life behind the walls 
created a shock that puts the viewer’s body directly into the transcendence stage 
followed then by ambiguity and indeterminacy. In general, the moment of 
revealing a fact in the story can create an aligned sympathy for the character 
because the viewers know that since the character has been watched for so long 
then she/he will be vulnerable and easily touchable. This is similar to the case of 
‘personal transparency’ which was discussed in chapter seven, which in brief 
concerning the transparency that results from the close relationship between the 
protagonist and the antagonist, such as a husband and wife. As the antagonist 
knows his victim very well, he can anticipate her behavior and control her survival 
possibilities. In addition to that, the antagonist (e.g., Buffalo Bill, Max, and The 
Boy) can be seen to have power and control over their labyrinth. Only the style of 
shooting can determine the quality of this engagement; if it is shot in first-point 
perspective, then it will create empathy as with Clarice. Otherwise, engagement 
will remain as sympathy. 
The experience of the ‘embedded structures’ in horror is totally different from that 
in dread. Taking The Conjuring (Wan 2013) as an example, a paranormal 
investigator works to help a family terrorized by a dark presence in their 
farmhouse. A combination of double walls and floors are used to hide the children 
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by ghosts and unnatural powers. The aesthetic strategies used in this film in 
particular and the way the viewer is engaging with the characters can be 
distinguished as different from the attention discussed in the previous examples. 
In The Conjuring and similar horror films, the aesthetic strategy is only based 
upon shock. This is probably because attention works more cognitively in dread 
than in horror in that it gives the viewer time to think and anticipate the outcome 
and forthcoming narrative events, thus allowing for cognitive activity, which does 
not develop in horror films. 
8.5.3 Digital Panoptical Forms 
 A very literal form of surveillance can be seen in horror films and some 
thrillers through the depiction of CCTV monitoring (e.g., SAW I, II, III, and IV). But 
this kind of surveillance only injects the viewers with anxiety and sympathy since 
they know their characters are being watched and controlled. This form of 
surveillance functions exactly as the Panopticon for the characters, not viewers, 
in that they are watched but cannot access the surveyor and in that it only creates 
docile body characters in terms of psychoanalytical study. Therefore, this 
research does not address this form of surveillance in detail, but highlights it as 
a theme for future studies.  
8.6 Conclusion 
 In this part of the thesis, surveillance is identified as a quasi-thing and as 
a situation that has the ability to increase the embodiment and body corporeality 
of the viewer. The Panopticon prison presented through Foucault’s discourse is 
relayed as a signifier of power and discipline in the modern era seen to have 
influenced the architecture of many institutions. Foucault’s book Discipline and 
Punish in turn related to other modes of surveillance discussed in psychoanalysis 
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(e.g., gaze and voyeurism) that are of significant interest to a study of the 
motivation for watching. But according to the goal and scope of this thesis, it was 
not necessary to dig deeper in to such modes. The motivation for watching does 
not however matter, rather it is understanding how a surveillance atmosphere is 
constructed for the surveyor and the surveyed person(s) in order ultimately to 
perceive the essence and phenomenology of surveillance as a tool in film. 
The atmosphere of surveillance is a combination of the atmospheres of power, 
control, and entrapment of the surveyor, and the atmospheres of claustrophobia, 
isolation, and alienation for the surveyed person(s). The power and control of the 
surveyor are divided into ‘Sensorial Control’ and ‘spatial Control’. ‘Sensorial 
Control’ expresses the ability of the surveyor to see without being seen, to hear 
without being heard, and to touch without being touched. Fragmentation against 
communication; the individual enclosures; the vast, wide spaces; and the use of 
glass and transparent materials are factors that support the ‘sensorial control’ 
and visibility of the surveyor. ‘spatial Control’, on the other hand, can be achieved 
through the arrangement of furniture in such a way as to restrict the movement 
of the prisoners or the workers and ensure a non-sociable environment. Although 
the surveyor cannot be always watching or hearing, occupancy of the watchtower 
and the apparition of a surveyor are sufficient to secure the panoptic power effect, 
which is triggered by the prisoner’s realization that he is subjected to the gaze 
(Foucault 1995 p.117). This power increases the awareness of the subject of 
being observed and turns the subject who surrenders himself to the surveyor into 
a docile body subject experiencing alienation and isolation. 
The spatial arrangement that supported the surveyor in his ‘sensorial control’ and 
use of some features such as echoing corridors and naked electric lights have 
the power to depress the senses of the surveyed person. The effect starts as a 
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sensual disengagement in the space that turns into a sensual deprivation as a 
result of the psychological compression. This will, in turn, cause loss of critical 
capacity, disorientation, enfeeblement of resistances, reduced clear thinking, and 
increased vulnerability of the subject. The fear triggered by this atmosphere 
constricts the subject’s body and disassociates her/his power from her/his body 
to create more disturbed, destructed, and alienated body; a docile body. 
Understanding the phenomenology of surveillance helped the researcher to find 
other panoptical forms in film that can be seen to apply power and control for the 
surveyor and isolation for the character. Analysis provided evidence that such 
devices can be used to create a ‘docile-body-viewer’. The most important finding 
is that these forms of the ‘docile-body-viewer’ are experienced haptically through 
the aesthetics of empathy and sympathy for the viewer where touch can be seen 
as the motivation for fear. These forms of the ‘docile-body-viewer’ are categorized 
into ‘sensorial panoptical forms’ that concern the senses inside the scene and 
‘spatial panoptical forms’ that concern the constricted atmosphere of the scene. 
Sensorial Panoptical Forms 
As a sensorial panoptical form, the use of ‘Someone-is-Watching-note’, such as 
“get out,” is a ‘textual surveillance’ mode that informs the character, and the 
viewer, that the character is watched. They literally read the note together. This 
kind of communication reflects the proximity of the antagonist (the watcher) and 
the vulnerability of the character and gives the message that the moment of touch 
is very close. This sensorial panoptical form creates surprise for the viewer that 
is experienced as imaginative empathy and somatic empathy based on the 
mimetic relationship with the character in addition to aligned sympathy. This 
sensorial panoptical form applies the logic of existence according to Merleau-
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Ponty; it starts with ambiguity and uncertainty of who and where the sender is, 
then turns into a transcendence stage that follows the action of the character. 
The other sensorial form is ‘sensorial transparency’. where the protagonist 
misses a sense, the antagonist encounters the protagonist in the same space 
without physical barriers and the possibility of touch is, therefore, very high. In 
light of the way that ‘sensorial transparency’ is shot, that is, through the body of 
the antagonist, and based on its one point perspective, it creates a state of shock 
for the viewer because of the attention it raises. The raised attention, in turn, 
increases the consciousness of the viewer who lives in the body of the antagonist. 
Similar to the effect given by panoptic power, in the present case, the viewer, 
through the effect of a state of shock, tries internally to stop the antagonist from 
touching the protagonist because ‘sensorial transparency’ is experienced 
subjectively, but he/she cannot. The intensity of this moment, in addition to the 
somatic empathy and aligned and allegiance sympathy with the character, 
disassociates the power of the viewer’s body and disturbs her/him to become a 
‘docile-body-viewer’.  
Spatial Panoptical Forms 
‘substance transparency’ is a spatial panoptical form that occurs through the use 
of glazing materials or through any spatial arrangement that allows people to look 
through. In these cases, the antagonist and the protagonist are in the same 
space, recognizing each other, but may be separated by a glass partition. This 
panoptical form may induce shock at first followed by anxiety due to the lack of 
spatial divisions. However, it does not create a ‘docile-body-viewer’. Rather, it 
creates an anxious viewer who sympathizes with the character.  
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‘Labyrinth-like spaces’ are the other spatial panoptical form that increases the 
corporeality of the viewer. The Panopticon of Bentham is the opposite of a 
labyrinth, however in film, and according to reading the phenomenology of 
surveillance including power and isolation, the labyrinth is considered as a 
panoptical form in film that increases corporeality of the viewer. Repetition and 
doubling are identified in Freud’s terms as the main features of the labyrinthine 
experience that can cause disorientation, dizziness, confusion, and loss of 
bearing. The way of shooting this spatial panoptical form controls the docility of 
the viewer but it does not have a greater capacity for creating a ‘docile-body-
viewer’ than the use of ‘sensorial transparency’. However, this spatial panoptical 
form is characterized by two specific forms which control the logic of bodily 
existence according to Merleau-Ponty. The first is what can be observed in the 
case of Clarice in Bill’s basement, where the aesthetic strategy employed is to 
demand attention only. This makes the character conscious of Clarice 
anticipating Bill at any moment. The structure of existence here starts with 
ambiguity and indeterminacy in Merleau-Ponty’s terms. Then, it moves to the 
transcendence stage according to Clarice’s actions. A second form of spatial 
panoptical arrangement is identified here for the first time. This spatial panoptical 
form corresponds to the identification of ‘embedded structures’ where there is a 
‘wall within wall’ and a ‘floor within a floor’ which serve to create ‘through-wall 
surveillance’ and ‘through- floor surveillance’. One may consider the film sets of 
Peter Greenway as offering a form of a ‘through-wall surveillance’, but it is not the 
case here since this form concerns the panoptical form in film setting for the 
actors, not for the audience. In this spatial panoptical form, the antagonist lives 
with the protagonist, without her/his knowledge, behind a wall or under floor. The 
moment of revealing this fact is experienced by the viewer at the same time as 
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the character and inspires a shock followed by attention. This means that the 
viewer is moved to the transcendence stage first increasing her/his corporeality, 
it then moves her/him to the ambiguity and indeterminacy stages.  
 In summary, analysis of the phenomenology of surveillance here has 
helped to identify the use of panoptical forms in dread scenes in thrillers. It serves 
to demonstrate how these forms can heighten the corporeality of the viewer. 
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Conclusion: The Embodied Experience of Cinematic Dread 
The main goal of the current study was to develop a comprehensive 
conception of the atmosphere of dread in thriller films, to fill a gap in Julian 
Hanich’s research. Accordingly, the thesis ultimately offers a critical analysis of 
the construction of the atmosphere of dread from a phenomenological 
perspective based on embodiment and the relationship between the viewer and 
the screen. 
The main findings can be classified under ‘theoretical’ contribution and 
‘methodological’ contribution: 
Theoretical Contribution 
The thesis builds upon the work of Merleau-Ponty, and extends it in order to 
develop an approach to embodiment in film. On one hand, Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
structured the process of engagement in the world through linking the subject and 
the object by providing a model of perception, movement, and action. However, 
he did not consider embodiment as a process and a theory of consciousness, 
also he had not extended his work to address that of film. On the other hand, 
other philosophers and researchers had recently combined Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy with that of embodiment. However, their treatments of embodiment in 
these studies concentrated on one component of the process or only a few 
components, not on the process of encountering between the subject and the 
object. For example, Marks (2000) focused on memory and sensual inputs while 
Sobchack (1992) concentrated on the cross-modality of the senses. Laine (2006) 
studied the role of skin in perception to create the affective experience, and Paul 
Elliott (2011) used the knowledge of many film phenomenologists including Marks 
and Sobchack to describe the sensory experience in Hitchcock films.  What is 
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critical to the thesis is decomposing the process of embodiment according to the 
conception of Merleau-Ponty and injecting it with recent theories of embodiment 
so as to create a new comprehensive framework that enabled the researcher 
apply this to film and so to read a dread scene and then draw a corporeal map 
for her lived experience.  
The key contribution in this framework is in linking the perception, movement, and 
action of the character with the perception, movement, and action of the viewer, 
in film, a connection that is justified by the interactive exchange between the two 
bodies.  
According to the process of Perception as outlined above, it relates that of the 
individual viewer to the shared one of the character according to the concept of 
(perception of perception) of Deleuze (1992). Shots that are taken from the 
character’s point of view or the shots that Hitchcock named subjective treatment 
are essential in dread scenes to bond the viewer so that she/he will experience 
the perception of the character. However, in film, perception is shown here to take 
place as a haptic perception on the basis of synaesthetic perception, which 
means that perception of the character is felt on the viewer’s skin. 
The relationship is also based on the movement of the character in the scene and 
on how it is reflected on the viewer’s felt-body movement to create expansion and 
contraction. This relationship is created according to the contribution of Sheets-
Johnstone in her discussion of self-movement in the real world, and the 
philosophy of Schmitz’s New-Phenomenology and the felt-body. 
Finally, the process of encountering is based on the character’s action that is 
responsible for the transcendence of the viewer to exist in that moment 
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corporeally and to be in full consciousness, namely, to transfer her/him to a 
situation in which to act or to wish to act. 
This framework clarified how fear can be translated into more corporeal moments 
when watching a dread scene; fear, as a motivation, is responsible for influencing 
the spectator to live with the character spatially, temporally, and emotionally, 
hence identifying with the character under the empathy and sympathy framework 
turns into a kinesthetic corporeal experience. The reason behind this being that 
fear awakens the senses and stimulates proprioception to create a 
transcendental subjectivity felt on the skin. All this experience will be reflected as 
a contraction of the felt-body, which will tighten the absolute space of the 
spectator. This constitutes an affective experience felt kinesthetically by muscles 
and synaesthetically by the contraction of the felt-body.  
This framework helped the researcher to read a dread scene from the Silence of 
the Lambs, which helped to produce three new phenomenological themes that 
represent corporeal atmospheres that were then shown to be related to a 
construction of cinematic dread. 
Since phenomenology opens up possibilities to understand other fields, or 
to explore further phenomena, this thesis found out the following conclusions:  
1- The logic of existence of Merleau-Ponty (2002) formed an essential 
framework for this thesis. See diagram 3 and 4 below. He claimed that 
the logic of existence starts in ambiguity, indeterminacy then ends in 
transcendence. But in this thesis, it has been observed, that in film, 
whenever the viewer reaches the transcendence stage first, it 
heightens the senses and increases consciousness and corporeality 
whilst engaging in a dread scene. Subsequently it moves into the other 
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stages of the logic of existence to maintain that consciousness and 
corporeality. This observation helped the researcher to clarify several 
aspects in various phenomenological theories, such as the one of 
Mølbak (2012), who claims that in order to have the experience to 
create an event, there should be phenomenal factors that are used to 
de-familiarize the familiar situations, such as shock and surprise. This 
thesis contributed to his claim by relating the phenomenal factor to the 
transcendence stage of Merleau-Ponty, to demonstrate that its 
application could be even wider. 
 
Diagram 3: Merleau-Ponty’s Logic of Existence 
 
Diagram 4: Another arrangement of Merleau-Ponty’s Logic of Existence found in Cinematic Dread  
 
2- Any form of transparency linked with the senses, such as ‘sensorimotor 
verbs’ and ‘sensorial transparency’, is experienced more corporeally, 
consciously, and affectively because it hits the senses and awakens 
them immediately. Accordingly, the ‘sensorimotor situations’ (verbs 
and transparency) work as an affect that snatches the body from 
silence to create an event. They help the object to jump to the 
transcendence stage first, then to reach the stage of ambiguity and 
indeterminacy. 
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3- Doors, corridors, and stairs are considered as things that have a 
special effect in any scene. However, on the basis of conceptions that 
are phenomenological, atmospheric, and related to embodiment; what 
matters is creating situations, namely, quasi-things, in Griffero’s terms, 
not things. Situations can allow for the atmosphere to be perceived and 
felt corporeally, as a whole. Hence, this thesis has established that one 
cannot define an element of corporeality, but one can define an 
‘atmosphere of corporeality’. 
From another point of view, the thesis, on the theoretical aspect, has elaborated 
on explaining and clarifying the role of certain phenomena through their 
contribution to the process used in reaching the main findings. They can be 
summarized as the following; 
- Relating the ideas and thoughts of Schmitz (1964-2005) to those of 
Sheets-Johnstone (2011) is a contribution of this research. Sheets-Johnstone 
(2011) discussed self-movement. However, through an understanding of the 
body within the framework of Schmitz’s New-Phenomenology, the researcher 
demonstrated how Sheets-Johnstone’s structure of movement can be applied to 
the reading of the felt-body as well. 
-Sheets-Johnstone (2011) pointed to the significance of kinesthesia as the 
core of kinesthetic experience. As a contribution of this research, and through 
Sheets-Johnstone’s structure of movement, the researcher proved that 
proprioception in cinematic dread is the core of kinesthetic experience precisely 
because of the pause and the slow movement that is required of the character in 
dread scenes.  
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-Another contribution of this research is that it determined the reason 
behind the extended-time experience in a dread scene by relating the philosophy 
of Sheets-Johnstone (2011) to those of Hanich (2010), Pallasmaa (2010, 2012), 
and Schmitz (1964-2005). First, the viewer follows a character who is walking 
(walking as a continuous action verb). While following the character as she/he is 
moving, the viewer spends time. Second, hesitation in walking and slowness 
have qualitative cardinal time, which lead the viewer to pay additional effort to 
follow the character in moving and in stillness, preparing to move. Additionally, 
because of the restricted movement options in the dread spaces, only 
contractedness and narrowness are produced in the felt-body and in the absolute 
space. This pause gives time for the spectator to think and to feel its position and 
balance in the space, which increases the locomotion of her/his body to 
eventually create a corporeal consciousness. As a consequence, the experience 
of time is extended. 
-A further contribution of this study is to reveal the embodiment behind the 
structure of the labyrinth and the analysis and explanation of how it is understood 
through lived experience and its relation to un-intended repetition and Freud’s 
concept of the double, which were demonstrated to be the acts that explain the 
uncanny nature of the labyrinth and substantiated its use in thrillers and horror 
films. This led to another contribution, which is the identification of ‘embedded 
structures’ and the ‘through-wall surveillance’ in film. 
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Methodological Contribution 
Taking the framework established above as a means to identify characteristics 
of encountering, the last dread scene in The Silence of the Lambs (Demme 
Jonathan 1991) was used as a case study by adopting the phenomenal 
phenomenology method of Shīrāzī (2013) for a phenomenal reading. Griffero 
(2014) defined the atmosphere as emotions and feelings that loose meaning 
when someone tries to describe them. Thereupon, he argued one has to live in 
these emotions and feelings in order to understand them. Subsequently, the 
researcher followed the characteristics which she identified earlier very carefully 
as a road map, narrated to transfer her lived experience to the reader.  
The first impression drawn while watching the scene was very effective in plotting 
a corporeal map of events. The second, third, and fourth times of watching the 
same scene helped the researcher to describe the phenomena in the corporeal 
map. There were many corporeal moments in that scene, but the ones that 
affected the researcher the most were “AMERICA, open your eyes”, the blinding 
of Clarice, the experience of touching Clarice and the return back to the same 
room with the mannequin. Those corporeal phenomena urged the researcher to 
examine their phenomenology in an attempt to find new situations or quasi-things, 
as Griffero (2014) calls them, that were not discussed in film studies before and 
to try to look at certain phenomena from another perspective in a way that has 
not been discussed in film studies previously either. 
Three key phenomenological themes emerged which were then discussed in 
subsequent chapters: Phenomenology of Text, of transparency and of 
Surveillance. They were related to the construction of cinematic dread through 
relating to case studies and other secondary literature. 
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Phenomenology of Text 
In Chapter Six, the researcher sought to undertake a literature review of the 
use of text in film, but according to the available resources, it was not found a 
single article talks about that. Therefore, the other sources that addressed the 
role of the language in embodiment were sought. Experiments from psychology 
and neuropsychology were reviewed. In addition, Merleau-Ponty’s perspective 
on words, that they have a motor physiognomy, qualified the use of text in film to 
be considered as a powerful approach to establishment of corporeal experience 
that can ‘prepare’ the viewer and/or the character and ‘transfer’ them into a new 
situation.  
Observation of different thriller films led to the researcher to the conclusion that 
text is used for ‘preparation’, a way ‘into-a-situation’ and for ‘being-in-situation’. 
‘Preparation’ text is meant for viewers not for characters, even if it is one word 
with different functions such as the use of ‘Exit’ as an entrance or as an emotional 
arousal such as ‘pain’ or ‘agony’, where these arousals prepare the body of the 
viewer for fear signals, resulting in a heightened bodily sensitivity to produce 
facial activity or any body movement. The reason behind fear in such experience 
is shown to be through sympathizing with the character.  
A way ‘into-a-situation’ is regarded as a reflection of the sympathy for the 
character, which happens when exposed to the same text but in different timing. 
It feeds the anticipation of dread. 
‘Being-in-Situation’ is a direct engagement of the body of the viewer with that of 
the character. Such situations can be created by the use of action verbs that have 
direct relationships with the body and senses, which the researcher called 
‘sensorimotor verbs’ in this study. Of all text types, these verbs result in the 
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highest cognitive perception, e.g., “open your eyes!” It has been proved that those 
verbs can intensify the somatic response based on somatic empathy, and 
according to that, they jump to Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental stage of existence 
first, then move to ambiguity and indeterminacy. They produce kinesthetic effect 
in the muscles to increase the consciousness and the felt-body movement to 
create synaesthetic experience.                   
When the ‘sensorimotor verbs’ are used as the title of a film, e.g., Hold your 
Breath, they serve in both ‘preparing’ and ‘transferring situation’ for the viewer. 
They start to embody the viewer from the beginning to create a conscious action 
that is practiced unconsciously over duration of the film as a reflection of empathy 
with the character. The numbers and names are also considered in this research 
as special text that is used to prepare viewers and lead them to sympathize with 
the characters.  
 Phenomenology of Transparency 
In this thesis, transparency is addressed as an atmospheric quasi-thing that 
allows for accessibility and proximity to, and touch of, the characters. In film, this 
research has identified three forms of transparency: ‘personal transparency’, 
‘substance transparency’, and ‘sensorial transparency’. Whereas one or all of 
these forms of transparency can be found in thrillers in general, this study found 
that ‘sensorial transparency’ is the transparency form most commonly used in 
creation of dread scenes.  
‘Personal transparency’ is defined in this research as a phenomenal transparency 
that stems from the close relationship that is established between the protagonist 
and the antagonist, which makes the protagonist closer and more reachable. This 
form of transparency can be readily found in the suggested horror prototype of 
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Hanich (2010), experienced through sympathy for the character. The present 
study did not discuss this form of transparency in detail. However, the literature 
review highlighted high opportunity for future psychoanalysis research into it. 
‘Substance transparency’ in this research refers to the physical barrier that 
separates the protagonist from the antagonist, such as glass, which allows for 
penetration of all the senses except touch. In this form of transparency, both the 
protagonist and the antagonist realize each other. This leads to some loud and 
hectic actions such as running or escaping, which makes it a transparency form 
that is more suitable for terror and horror than for dread. In this form of 
transparency, the viewer engages with the character through sympathizing with 
her/him through the effect of shock that can be experienced at first, which then 
turns into anxiety, that is; worrying about the character. 
Analysis of the case study in this research led the researcher to conclude that 
‘sensorial transparency’ is the transparency form fitting dread the most. This is 
the transparency form that occurs when both characters exist in the same location 
without any barriers, where one of them, which is usually the antagonist, controls 
the space because the other one misses one sense or more. This situation makes 
the surroundings transparent for the antagonist to spot the protagonist, to move 
towards her/him, and to touch her/him at last. Touch proved to be the end point 
in any scene in thriller films as it increases the haptic experience of anticipation. 
The increased potential for touch has been shown to relate to an increase in 
kinesthetic consciousness, which, by turns, increases the potential for a sense of 
corporeality.  
The ‘sensorial transparency’ can be very intense, depending on its style of 
shooting in film, which, are most of the time the first-point view perspective and 
close-up shots, and which, as a consequence, raise the attention of the viewer, 
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therefore creating imaginative and somatic empathy engagement in addition to 
sympathy. All this makes the viewer produce extra intellectual effort to stop the 
antagonist from moving forwards. This awakens the senses and turns the 
kinesthetic experience into a transcendental subjectivity in which the viewer feels 
its body locomotion and experiences the moment corporeally and consciously. 
The possibility of having the three forms of transparency is high and this points 
out a new dimension of transparency; the ‘intensified transparency’. 
 Phenomenology of Surveillance 
In the light of the importance of watching in terms of film, Foucault’s analysis 
of the spatial consequences of the Panopticon prison and the main institutions of 
the modern era were identified as critical relevant. The atmosphere of 
surveillance has been described from another point of view that supports a 
phenomenological way of thinking. As a consequence, this research concluded 
that the phenomenology of surveillance for dread in film is a combination of the 
atmosphere of power, control, and entrapment of the surveyor, and the 
atmospheres of claustrophobia, isolation, and alienation for the surveyed 
person(s). The power and control of the surveyor are divided into ‘sensorial 
control’ and ‘spatial control’. ‘Sensorial control’ expresses the ability of the 
surveyor to control the senses of the surveyed person, which means to see 
without being seen, to hear without being heard, and to touch without being 
touched. Fragmentation of communication, the individual enclosures, the vast 
wide spaces, and the use of glass and other transparent materials are factors 
that support the ‘sensorial control’ and visibility of the surveyor. ‘Spatial control’, 
on the other hand, is shown to be achieved by restricting the movement of the 
prisoners or the workers and ensuring a non-sociable environment. Both the 
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‘spatial control’ and the ‘sensorial control’ create a sensual disengagement that 
turns into a sensual deprivation for the prisoner/worker, which increases the 
vulnerability of the subject and creates disorientation, the enfeeblement of 
resistances, and reduces clear thinking, so as to create fear triggered by that 
atmosphere and a body disassociated from its power to be more destructed and 
alienated body, i.e., a docile body (Foucault 1995). This understanding enabled 
the researcher to look for panoptical forms in film which involve the power and 
control of the surveyor and the isolation of the character and to determine if that 
can, or cannot, create a 'docile-body-viewer'. Therefore, the forms are 
categorized in the thesis into ‘sensorial panoptical forms’ that pertain to the 
senses of the character and ‘spatial panoptical forms’ that relate to the constricted 
atmosphere of the scene. 
The first ‘sensorial panoptical form’ observed in thriller films is ‘someone-is-
watching-note’, which is defined as a ‘textual surveillance’ mode in this thesis, 
which informs that the character is being watched. It reflects the proximity of the 
antagonist and the vulnerability of the protagonist. In view of Merleau-Ponty’s 
logic of existence, this panoptical form is defined to start with ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of who and where the sender is, then turns into a transcendence 
stage that follows the action of the character. This sensorial panoptical form is 
shown to create surprise for the viewer that is experienced as imaginative 
empathy and somatic empathy based on the mimetic relationship with the 
character in addition to aligned sympathy and allegiance sympathy. 
The other sensorial panoptical form is ‘sensorial transparency’ that has been 
identified here. On the basis of the character’s loss of one sense or more, and in 
the light of shooting this panoptical form, which is a subjective point of view from 
the antagonist perspective, ‘sensorial transparency’ is shown here to create a 
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state of shock for the viewer because of the attention it raises, which is 
experienced as pure somatic empathy. As a result, the viewer tries internally to 
stop the antagonist from touching the protagonist, but she/he cannot. All what the 
felt-body does according to fear is expanding the Away!-tendency as if she/he is 
escaping the skin. However, instead, it turns into tension that awakens all the 
senses and constitutes a very affective engagement that increases a sense of 
corporeality and consciousness, which, by turns, increases the embodiment. By 
not escaping the skin, the body looks like the docile body because fear 
disassociates the power of the viewer’s body, which is reflected in a physical 
contraction of the body due to tension, in which it creates a ‘docile-body-viewer’. 
‘Substance transparency’ is defined here to be a form of ‘spatial panoptical 
surveillance’ that occurs as a result of the spatial deprivation that restricts the 
protagonist’s movement because of the ‘seen-through’ materials that separate 
the protagonist from the antagonist. This form of transparency creates shock in 
the beginning, followed by anxiety. Hence, this form of transparency does not 
create a 'docile-body-viewer', but an anxious viewer who sympathizes with the 
character. 
A further spatial panoptical form defined in this thesis is that of the labyrinth. It is 
related to the ‘embedded structures’, e.g., the wall within a wall. Although the 
labyrinth is the opposite of the Panopticon as a result of its spatial deprivation 
that restricts the ‘sensorial control’, but based on the conception of surveillance 
in film, it can be stated that the labyrinth applies the power and control of the 
surveyor and achieves isolation of the character, and, accordingly, the viewer, if 
the scene is shot in a way that reflects empathy. With reference to the logic of 
existence of Merleau-Ponty (2002), following a character who is walking in 
labyrinth starts with ambiguity and indeterminacy. Then, it jumps into the 
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transcendence stage whenever a shock occurs, which mainly happens by effect 
of the experience of doubling and the unintended repetition; when one returns 
back to the first point. This experience raises the attention of the viewer and may, 
and may not, end with a shock. 
The final new form of surveillance identified by this thesis for dread space is the 
‘through-wall surveillance’ or ‘through-floor surveillance’. This form of surveillance 
manifests itself when the protagonist lives all the time behind the wall or under 
the floor of the protagonist. In most of the thriller films discussed, the character 
and the protagonist discover this fact together. This creates a shock followed by 
attention, which means that the protagonist jumps directly to the transcendence 
stage of existence and then moves into the ambiguity and indeterminacy stages. 
Depending on the way of shooting the shock, the viewer may develop sympathy 
or empathy with the character. 
Significance of the Previous Contributions to Architecture and Related Arts 
Pallasmaa (2001) pointed to two different architectures; the architecture of image 
and the architecture of essence. The architecture of image is the one that gives 
less actual encounter with the objects or the buildings. It offers a form only and 
leaves the user as a viewer, not as a participant, unlike the architecture of 
essence. 
What has been grasped from this thesis is that understanding the phenomenon 
in its essence helps in using this understanding in any field. For example, the 
concepts of sympathy and empathy can be used in museums to connect and 
involve the user more with the objects. The differences between people in using 
this understanding can be ascribed to differences in its application, that is, in how 
to make it; through the space itself, or the objects, or the display of the objects. 
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According to that, the theoretical framework that has been used in the 
phenomenal reading can play a significant role in defining the relationship 
between the subject (a user) and the object (a statue, a model, a painting, or even 
the space itself). Understanding how perception, movement, and action work for 
a more corporeal interaction can open up possibilities for directing the users to 
guarantee the lived experience. 
The phenomenology of text, transparency, and surveillance are effective and 
powerful and they can be easily and literally applied in architecture.  
It has been proved that the words, especially the ‘sensorimotor verbs’, have 
power and direct effect and that they end up in amplifying the senses. Does a big 
sign saying: “Open your eyes” in a museum affect the users? According to the 
literature cited in Chapter Six, this verb will open the eyes of the users and create 
ambiguity and indeterminacy of where, and how, to look. 
‘Substance transparency’ can also be literally applied to architecture. How does 
a glass partition affect the user if it is separating many layers of actions or events 
without giving her/him the opportunity to reach them? 
Bernard Tschumi has named the experience of narrow corridors filled with high 
crowd of people as an event of violence. This is very close to what the labyrinth 
creates according to the double and repetition characteristics, and, hence, the 
unintentional returns. Then, one can apply the double experience to add more 
corporeal experience in museums or exhibitions, especially the ones that are 
categorized under experiences. Can adding another passage make the user 
stand a while to choose? If so, then what kind of kinesthetic experience will it 
create? 
 Conclusion 
339 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This research has suggested a theoretical framework for understanding the 
embodiment of the viewer while encountering a dread scene in a thriller film in an 
effort to develop a spatial understanding of the atmosphere of dread. This 
framework has potential for revealing other phenomena in other context. For 
example, researchers may further investigate the phenomenology of descending 
and ascending in a dread scene so as to complement the discussion of the roles 
of movement and inner effort in potentially exhausting the body of the viewer.  
Since so far there is limited integration of theory with practice in film studies, the 
framework suggested by the present study offers an opportunity to researchers 
to apply it to other films and to films of other genres and to assess its applicability 
and generalizability to those films. 
This research determined the role of ‘personal transparency’ in creating surprise 
for the viewer and increasing her/his sympathy with the character. But it did not 
pursue this in greater details because this phenomenon is related to the 
character, not the viewer, meaning, that it is a phenomenon that falls within the 
field of psychoanalysis. This is an opportunity for other researchers to attempt to 
develop this phenomenon from the perspective of psychoanalysis and to try to 
find out how ‘personal transparency’ works and describe its related psychological 
dimensions. The same applies to the ‘digital surveillance’ in film, where other 
researchers can relate it to characters’ performance. 
In architecture, one can apply the framework proposed by this study to test or 
read dread spaces in war museums, memorials, or immersive exhibitions, for 
example, The London Bridge Experience, which are generally designed based 
on narrative, in order to assess the potential embodiment of the subjects in such 
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cases. This may expose various further dimensions and aspects to investigate in 
the engagement process, in the subject’s movement pattern (quick or slow), in 
the overt and implicit actions of the users, or even in their perception of these 
spaces.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Glossary  
Absolute location:  A space without surfaces that belongs to the felt-
body, it can be described as contracted or expanded 
space (Schmitz et al. 2011). 
Absolute Space:  This space is devoid of surfaces and dimensions. It 
is the space of the felt-body that has no surfaces and 
cannot be measured, such as climatic space, the 
space of silence, and the space of the corporeal isles 
(Schmitz et al. 2011). 
Abstract space:  The space that has no meaning, which makes the 
users as spectators only (Lefebvre 1991). 
Act of embodying: a dynamic dimension of embodiment that helps in 
understanding the moment to moment unfolding of 
the experience so as to help the subject to shift to the 
state of embodiment (Hirose 2002) 
Action-Image:  Re-action of the actor to the world of the scene. It has 
two forms: The large form of the action-image is the 
impact that flows from the environment towards the 
actor, the small form of the action-image is the impact 
that flows from the actor into the environment 
(Deleuze 1992). 
Active attention: A process coming from the aesthetic attitude of the 
subject when he takes up some deliberate decisions 
(Hanich 2010).  
Active perception :  the perception that relates to learning, when the 
subject interacts with an object in its ultimate way 
(Macrae et al. 2013; Duncan and McCauley 2008; 
Holl et al. 2007; Whitney 2014).  
Actual body: is the body that reacts to the meaning of the world 
consciously and at the moment (Merleau-Ponty 
2002; Seamon 2017) 
Aesthetic attitude: The attitude comes from the viewer who intends to 
experience a pleasure while watching a film, all what 
he or she does counted as attitude to complete the 
aesthetic experience (Hanich 2010). 
Aesthetic experience: The experience of the pleasure of horror that is 
produced by the aesthetic attitude of the viewer 
(Hanich 2010). 
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Aesthetic object:  The screen when the cinematic experience is 
revealed, the screen becomes from a mere object 
into an aesthetic object (Hanich 2010). 
Aesthetic strategies:   Aim to produce emotions of the same name, as a 
decision made at the film level, to affect the viewer 
and evoke her/his emotions such as surprise, shock, 
and attention (Hanich 2010). 
Affect: A Freudian theory that has been used by many 
philosophers such as Deleuze (1992) as an internal 
phenomenon. Green relates that moment of affect as 
the moment that snatches the body from silence 
(Green 1995) which is not yet named as emotion 
(Matthews 2013). Researchers refer it to a way of 
describing the feeling or the intensity of the 
experience (Bayliss 2010). 
Affection- Image:  The image that refers to the state of emotions and 
fills the gap between action and reaction. Itreflects 
the impact on the character, usually appeared in 
close-up shots (Deleuze 1992) 
Affective Atmospheres:   The ones that create more sensed architecture than 
understood architecture, in other words, they can be 
achieved by revealing smell, touch, movement, and 
walking, or even dark voids, to create memory, 
because creating new sensations creates memories 
(Anderson 2009).  
Affective engagement:  The ultimate engagement with film that happens 
through skin, spreading an affect over the entire body 
and through the expansive Away-Tendency! (Hanich 
2010; Laine 2006). 
Affective experience:   the corporeal affect that is produced kinesthetically 
by muscles, and synaesthetically by the expansion 
and contraction of the felt-body that can change the 
absolute space (Griffero 2014) 
Affective mimicry:  One type of empathy comes from the anticipation of 
fear and is reflected in facial expressions (Hanich 
2010). 
Affordance: Is an ecological psychological term set out by James 
J. Gibson. It describes how people visually perceive 
their environment and considers any resource 
encountered by the subject in the environment such 
as surfaces, objects, substances, and events that 
might provide an opportunity for action (Gibson  
2014). 
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Allegiance sympathy:  To a character causes a form of engagement that 
positions the viewer within the discursive and textual 
frame of the film. is the strongest form of sympathy 
(Smith 1994). 
Ambiguity Is the essence of human existence, where everything 
the subject lives or has in her/his mind has several 
meanings (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Amplitudinal quality of 
movement:  
A spatial aspect that is associated with both the felt 
expansiveness or contractedness of the subject’s 
moving body and the spatial extensiveness or 
contractedness of the subject’s movement, such as 
describing the space as large space, tight space 
(Sheets-Johnstone 2011).  
Analytical perception:   Perception that is based on logic, rational thought 
and the object existence in space, even if there is no 
one to interact with it. It was discussed by the 
Cartesian empiricists and intellectualists  (Merleau-
Ponty 2002). 
Anchor points:  Elements or moments that make the atmosphere 
perceived (Griffero 2014). 
Architecture of essence:  The architecture that is experienced in an embodied 
manner; it projects narratives of culture, history, 
tradition, and human existence, and turns the 
audience into participants (Pallasmaa 2001). 
Architecture of image:  Is the architecture which gives less in the actual 
encounter than in its photography picture; it offers 
mere images of form and leaves the audience as 
spectators only (Pallasmaa 2001). 
Assemblage Theory makes the entities composed of heterogeneous 
elements irreducible to their role within the larger 
assemblage to work together in the museum 
(Waterton and Dittmer 2014). 
Attention: Is considered as an aesthetic strategy. For Merleau-
Ponty, it is a “consciousness in the act of learning”, a 
creative act in terms of the subject’s relationship to 
the world (Merleau-Ponty 2002).  
Axiality:  The axis or axes that the subject use to move 
physically or visually (Yudell 1977).  
Being embodied: Is a static condition under which the subject is part of 
the world (Hirose 2002). 
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Being: a mode of existing, happens when every moment of 
practical acting and knowing takes place to involve 
the subject in the world (Heidegger 1996) 
Be-in-the-world:  An expression for existence and being in the world 
(Heidegger 1996). 
Body schema: is a group of skills and capacities that establish the 
precognitive familiarity of the body with itself and with 
the world it inhabits (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 
1999) 
Bona fide boundaries:  Boundaries established due to an immanent 
qualitative and spatial discontinuity (Griffero 2014). 
Cardinal time:   Is a qualitative experience of time, describes 
temporality that can be described using such 
expressions as ‘creeping’, ‘rushed’ (Sheets-
Johnstone 2011). 
Chiasm: Flesh of thought, or perhaps the thoughts of the flesh, 
because it posits a body capable of autonomous 
sense making and of sub-conscious, pre-reflective 
action, which, in turn, grounds the body within the 
world and increases its consciousness and 
corporeality (Merleau-Ponty et al. 1968). 
Cinematic dread:  A vulnerable character who is slowly and quietly 
entering a dark, forsaken place harboring threat. It 
works under the scenario of “here and now”. The 
strongest form of suspense, and it relates to 
moments in the near future (Hanich 2010). 
Cinematic shock:  Is a highly compressed type of fear that responds to 
a threat of a situation, suddenly and unexpectedly, 
e.g., when a car hits the character suddenly (Hanich 
2010). 
Cinematic Terror:  An anticipatory type of cinematic fear, ‘chase and 
escape scenario, an experience of inner acceleration 
and agitation scenario’  (Hanich 2010). 
Cinesthetic subject:  the subject whose body is affected by the film in order 
to be involved in understanding it and its meaning 
(Sobchack 1992) 
Complete perception:  Is formed by the synthesis of foreground, middle 
ground, and distant view, taken all together, with the 
subjective qualities of material and light (Holl et al. 
2007).  
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Conceived space:  Is the representation and image of the space 
(Lefebvre 1991). 
Conceptual fear knowledge: Any fearful stimuli (a word, an action) that can invoke 
a bodily reaction and enhance subsequent bodily 
reactions (Oosterwijk et al. 2010). 
Consciousness: Is existence for itself. One of the ways to reveal it, the 
act of looking must be renewed, otherwise it falls into 
unconsciousness (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Constant hypothesis:  Cartesian way of thinking, which allocates one 
sensation, and only one, to each stimulus (Merleau-
Ponty 2002). 
Constricted atmosphere:  Atmospheric elements or zones suggest viewing an 
experience of constriction and isolation, such as 
confined spaces, endless spaces, and labyrinths 
(Hanich 2010) 
Corporeal atmospheric 
affections:  
Affections that are not metrical, measurable and 
metaphoric. They occur when the subject is 
connected  corporeally to the atmosphere through 
the corporeal isles, and they can be produced 
kinesthetically and synaesthetically (Griffero 2014).  
Corporeal consciousness: The ultimate experience created by movement and it 
is the last phase in Sheets-Johnstone’s structure of 
movement. It is what happens when the action verb 
‘I can’ turns into ‘I am’. It is what happens when the 
volunteer turns into a person in a situation. It is the 
highest level of existence (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).   
Corporeal isles:  The head, the chest, and the sole of the foot which 
the felt-body identifies itself each time (Schmitz et al. 
2011) 
Cross-modality:  Cooperation of all senses, not only seeing, such that 
they become fleshed-out to make the body feel 
through the skin before the eye (Sobchack 1992) 
Da-sein:  German expression that means being there; to bring 
things close in the sense of bringing them within the 
range of its concern (Heidegger 1996). 
De-distancing:   Moving towards the things to shorten the distance in 
order to create ‘existence and being; Da-sein’ 
(Heidegger 1996). 
Direct horror:  The viewer experiences horror as a frightening and 
overwhelming confrontation with the threatening 
event or monstrous object, directly and in full vision, 
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as in the case in the famous shower scene in Psycho 
(Hanich 2010). 
Directional space:  A pre-geometrical state of motility. It is the starting 
point of a corporeal communication with the 
surrounding environment, which works according to 
a motor suggestion to move, but not yet reduced to 
be a local space. The directional space aligns the 
subject’s movement and is responsible for creating 
felt properties such as the narrowness or vastness of 
the atmosphere so as to create a ‘vector 
atmosphere’. Schmitz’s (1974 to 2005) as cited in 
(Griffero 2014). 
Directionality: To move to the right or to the left, and/or up or down 
to engage with the space in order to create ‘existence 
and being; Da-sein’ (Heidegger 1996). 
Docile bodies: The prisoners bodies according to panoptic power, 
which creates calculated manipulation of the body, 
where discipline increases the forces of the body and 
diminishes these forces; it dissociates power from 
the body, and accordingly it leads to alienation 
(Foucault 1995 p.202). 
Docile-body-viewer: In film, a disturbing and destructive body experience 
because the viewer experiences a deep contraction 
without the possibility to escape the absolute 
location. Usually it is created through the body of the 
antagonist saturated with the protagonist’s body 
reactions. The author. 
Doubling:  The repetition, the illusion of free will when revisit the 
same events every time. It could be literal or 
figurative. It usually relates to the concept of  
alienation, namely, the self and the other, that one 
requires one’s ego and perceives oneself as an 
autonomous and compact self, that is, the ‘I’ (Freud 
2003).it draws attention to a phenomenon (Merleau-
Ponty 2002).  
Duration: The lived moment, the memorable one. Henri 
Bergson’s philosophies in (Deleuze 1992). 
Dynamic fit:  Is the affordance that informs the subject where and 
how to move (Yudell 1977). 
Embedded structures: The structures that integrate from the same category; 
such as walls within walls and floors within floors. 
(The author)  
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Embodiment: As a process, not a result, where the type of 
experience is not an account based on a linear cause 
and effect description of the body apparatus, but an 
indication of the lived body experience, where the 
body is considered as the center of the experiment 
with all its capacities to interact with the environment, 
to exist in the world, ‘here’ and ‘now’ (McCardell 2001 
p.36; Marin and Leder 2013; Bayliss 2010; Hirose 
2002). 
Emotional immersion:  One of the cinematic dread characteristics. The 
viewer expects the threat and imagines the worst. 
Hence, she/he is glued to the screen and captivated 
in an anticipatory type of fear (Hanich 2010). 
Empathy:  The viewer feels with the character (Hanich 2010). 
Encounter:  Meeting between the self and the unknown 
(stranger) that involves surprise and conflict (Ahmed 
2000). 
Enmeshing Experience:  Atmosphere as a synthesis of foreground, middle 
ground, and distant view with the interlocking of time, 
light material, and details, in addition to the subject to 
create the whole where no one can distinguish the 
individual elements (Holl et al. 2007). 
Environment:  Always exists, regardless of whether there is, or 
there is not, a subject to engage with (Seamon 2017) 
Event:  Bringing something into being in a period of time in 
order to create a new experience for the subject. It 
can be revealed through some phenomenal factors 
such as shock and surprise (Mølbak 2012). 
Expansive Away!-tendency:   The expansion that occurs when subject 
experiences fear. If the subject cannot escape the 
physical location, it will transfer to its felt-body, as if it 
wants to escape the skin, but it cannot (Schmitz 
concept elaborated by (Hanich 2010).  
Expression: Is an account of meaning in action (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). 
Fear: an emotion that carries a sense of personal 
phenomenological detachment of feeling, which 
becomes separated because it centripetally 
constricts the lived body  (Hanich 2010; Schmitz et 
al. 2011) 
Felt-body: The opposite of the physical body, it concerns 
sensations, Husserl and Schmitz focus on felt-body 
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more than the physical body (Husserl 2012; Schmitz 
et al. 2011) 
Fiat boundaries:  Boundaries of the atmosphere established by the 
subject’s cognitive activity dependent on the 
perception (Griffero 2014). 
Field of condensation:  What the anchor points create to make the 
atmosphere perceived (Griffero 2014). 
Flow Theory:  When the subject’s action and awareness merge for 
a more an expanded experience; for example, in 
video games, the player is unified with the game in a 
way that keeps her/him aware of the contextual 
situation, and she/he is not lost, but expanded and 
aware (Bayliss 2010). 
Formal violence:  Deals with conflicts between objects and forms, 
which take place when the forms attack each other 
geometrically to create some gaps (Tschumi 1994).  
Gaze: The look that focused on the identification of the self 
with sexual interest and acquisition of sexual 
differences (Hayward 2013). 
Giving space:  Is the yielding of places to arrange and prepare an 
openness in which things belong together and make 
dwelling possible, and accordingly, the space is 
discovered in the world (Heidegger 1996). 
Grounded cognition 
theories: 
Theories predict that processing conceptual or 
linguistic cognition of emotion may be accompanied 
by bodily reactions (Oosterwijk et al. 2010).   
Habit: A group of skills that are ready to anticipate the world 
prior to the formation of thoughts and judgment 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002) 
Habitual body: Is a body that performs the meaning unconsciously on the 
basis of the familiar situation (Merleau-Ponty 2002).  
Haptic perception:  Is a mode of seeing through all modes located on the 
skin and therefore is a mode of bodily consciousness 
and corporeality (Laine 2006; Marks 2000). 
Haptic sound:  When vision and sound work in union, they create a 
corporeal experience that is experience internally, 
not semiotically or interrogatively,  (Marks 2000). 
Haptic vision:  When vision is “twinned with touch, in discerning 
texture, movement, three dimensional form and even 
kinetic energy, developed by Deleuze and Guattari, 
and used then by Sobchack and Marks. The haptic 
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vision is tactile, kinaesthetic, and it functions like 
touch (Sobchack 1992; Marks 2000).  
Ideomotor actions:  The action that is created when the expectation 
doesn’t fit the real. Preston illustrates if a soccer fan 
watches a player running toward the goal and then 
stopping, the expected action is for the player to kick 
the ball. If the action does not fit the expectation, then 
an error signal is generated in the mind of the 
subject, resulting in an actual kicking movement 
being generated by the subject (Preston 2007). 
Imaginative empathy:  The empathy which emerges when the viewer takes 
over the perspective of the character so as to 
imagine the character from inside and feel what 
she/he feels at the moment (Hanich 2010). 
Imagined act:  An object or a theme of the subject’s consciousness 
that is perceived in the felt-body, felt in corporeal 
isles (Ierna et al. 2011). 
Imitative contagion:  An infectious, though often unconscious, response to 
atmosphere that primes subjects to act in certain 
ways (Thrift 2008) 
Immersion: The merging of the subject with the object, where 
there is no distinction between them; the movement 
and action happen unconsciously. Merleau-Ponty 
used it as a term to describe the lived embeddedness 
of human beings in the world in which they find 
themselves (Seamon 2015) 
Indeterminacy: “[E]xistence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its 
fundamental structure, and in so far as it is the very 
process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on 
meaning… in so far as it is the act of taking up a de 
facto situation” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196). 
Ipesity of the thing:  When each aspect of the thing falls to our perception, 
is only an invitation to perceive beyond it as a 
moment in the perceptual process (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). 
Kinesthesia:  An awareness of body in space while movement, and 
it is a sensation of the perception of motion; a 
perception of one’s own body, through a muscular 
effect felt in its limbs and muscles (Sheets-Johnstone 
2011). 
Kinesthetic consciousness:  The consciousness developing when the spatio-
temporal aspects of movement awaken the senses 
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and the subject transforms her/his attention to 
movement (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
Kinesthetic experience:  A dynamic process that evolves during movement or 
when one is about to move, where the body brings a 
certain play of forces to life to encounter the world. 
Sheets-Johnstone have spatial and temporal 
qualities and aspects that have the ability to affect 
the senses and the corporeality. Sheets-Johnstone 
identified four essential qualities of movement: 
tensional, projectional, linear, and amplitudinal 
qualities (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
Knowledge-bringing event:  A process of perception, where the key is in 
describing knowledge, not constructing it (Merleau-
Ponty 2002). 
Korper: In German: Material and Physical body 
Leib: In German: the felt-body  
Linear quality of movement:  Has to do with the paths that the subject senses while 
describing the process of movement such as linear, 
curved, twisted, diagonal, and zig-zag (Sheets-
Johnstone 2011). 
Literal transparency:  Which is an inherent quality of substance, that of 
being penetrable to air and light, as in a glass curtain 
wall (Rowe and Slutzky 1963). 
Lived space:  The space that provides conditions for creative social 
practice to have the associational meanings and 
symbols, it include subject-object, mental-material, 
and imagined-real spaces (Lefebvre 1991), and 
depth, movement, and meaning directions, are great 
affective entities for creating it  (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). 
Local Space:  A space which is founded on relative dimensions 
devoid of their own features like surfaces, lines, and 
distance (Schmitz et al. 2011). 
Locomotion:  The awareness of one’s own motion in the world and 
interior flux, and a revolution of being other than 
changing position in place or displacement (Merleau-
Ponty et al. 968). 
Logic of existence:  Three stages for being: ambiguity, indeterminacy, 
and transcendence (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Making room:  Is the yielding of places to arrange and prepare an 
openness in which things belong together and make 
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dwelling possible, and accordingly, the space is 
discovered in the world (Heidegger 1996). 
Material body: The physical body  
Mirror stage:  An idea drawn from the theories of Freud and Lacan 
about image mimicry that works at the level of the 
unconscious mind (Hayward 2013). 
Modern scopic regimes:  Any agenda encourages the power of vision (Elliott 
2011). 
Moments: The spaces that come out through inhabitation where 
memories fixed to places (Lefebvre 1991). 
Motivation: A continuous unconscious process of a balance in 
the body orientation that adjusts it to integrate 
experience and engage with the environment, it 
describes the unity of movement and perception 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002).  
Motor mimicry:  One type of empathy, when the viewer mimics the 
muscular actions of the character, which can have a 
tension or relaxing effect, or even the character’s 
breathing (Hanich 2010). 
Motor resonance:  Regards any movement in the muscles of the body 
(Foroni and Semin 2009). 
Movement-image: A centered set or ensemble of variable elements 
which act and react on each other. Deleuze presents 
time through the medium of motion and he created 
Perception-Image, Affection-Image and Action –
Image (Deleuze 1992). 
Natural attitude of 
movement:  
 It is the physical change in the location of particular 
object between two points, where under the absence 
of movement the subject will be at rest. It is the 
ordinary way of being-in-the-world.  (Husserl 2012). 
Natural perception:   This form of perception refers to the subject, not to 
the object, and follows the experience of the subject 
based on What the subject sees or hears. If anything 
is not seen, this mean it doesn’t exist (Merleau-Ponty 
2002). 
New-Phenomenology:  Schmitz’s phenomenology that relates to the felt-
body (Schmitz et al. 2011) 
Objective feelings:  A halo in determined objects, and are felt among one 
another, such as the bliss of an evening sky (Griffero 
2014) 
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Ordinal time:  Quantitative description of time that disrupts the 
qualitative dynamic experience. It can be described 
by such expressions as now, at some time, lately, 
and just now (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).  
Overt acts:  Acts that are created in a similar way according to 
the situation, such as smiling or breathing (Preston 
2007). 
Panoptic power:  The effect achieved through the realization that one 
is subjected to the gaze (Foucault 1995 p.203). 
Perceived space:  The empirical, measurable, and map-able 
phenomenon. It is what an eye can describe. It refers 
to both the built and the natural environments  
(Lefebvre 1991). 
Perception of perception:  The perception-image when using subjective and 
objective shots in combination, in order to let the 
audience perceive what the character perceives 
(Deleuze 1992). 
Perception-image:  Deleuze (1992) defined this as ensemble of 
elements which act on a center and which have a 
relation with it (Deleuze 1992). 
Perceptual consciousness: The perception that is integrated with consciousness, 
where the subject knows himself/herself perceiving 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Perceptual field:  “[T]he perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle 
of something else, it always forms part of a ‘field’” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.4) 
Personal transparency:  Is an intangible form of transparency that stems from 
the close relationship between the protagonist and 
the antagonist. The author 
Phenomenal 
phenomenology:  
A method created by Shīrāzī (2013) , which is a first-
person phenomenology describing the Langen 
Foundation Museum designed by Tadao Ando, 
which distinguished with some characteristics based 
on mixed, comprehensive phenomenological 
theories that describe architecture for the purpose of 
making the reader as traveler perceives and feels, 
with all the senses, Shīrāzī’s experience (Shīrāzī 
2013). 
Phenomenal transparency:  Which is an inherent quality of organization, which its 
experience and layering work as it is transparent 
(Rowe and Slutzky 1963). 
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Phenomenal zones:  Phenomenon things that reveal themselves in the 
context, such as stairs, doors, corridors (Shīrāzī 
2013). 
Phenomenology from 
Within 
To have a comprehensive reading of one 
phenomenon, through taking one whole case study 
instead of having different phenomenological  
concerns (Husserl as in (Shīrāzī 2013). 
Phenomenology of Event:  Can be created by means of an experience between 
the subject and the object. The subject may have an 
experience, but in order to create the event, Mølbak 
suggests creating ‘the’ experience which the subject 
undergoes, not the experience she/he has. He 
considers surprise, shock, and similar experiences 
are important factors to create ‘the’ experience 
(Mølbak 2012). 
Phenomenology of practice: Aims to explain, interpret, and highlight phenomena 
and aims to open up possibilities for creating 
formative relations between things, being and acting 
(van Manen 2007) 
Place: Where one perceives the memory, the fear and 
desire, the value and meaning, it offers means 
highlighting that the subject is always immersed in its 
world that makes it a lived body (Seamon 2017), it is 
any environmental locus that gathers human 
experiences, actions, and meanings spatially and 
temporally (Seamon 2017; Fiddler 2007; Lefebvre 
1991; Heidegger 1996; Pallasmaa 2001). 
Pluralization:  Collaboration of the dynamics such as temperature, 
weather, lighting, and other sensorial motifs to 
thicken the atmosphere (Labelle 2011) 
Post-modern scopic 
regimes: 
Any agenda encourages the other senses beside 
vision (Elliott 2011). 
Present-at-hand:  The tools that are perceived as tools, with 
consciousness of the tool and the action (Heidegger 
1996). 
Primary level:   A sense experience that precedes its division 
among other senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002).  
Programmatic violence: Is related to occasions when actions, events, and 
programs, by accident or design, serve evil purposes 
like designing narrow corridors for a big crowd of 
people (Tschumi 1994). 
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Projectional quality of 
movement:  
Is the description which Sheets-Johnstone gives to 
the effort produced, e.g., ‘a sharp and even striding’ 
or ‘flat but heavy clumping’ (Sheets-Johnstone 
2011). 
Proprioception: An awareness of the body in space, as a sense that 
provides the perceiver with a sense of locomotion in 
stillness, a sense of balance and position (Merleau-
Ponty 2002). 
Prospective looking:  The looking where the object is the final stage of the 
subject’s action of focusing (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Quasi-things: As a situational constraint demonstrated by motor 
reactions and traced or suggested by the situation 
itself, they provide an accessible aesthetic and 
phenomenological account of feelings based on the 
paradigm of atmospheres. The term created 
originally by Schmitz in 1978, but Griffero extended it 
(Griffero 2014; Griffero 2017). 
Ready-to-hand:  When tools are used as extension to the body such 
as the blind’s cane or the mouse of the computer. 
The subject unconsciously deals with and focus on 
the action only (Heidegger 1996). 
Relational image:  The words that may induce behavioral patterns once 
they are spotted (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Relative location:  Subject’s position in geometrical space (Schmitz et 
al. 2011). 
Representation:  Has been used in psychology to express the pattern 
of activation in the body and the brain that 
corresponds to a particular state that attempts to 
repeat the same pattern (Preston 2007). 
Retrospective looking:  The looking that will present itself in its own 
appearance and as the stimulus, the motive, or the 
prime mover of the process from the beginning 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Sensation empathy: Happens when the viewer replicates the sensation of 
the character for example when a hot needle is 
pierced in the character’s eye (Hanich 2010). 
sensorial control:  A notion that focuses on the power of making the 
subjects always accessible by entrapping and 
interpreting the senses of the surveyed personnel in 
watching and hearing, and sometimes through 
touching them. The author. 
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Sensorial transparency:  In film, it corresponds to a temporary or permanent 
loss of a sense, which makes the character 
reachable and touchable because of that missing 
sense it could be sight transparency or audible 
transparency. Both protagonist and antagonist are 
located in the same space without separated 
barriers. The author. 
Sensorimotor verb:  Any action verb that works on the senses such as 
“open your eyes”. It creates a cognitive perception 
and a somatic unconscious reaction that, in 
reciprocation, can amplify the sense of sight. The 
author 
Sensual disengagement:  Is achieved when the body experiences ‘non-
synched’ senses and/or the ‘not-fit’ body in the space 
that should be in somewhere else. This 
disengagement creates a psychological 
compression to be turned assault on the senses 
(Hancock and Jewkes 2011). 
Shintai:  Means the union of flesh and spirit to acknowledge 
the world at the same time of acknowledging the self 
(Ando 1995 as cited in (Shīrāzī 2013). 
Shock:  An aesthetic strategy, that bursts into the scene 
suddenly and lasts only briefly, and the moment of 
shock is rooted in the present (Hanich 2010). 
Significance core: The property that one can distinguish the sense 
according to (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Sinaesthesias: Metaphoric and not measurable qualities that have 
the synthetic nature, they create corporeal affections 
that can only be compared by language, such as 
sharp noise (Griffero 2014). 
Situation: An expression of being, of existence, Merleau-Ponty 
says: “which a moment ago I voluntarily maintained, 
now becomes my very being”. He also considers it 
as a horizon of significance, where the sensory 
system gives a certain theme and style to look 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Skin: Is a medium of intersubjective connection that 
structures the perception beyond the inside and 
outside and gives the shape of affective engagement 
with a film (Laine 2006). 
Somatic empathy:  The empathy that works with the body physically, it 
has three types: sensation, motor mimicry, and 
affective mimicry (Hanich 2010). 
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Sonsign:  As a “pure sensory image” that signals the collapse 
of the sensory motor process and seeks other paths 
towards filmic involvements. Such as the sound of 
the birds in The Birds (Hitchcock 1963) invites the 
viewer to experience a film in a more sensual way as 
it spreads between the viewer and the film (Deleuze 
1992) 
Space:  areas and volumes and relates more to the sense of 
the geometry of an area with no emotions related to 
(Fiddler 2007; Pallasmaa 2001) 
Spatial attachment :  One of the interlocking functions for alignment 
sympathy, related to the capacity of the narration to 
restrict itself to the actions of a single character 
(Smith 1994). 
Spatial Control:  Creating boundaries in space is what guides the 
movement of the users and restrict them as well. The 
author.  
Spatial immersion:  One of the cinematic dread characteristics. Although 
the visual access in dread scenes is often strongly 
restricted, but the filmic space plays a crucial role as 
an atmosphere to suck the viewer in, in addition to 
that, it has movement into or through space (Hanich 
2010). 
Spatiality: One way to increase the existentiality in place, and it 
is fulfilled through movement in general and through 
movement in different directions to create different 
viewpoints and eventually this creates spatiality 
(Heidegger 1996). 
State of shock:  A state related to prisoners, when sensual 
deprivation causes the loss of critical capacity, 
disorientation, enfeeblement of resistance, and 
makes thinking to be less clear (Klein 2010). 
Static fit:  Is the affordance that informs the subject where and 
how to sit (Yudell 1977). 
Structure: Is defined by Landes as a whole whose parts cannot 
be defined independently of their place within that 
whole. It points to a certain unity or internal harmony 
that is held by a system. When it relates to Merleau-
Ponty, it is always connected to consciousness 
(Landes 2013; Merleau-Ponty 2002).  
Structure of movement:  Defined by Sheets-Johnstone that tells movement 
has a qualitative nature. It is divided into four phases; 
kinesthetic experience, transcendental subjectivity, 
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kinesthetic consciousness, and corporeal 
consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
Structure of Perception : Is the structure of the seen and the structure of 
subject’s consciousness, where this combination 
guides the subject to grasp what perception is and to 
describe the essence of perception (Merleau-Ponty 
2002) 
Subjective access:  One of the interlocking functions for alignment 
sympathy,  relates to the degree of access the viewer 
has to the subjectivity of characters, (Smith 1994). 
Subjective treatment shot:  The shot that shows first point perspective when the 
camera movement represents the eyes of the 
character (Hitchock1995). 
Substance transparency:  A situation when the protagonist and antagonist exist 
in the same space but are separated by a transparent 
obstacle that allows them to see, hear, smell, and, 
sometimes, touch each other. The author 
Suggested Horror:  Relies on imagining violence or a monster through 
verbal description, sound effects, or blurry vision 
such as the scene in Unbreakable (Hanich 2010). 
Surprise: An aesthetic strategy that is not a type of fear since 
the viewer does not in every case of surprise respond 
to something threatening (Hanich 2010). 
Sympathy:  The viewer feels for the character (Hanich 2010). 
Synaesthetic experience:  The experience that is created according to the 
sensory experience that is felt once without the ability 
to distinguish the sense, and it is called as 'synthetic 
experience'  it speaks directly to all senses at the 
same time at primary level, a sense experience that 
precedes its division among other senses (Merleau-
Ponty 2002). 
Synaesthetic nature:  When the object speaks directly to all senses 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002) 
Synaesthetic Perception:  Perceiving the object directly with all senses and, 
then, at a subsequent stage, the subject can 
distinguish the appropriate sense. this perception is 
responsible for creating the ambiguity of experience 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Synaesthetic subject:  Describing the spectator as a site of reception, where 
its sensorium can provide visual images with a 
multisensory and synaesthetic thickness. The body 
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of the spectator is actively involved in the creation of 
meaning instead of being passively affected by the 
film on the basis of the cross-modality of the senses 
(Sobchack 1992). 
Synesthesia: Is the perception of one sensation by another modality, 
such as the ability to distinguish colors by feel. The yellow 
color, for example, is associated with male procreative 
power and with the merry melody of the flute (Marks 
2000 p.213). 
Synthetic experience: The same as ‘synaesthetic experience’. 
Tactile values:  Qualities that relate some visual images to the 
knowledge and experience of the flesh and skin. It is 
stimulative of the sense of touch (Samuels 1981).  
Temporal immersion:  One of the cinematic dread characteristics. The 
dread scenes are much more extended than scenes 
of shock and horror owing to that the viewer 
experiences the threat to the same extent to which 
the character in the film does (Hanich 2010). 
Tensional quality :  A temporal aspect of movement, relates to the sense 
of effort since any effort to be produced (e.g., walking 
or lifting) awakens the kinetic energy that drives the 
movement of the subject (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
Thing: He bridge that can gather the environment; the earth, 
sky, divinities, and mortals (Heidegger 1996). In this 
thesis it also refer to any element that affect the 
space. Such as staircase, wall, or even objects that 
affect the atmosphere and gather the environment. 
Transcendence: Is the process by which existence takes up to its own 
account and transforms from a volunteer into a 
situation (Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
Transcendental 
subjectivity:  
Is then the second phase in the structure of 
movement that occurs when the senses are evoked 
and heightened (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). 
Unintended repetition: It occurs when someone spots the same thing from 
another place, by finding the same reference point 
which makes the body aware of repetition. It creates 
confusion and loss of bearings and leads to uncanny 
(Freud 2003). 
Vacant space:  Reality of the lived experience in prisons’ cells 
(Fiddler 2007). 
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Vector atmosphere:  the vast and narrow atmosphere that is created from 
the directional space, for which can be described as 
unilateral, omnilateral, centrifugal, centripetal, or 
undecided atmosphere Schmitz’s (1974 to 2005) as 
cited in (Griffero 2014). 
Vital drive: Corporeal dynamics from expansion and contraction 
on the felt-body (Schmitz et al. 2011). 
Voyeurism: The act of viewing the activities of other people 
unbeknown to them. It usually refers observing 
unsuspecting people with fantasies that may or may 
not include sexual activities (Hayward 2013; Sadock 
and Sadock 2007). 
Work of art:  Merleau-Ponty looks at the body of humans as a 
work of art because of the body’s capabilities to 
negotiate with all the potentials surrounding it such 
as body-schema and habit (Merleau-Ponty 2002).  
 
